Fin/Inv

In Folge der Immobilien-, Kredit-, Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise sind in den USA seit Ende 2006 insgesamt 355 Mortgage Lender, Hypothekenspezialbanken, Pleite gegangen! Nicht nur Hypothekenvermittler, auch die Home Builder, 82 große Bauunternehmen, haben die platzende Immobilienblase seit 2006 nicht überlebt. Im gleichen Zeitraum sind insgesamt 109 bei der Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) versicherte Banken Pleite gegangen.

Am Freitag zog die US-Einlagenversicherung weitere 4 Banken aus dem Verkehr, damit erhöht sich die Zahl der US-Pleitebanken auf 81 in 2009! Eine der vier bankrotten Banken ist die Guaranty Bank of Austin aus Texas mit einer Bilanzsumme von 13 Mrd. US-Dollar! Dies ist die zweitgrößte Pleite gemessen an den betroffenen Vermögenswerten in 2009 und der 10-größte Bankrott in der Geschichte der FDIC! Die 4 Pleiten vom Freitag belasten die Rücklagen des Einlagensicherungsfond der FDIC alleine um 3,262 Mrd. Dollar!

> Im Langfristchart seit 1934, die Pleite gegangenen US-Banken. Die Anzahl der 81 Pleiteinstitute in 2009 sieht fast harmlos aus, 1989 während der Savings and Loan Crisis (Sparkassenkrise), gingen gewaltige 531 Banken bankrott. Allerdings waren damals 163,957 Mrd. Dollar an Assets (Vermögenswerten) betroffen, im Jahr 2008 waren es 371,945 Mrd. Dollar. 2009 sind bis jetzt durch die Pleiten Assets in Höhe von 88,356 Mrd. Dollar betroffen. <

> Das Volumen der Assets der bankrott gegangenen Banken seit 1975. <

Die bisher größte Banken-Pleite einer bei der FDIC versicherten Bank war am 25. September 2008. Die US-Sparkasse Washington Mutual (WAMU) ging mit Vermögenswerten von mehr als 307 Mrd. US-Dollar und 188 Mrd. Dollar an Einlagen bankrott. Die WAMU wurde zwar von der FDIC geschlossen, die Vermögenswerte, Verbindlichkeiten und Einlagen gingen für nur 1,9 Mrd. Dollar an JPMorgan Chase. Es entstanden keine Kosten für die Einlagenversicherung. Die zweitgrößte Pleite war am 11. Juli 2008. Die Hypothekenbank IndyMac ging mit Vermögenswerten in Höhe von 32 Mrd. Dollar und Einlagen von 19,06 Mrd. Dollar bankrott. Diese Pleite verursachte für die FDIC bis zu 8 Mrd. Dollar an Kosten. Am 14. August 2009 erfolgte mit der Colonial Bank of Montgomery, die bisher sechstgrößte Pleite in der Geschichte des US-Einlagenversicherung. Die Colonial Bank wies eine Bilanzsumme von 25 Mrd. Dollar aus und hatte Einlagen in Höhe von 20 Mrd. Dollar. Mit immerhin 2,8 Mrd. Dollar musste die FDIC aus dem Einlagensicherungsfond einspringen.

Nach den letzten Daten der FDIC waren im 1. Quartal 2009 8'246 Finanzinstitute bei der FDIC versichert. Die Vermögenswerte der versicherten Finanzinstitute betrugen gewaltige 13,54163 Billionen Dollar! Unfassbare 203,38 Billionen Dollar betrug insgesamt das nominale Derivate-Volumen der bei der FDIC versicherten Finanzinstitute!

Von den 8,954 Billionen Dollar an Deposits (Kundeneinlagen) versichert die FDIC die Einlagen in Höhe von 250'000 Dollar je Konto, insgesamt 4,831 Billionen Dollar. Diese Einlagenversicherung ist absolut lächerlich, denn die FDIC hatte per 1. Quartal nur noch 13,007 Mrd. Dollar Rücklagen im Einlagensicherungsfond (Deposit Insurance Fund - DIF), mit denen sie die 4,831 Billionen Dollar an Kundeneinlagen garantiert. Ein ganz klarer Fall eines nackten Kaisers. Der Mindestreservesatz (DIF Reserve Ratio), das Verhältnis von zu versichernden Einlagen und den noch zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln aus dem Einlagensicherungsfond der FDIC fiel schon im 1. Quartal 2009 auf nur noch 0,27%!

> Die geschrumpften Rücklagen des DIF! <

Die Realität ist, die FDIC ist selber Pleite und braucht ein staatliches Bailout! Denn seit Ende des 1. Quartals 2009 haben die weiteren 60 Bankenpleiten die FDIC und deren Rücklagen im Einlagensicherungsfond mit 19,3 Mrd. Dollar belastet!

Die FDIC kann aus ihren Rücklagen seriöser Weise überhaupt nicht Kundeneinlagen in Höhe von 4,831 Billionen Dollar garantieren. Damit nicht genug, im Rahmen der umfangreichen staatlichen Liquiditäts- und Kreditgarantien übernimmt die FDIC über das Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program - Debt Guarantee (TLGP-DGP) auch weitere Garantien für unbesicherte Bankkredite, Interbankgeschäfte und Anleiheemissionen in Höhe von 940 Mrd. Dollar. Die mit einer TLGP-Garantie versehenen Bonds profitieren von niedrigeren Refinanzierungskosten. Das Ponzi Scheme komplettierend trägt die FDIC über das Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TLGP-TAG) noch unbegrenzten Garantien für 684 Mrd. Dollar an nicht zinstragenden Transaktionenkonten (in der Regel Girokonten)!

Wie bei einem so maroden Bankensystem und den auf nichts basierenden Ponzi-Garantien der FDIC immer noch nahezu 100% der Kunden Vertrauen in das US-Bankensystem haben, ist schon "fast" ein Phänomen!

Meredith Whitney, Banking Analyst: 300 Banks to Fail

Quelle: Fdic.gov

Querschuesse-Forum

Kontakt: info.querschuss@yahoo.de

Hello All

This is a long video but its well worth watching. Harvard professor Elizabeth Warren does a wonderful job describing how we are slowly becoming a two class system in this country.

The bankers have essentially destroyed the middle class by stuffing them with oodles of debt. Families in this country now need two jobs in order to just survive.

One thing to note in this speech is that the cost of owning a home has risen by 76% versus a generation ago.

Whats interesting is this lecture was given in 2007. Its amazing to see how Dr. Warren's concerns have now become a reality.

Enjoy!

by Bruce Webb

The part of the blogosphere that caters to the Progressive Left is hardening its position around the Public Option, it has become a non-negotiable point, the line in the sand, the "are you with us? or against us?" line. And I don't have any problems with that position as a matter of strategy and tactics, the Public Option is much better policy than any proposal that would leave it out, and I don't think it has the political risks that the appeasers believe it does. So 'Fight, Fight, Fight for Old PO!' can be our fight song.

But this does not mean that everyone who argues that life would be worth living even without a Public Option is some treasonous Quisling intent on selling us all out to the insurance companies, as the risk of introducting French into the discussion I suggest the situation is more nuanced than that.

Ultimately I don't think we will ever get overall cost-controls in Health Care in place without the PO because only it allows you to attack both of the cost centers, that which comes from the providers and that which comes from the insurers. Now these two sectors of health care are both natural allies and mortal enemies. They are allies in that insurers would be glad to sell coverage to everyone, and providers would be happy to charge for giving care to everyone, meaning each has a lot to gain from mandated insurance coverage. But at that point their interests diverge, under current business models doctors and hospitals gain most when they can supply ever more and ever more expensive treatment, while the financial incentives of insurance companies work in exactly the opposite direction.

Which largely explains the current state of confusion with insurers and providers sometimes pulling in unison, as often in opposition and sometimes at cross purposes. What the Public Option provides is a place to pull from against the providers or from the insurers, and from time to time with one or the other.

Ultimately the Public Option will be bargaining with providers either directly or by accepting some sort of industry wide average itself decided by a bargaining process. too much is at stake to simply allow providers to declare a unilateral pricing monopoly. however large or small its market share may get and no matter how much latitude it is given to bargain as an independent agent the PO will add some pull against providers. On the other hand depending on that latitude it will equally have a smaller or greater pull against the other insurers on the basis of price of insurance.

So depending on how much freedom it is given the Public Option has the potential to help control cost growth in both sectors that of providing health care and that of insuring that families can pay for that care as needed. Without it the situation is a lot more dicey. But as my title suggests not fatal. And the reason why is something I blogged back on July 28th under the title HR3200 Sed 116: Golden Bullet? or Smoking Gun?

In the bluntest terms Sec 116 imposes profit controls on the insurance companies and would do so even in the absence of the Public Option. Its existence explains why Republican leadership are signalling, nay shouting, that they will not accept Health Care reform period even if reformers surrendered the Public Option, even if they abandoned the very weak beer that is Co-Ops. The Left by and large is convinced that giving up the PO simply hands the keys to the castle over to the insurance companies with the rest of us tied up in chains at their mercy, that they can just merrily raise rates at their whim. Well no and that control is hidden in plain view in the first two sentences of the Section.

SEC. 116. ENSURING VALUE AND LOWER PREMIUMS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—A qualified health benefits plan shall meet a medical loss ratio as defined by the Commissioner. For any plan year in which the qualified health benefits plan does not meet such medical loss ratio, QHBP offering entity shall provide in a manner specified by the Commissioner for rebates to enrollees of payment sufficient to meet such loss ratio.

(b) BUILDING ON INTERIM RULES.—In implementing subsection (a), the Commissioner shall build on the definition and methodology developed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the amendments made by section 161 for determining how to calculate the medical loss ratio. Such methodology shall be set at the highest level medical loss ratio possible that is designed to ensure adequate participation by QHBP offering entities, competition in the health insurance market in and out of the Health Insurance Exchange, and value for consumers so that their premiums are used for services.

Insurance companies and their allies/lackies in Congress insist that the House Bill is simply designed to force private health care insurers out of business. Well this claim is not the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, but there is no question that it has some truthiness floating around it. Sec 116 guts the old business model which was based on insuring care to people who may not ever need it and denying it to those who had a proven need for it. Instead under this rule no care provision means no profits instead you have to rebate them to the insurees.

The CBO analysis of HR3200 that showed that it would only cover 10 million people by 2019 implicitly assumed that insurance companies would play fair and just go along with these profit controls. I am not so convinced on this point, and figure that many companies will just abandon those market components that become this profit constrained. Which is why we will need a Public Option to pick up those abandoned market sectors. And sooner is better than later. But ultimately a bill WITHOUT a PO but WITH Sec 116 and the other protections of Sec 111-115 puts us on a path that starts by controlling profits.

So by all means "Fight, fight, fight for Old PO!", that doesn't mean that people who suggest losing a battle means losing the war are traitors to their Alma Mater.

Robert Waldmann

This seems important to me.


Small business representatives told [Senator] Snowe [R-Miane] that they were opposed to any mandates that came without a public option and that such an alternative was desperately needed for small business, which can't afford the rising cost of health insurance for their employees.


In less good news, Snowe is still enthusiastic about the worst tax ever

"She added that she was considering requiring business with more than 50 employees to pay 100 percent of the cost of subsidies for their employees' health insurance."

Right can't let people who need the work compete for jobs with people who don't.

From CNBC's Diana Olick:

Just like in retail, where the big bargain stores are showing gains, only the low end of the housing market is moving. ... I spoke with Spencer Rascoff of Zillow.com today, who claims, "this is not a real recovery." Higher sales on one end of the market do not a full recovery make.

More mortgage borrowers are falling behind:

More than one in every eight homeowners with a mortgage was behind on home loan payments or in some stage of foreclosure at the end of the second quarter, as mounting unemployment aggravated the housing crisis, the Mortgage Bankers Association said on Thursday. ...

Jay Brinkmann, chief economist at the MBA, said signs were growing that mortgage performance is being affected more by unemployment than by the structure of risky home loans, indicating a new stage in the foreclosure crisis...

While the proportion of foreclosures started on borrowers with subprime adjustable-rate mortgages fell dramatically in the second quarter, foreclosure starts on traditional prime fixed-rate loans saw a dramatic increase.