Tagesarchiv für den 03.10.2009

Embarrassing reflection of our administrative incompetency as a nation being  discussed at the NYT’s In Transit blog: Chicago’s Loss: Is Passport Control to Blame?:

“Among the toughest questions posed to the Chicago bid team this week in Copenhagen was one that raised the issue of what kind of welcome foreigners would get from airport officials when they arrived in this country to attend the Games. Syed Shahid Ali, an I.O.C. member from Pakistan, in the question-and-answer session following Chicago’s official presentation, pointed out that entering the United States can be “a rather harrowing experience.”

Note that these are concerns I raised 5 years ago.

As someone who regularly travels both domestically and abroad, I have no doubt that this is a very serious issue of anyone wanting to visit the USA. We have the least user-friendly entry of any country I have ever been to. Cory Doctorow noted the insane fingerprints-and-photos regime at the US Border.

I do not know why Chicago lost, but I have no doubt that Customs & Immigration is at least part of the answer.

Ahhh, the Bush administration: The gift that keeps on giving . . .

>

Previously:
Is the balance of scientific power shifting? (January 16th, 2004)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2004/01/is-the-balance-of-scientific-power-shifting/

Economics, Security, and the Decline of the US Creative Class (October 6th, 2004)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2004/10/economics-security-and-the-decline-of-the-us-creative-class/

Losing Our Intellectual Edge (December 22nd, 2004)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2004/12/losing-our-intellectual-edge/

Global Competition for Talent (June 5th, 2005)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2005/06/global-competition-for-talent/

U.S. dominance in science and engineering at risk (July 23rd, 2005)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2005/07/us-dominance-in-science-and-engineering-at-risk/

Source:
Chicago’s Loss: Is Passport Control to Blame?
MICHELLE HIGGINS
In Transit, October 2, 2009, 2:51 PM
http://intransit.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/chicagos-loss-is-passport-control-to-blame/

This is an update to a 2007 post: Home Builders and Homeownership Rates1

From 1995 to 2005, the U.S. homeownership rate climbed from 64% to 69%, or about 0.5% per year.

Homeownership Rate Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The first graph shows the homeownership rate since 1965. Note the scale starts at 60% to better show the recent change.

The reasons for the change in homeownership rate are discussed in the 2007 post ( a combination of demographics and changes in mortgage "innovation"), but here are two key points: 1) During the boom, the change in the homeownership rate added about half a million new homeowners per year, as compared to a steady homeownership rate, 2) the homeownership rate (red arrow is trend) is now declining.

The U.S. population has been growing at close to 3 million people per year on average, and there are about 2.4 people per household. Assuming no change in these rates, there would be close to 1.25 million new households formed per year in the U.S. (The are just estimates, and fewer households are formed during a recession - a key problem right now).

Since about 2/3s of all households are owner occupied, an increase of 1.25 million households per year would imply an increase in homes owned of about 800K+ per year. If an additional 500K per year moved to homeownership - as indicated by the increase in the homeownership rate from 1995 to 2005 - then the U.S. would have needed 1.3 million additional owner occupied homes per year.

Important note: these number can't be compared directly to the Census Bureau housing starts and new home sales. There are many other factors that must be accounted for to compare the numbers.

During that same period, since about 1/3 of all households rent, the U.S. would have needed about 400K+ new rental units per year, minus the 500K per year of renters moving to homeownership. So the U.S. needed fewer rental units per year from 1995 to 2005.

Rental Units The second graph shows the number of occupied (blue) and vacant (red) rental units in the U.S. (all data from the Census Bureau).

Sure enough, the number of rental units in the U.S. peaked in early 1995 and declined slowly until 2005. The builders didn't stop building apartment units in 1995, instead the decline in the total units came from condo conversions and units being demolished (a fairly large number of rental and owner owned units are demolished every year).

Even though the total number of rental units was declining, this didn't completely offset the number of renters moving to homeownership, so the rental vacancy rate started moving up - from about 8% in 1995 to over 10% in 2004.

Since 2004 there has been a surge in rental units. Most of this increase is not new apartment buildings, rather a combination of investors buying REOs for cash flow, condo "reconversions", builders changing the intent of new construction (started as condos but became rentals), flippers becoming landlords, or homeowners renting their previous homes or 2nd homes instead of selling. This increase in rental units is more than offsetting the decline in the homeowership rate, and the rental vacancy rate was at a record 10.6% in Q2. (and will probably be over 11% soon because of the "first-time" homebuyer tax credit).

This increase in the homeownership rate, from 1995 through 2005, meant the homebuilders had the wind to their backs. Instead of 800K of new owner demand per year (plus replacement of demolished units, and second home buying), the homebuilders saw an additional 500K of new owner demand during the period 1995 to 2005. This doesn't include the extra demand from speculative buying. Some of this demand was satisfied by condo conversions and owner built units, but the builders definitely benefited from the increase in homeownership rate.

Looking ahead, if the homeownership rate stays steady, the demand for net additional homeowner occupied units would fall back to 800K or so per year (assuming steady population growth and persons per household). However the homeownership rate is declining, and this is now a headwind for the builders.

It appears the rate is declining at about 0.5% per year. This means the net demand for owner occupied units would be 833K minus about 500K per year or about 333K per year - about 25% of the net demand for owner occupied units for the period 1995 to 2005. (Not including replacing demolished units and 2nd home buying).

Although we can't compare this number directly to new home sales (because of 2nd home buying, replacement of demolished units, and other factors) this does suggest new home sales will probably remain at a low level until the homeownership rate stops declining.

New Home Sales and RecessionsThe third graph shows New Home Sales for the last 45 years. the Census Bureau reported: "Sales of new one-family houses in August 2009 were at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 429,000."

Once the homeownership rate stops declining - probably at about the same time the excess existing home units are mostly absorbed - new home sales will probably increase to a steady state rate based on population growth. However this level will be substantially below the average for the period from 1995 to 2005 when the homebuilders benefited from the increasing homeownership rate.

The "first-time" homebuyer tax credit (and new homebuyer tax credit in California) probably boosted new home sales a little this year, so the homeownership rate might increase in the 2nd half of 2009. However that increase will probably be temporary, and the homeownership rate will probably start declining again.

Key points:
  • New Home sales will probably remain at a low level until the homeownership rate stops declining.
  • Once the homeownership rate stops declining, new home sales will increase to a steady state rate based on population growth - but far below the levels during the housing boom.
  • Residential investment (a usually engine of recovery) will not provide much of a boost until the homeownership rate stops declining - that will probably happen when the excess existing home inventory is mostly absorbed.

    1 A special thanks to Jan Hatzius. Several of the ideas for this post are from his piece: "Housing (Still) Holds the Key to Fed Policy", Nov 27, 2007
  • energyecon

    EMRATIO – return to cliff diving?


    The monthly reported value of EMRATIO took a relatively big leg down month over month of -0.4% in September, and the year over year comparison of the 3 month moving average is even more disconcerting as it represents the largest decrease for this recession and the seventh new all time record for the series...


    Link to FRED for EMRATIO
    Ken Houghton

    Brad DeLong is Correct

    All right, I give up. I've reviewed for the Washington Post Book World, I consider some of their work interesting, and can almost forgive them for publishing Ruth Marcus, Charles Krauthammer, Anne Applebaum, and Richard Cohen as if they were sane.

    But when your Ombudsman claims that your readers "typically demand coverage that is unfailingly neutral," and cites as an example of "crossing the line" one of your reporters making a statement of fact:
    "We can incur all sorts of federal deficits for wars and what not," Raju Narisetti wrote on his Twitter feed. "But we have to promise not to increase it by $1 for healthcare reform? Sad."

    There is no purpose for your organization to even claim it publishes news.
    Tyler Durden

    Interview With A Mad Hedge Fund Trader

    Republished courtesy of Phil's Stock World and Ilene

    Mad Hedge is quite a fascinating character who’s had a very exciting career in finances and more. He writes daily newsletter entries on market action, stocks and trends in the economy, and I highly recommend taking a moment to peruse his site, Diary of a Mad Hedge Fund Trader.

    -Ilene

    Introduction Mad Hedge Fund Trader began his career in finance by moving to Japan and working at Dai Nana Securities as a research analyst in 1974. In 1976 he was named the Tokyo correspondent for The Economist magazine and the Financial Times, which then shared an office. He traveled the world interviewing famous people, such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. In 1982, he was named the US editor of Euromoney magazine, and in 1983 he built a new division in international equities for Morgan Stanley. After moving to London in 1985, Mad Hedge supervised sales and trading in Japanese equity derivatives. In 1989, he became a director of the Swiss Bank Corp, responsible for Japanese equity derivatives. A year later, he set up an international hedge fund which he sold in 1999. I haven’t even covered all of Mad Hedge’s adventures, such as his latent movie star career (as an extra in the 1979 epic war film, Apocalypse Now), and who knows what else. But now, missing the adrenaline-surging excitement of active trading, Mad Hedge has returned to the hedge fund business, set up an educational website, and is busy keeping up with the demands of newsletter writing.. So let’s begin our interview with Mad Hedge by exploring his current thoughts on the markets. Interview Ilene: Hi Mad Hedge. You’ve had a fascinating career having little to do with your major in biochemistry. A brief review of your newsletter shows that your recommendations early in 2009 have appreciated by an average of around 400%. You’ve been writing your daily market thoughts and investment strategies at your website - www.madhedgefundtrader.com - which it’s terrific, by the way. What are your goals with this site? Mad Hedge: This whole thing started out as a letter to investors in my hedge fund, to tell them my thinking behind my positions. Then I thought, why not post this on the web and see what happens? Six months later it is now going out to 50,000 readers a day, mostly to portfolio managers, financial advisors, and traders. The growth has been explosive. Ilene: Who are your readers? I seemed to have stumbled on a market that I describe as “semi-professionals.” If you are a big hedge fund, with a staff of 600 and a huge in-house research department, I’m not going to tell you anything you don’t already know. But there appear to be a few million people out there who trade their own accounts, or invest their own IRA’s. They have never worked on Wall Street, but have taught themselves a lot about markets and investing. My letter gives them the 30,000 foot view on global stock, bond, currency, commodity, and real estate markets which they can’t find at their online broker. About half of them are from abroad. When I get up in the morning now, there are five e-mails waiting for me from China and India asking what to do about natural gas. I also try to make the letter funny and entertaining. Not all financial publications have to be dreary reading. It’s not always about the next stock to buy. Ilene: In a recent letter you wrote that one of your favorite ETF’s is the Proshares Ultra Short Treasury Trust (TBT). Why is that? Mad Hedge: TBT is a 200% leveraged bet that long Treasury bonds will go down. While the Fed keeps short rates low, it doesn’t directly control long rates. As the supply of government bonds increases exponentially, their eventual collapse is inevitable. All Ponzi schemes must come to an end, and the US government is no exception. We currently have the greatest liquidity driven market of all time, and the ten year is eking out a mere 3.30% yield, pricing in near zero inflationary expectations. The average yield on this paper for the last ten years is 6.20%. If the yield goes back to 5%, that will take the TBT from $45 to $70. The TBT could perform even better if Treasuries lose their triple “A” rating, which I think is a real possibility. Historically, bonds are not a good buy in a low interest rate, deflationary environment. If long rates move from 3% back to the 12% we saw in the early eighties, bond holders will get slaughtered, and the TBT could exceed $200. Even if inflation stays low, the sheer weight of supply and credit concerns will crater government bond prices. Ilene: What’s the worst case scenario for the bond market? Mad Hedge: Debt service is currently 11% of the budget. If interest rates rise sharply, that could double to 22%. Then you get a downward spiral like you saw in Latin America in the eighties, when higher debt service creates more borrowing, and more borrowing creates a higher debt service, until the whole thing blows up. At some point China, Japan, the Middle Eastern countries may stop buying our debt. There are only so many “greater fools” out there. The only way out of this is for the economy to return to a long term 3%-4% growth rate. That’s obviously what Obama is hoping for with his programs. He’s taking big risks, but he doesn’t have much choice. He really did inherit a bad hand.  If he did nothing, we’d be in a depression by now, with 25% unemployment. He understands what he’s doing and understands the risks. He has great economic advisors. Obama couldn’t have allowed the banking system to collapse. We need banks as the economy’s lynchpin. A year ago we could have lost the entire financial system over a weekend. Ships were being turned around at sea and going back home because their letters of credit were failing. The freeze up in credit could have gone on for years. The stock market is up 50% since Obama took office, so it likes the uneasy stability that we have now. Credit markets have recovered tremendously, and IPOs are coming to the market again. Junk bond funds are up, confidence is returning. There’s greater willingness to lend, though only at high interest rates. But it’s a big improvement over last year. Ilene: What do you expect for mortgage rates in the next few months? Years? Mad Hedge: You shouldn’t touch real estate, as I think it will be dead money for another decade. Rent, don’t buy. If you have to buy, then get a 30 year fixed rate mortgage now at 5%, because rates are going up a lot in the future. When I bought my first home in New York in the early eighties, I got nailed with a 17% interest rate on my mortgage. We may revisit those levels. Houses will continue to move lower, maybe another 10% or so. We have another wave of foreclosures hitting the system soon, triggered by the option arm readjustments. I see support for prices when the cost of owning and the cost of renting are more in line. Home ownership may have to become cheaper than renting, because of perceived risk to the principle, for the real estate market sell-off to finish.  However, expecting houses to drop a lot from here is like shorting Citibank at $3. We’ve basically had the big move already. Due to poor demographic factors, the demand for houses is going to take a long time to come back. While 80 million baby boomers are trying to sell their houses to 65 million gen Xer’s, don’t expect a recovery in prices, especially when the gen Xer’s are still living in your basement. Ilene: You mentioned you missed the rally in financials, but still have concerns about the financial sector. Mad Hedge: With financials, I knew they would rebound, but didn’t imagine the extensive move we’ve seen. It was the greatest dead cat bounce and short covering rally of all time. But the financial sector will have troubles for years. If I had to buy U.S. stocks, I’d buy big tech stocks like Microsoft (MSFT), Oracle (ORCL), Intel, (INTC) and Cisco (CSCO), because for the most part they have tons of cash and little debt. Tech stocks didn’t have the problems that were plaguing the other sectors. For example, they have no troubled assets, and no regulatory clamp down on their business. The credit crisis didn’t affect them directly because they finance their operations through cash flow and tend not to borrow. Of course, they’re hurt indirectly when the customers have credit problems. Credit markets are now seeing a huge differentiation in terms. Lenders are much more discriminating about who they lend to. American consumers are very constrained, but foreign consumers are not as constrained. They are not returning to frugality as we are because they didn’t share our excesses in the first place. You don’t see many black Cadillac Escalades with chrome wheels in China. If I had to buy stocks, I would buy equity in foreign companies where the growth will be in the coming years. In March, you could have bought anything and had a great trade, as the rising tide lifted all boats. But stocks in emerging markets outperformed US stocks by over a two to one margin. Ilene: Would you be buying stocks now? Mad Hedge: No, I sold most of my positions in June. The risk was low in March, but not so low in June, and it’s even greater now. The PE multiple on the S&P 500 has just jumped from 10 to 20 in six months. Historically, a 20 multiple is a terrible time to enter the market. Markets are discounting a “V”-shaped recovery, which we are not going to get. I think we’ll get more of a “square root” shaped recovery, a “V” followed by sideways to a gradually upward sloping grind. We’ve already had the “V”. Markets are overpriced. I don’t see how we can have huge economic growth with capital-constrained banks, catatonic consumers, and commercial real estate troubles up the wazoo. One of the only positives is the weak dollar, which makes everything we sell to the rest of the world cheaper. This is good for our multi-national companies, good for our exporters. So far, the dollar is on a grinding, controlled move down, which is good. But if the dollar’s fall accelerates, it would not be good. A real dollar panic would lead to the widespread dumping of dollar assets, and commodity prices would explode. Then we’ll get to $2,000 for gold and $40 for silver very quickly. Ilene: You spent several years wildcatting for natural gas in Texas and Colorado, which has given you a unique insight into the energy space. What are your current thoughts on natural gas and oil? Mad Hedge: Stay away from natural gas. The volatility will kill you. If you are a masochist, then buy it only when it’s cheap, on big dips, in the $3/MBTU range. In the last three years, thanks to the new “fracting” technology used in oil shales, we have discovered a 100 year supply of natural gas sitting under the US, and the producers have not been able to cut back fast enough. So now we have a supply glut, and we are almost out of storage. This is what took us down from $13 to $2.40 in 18 months. The lack of hurricanes has not helped demand either. Producers have been cutting back like crazy, trying to balance supply and demand, with a breakeven point of $2.   They need a cold winter to help bring things back into balance. If the industry gets organized, then gas can become the 20 year bridge we need, until energy alternatives kick in. That makes me a big supporter of the “Pickens Plan.” Oil is much more interesting. It overshot to downside in January to $32. Crude is now at $70 climbing out of the recession. Imagine how high it will get when all economies are functioning again. The financial crisis hurt the ability of big oil companies to get financing for large development projects in oil. These projects can take five to ten years to bring online. That means we will get higher oil prices sooner. We may get a pull back to the $50s, but the $30’s would be a stretch. The $32 low was an artificial one caused by a complete absence of liquidity in all markets. I don’t think we’ll see those lows again. Ilene: Where do you see the price of oil going in the distant future? Mad Hedge: I think it may dip into the 50s, then up, perhaps skyrocketing to $300 before dropping back down to $3 after alternatives take over and demand vanishes. But that’s at best 20 years out. If we can wean ourselves off oil in 20 years, it would be a huge accomplishment. Ilene: I noticed you speak a little about politics in your essays; do you have a leaning one way or another? Mad Hedge: I’m politically neutral. I’m getting bashed by the right these days because I’ve said that the Republicans have no ability to affect the legislative process now. But we need to adjust our portfolios to reflect the current political realities. No matter how much you love Obama, you can’t dispute the fact that the massive issuance of government bonds he is proposing is terrible for the bond market and the dollar, but great for precious metals and commodities. Obama won by a big margin, so the Democrats will be around for a while. Of course, if my “square root” scenario doesn’t pan out, and we get a serious “W” recession instead, all bets are off. People will only give him the benefit of the doubt for so long. Ilene: Where do you think the stock market’s going to go over the next few years? Mad Hedge: I think there’s a 1 in 3 chance for new lows. That’s the “W” scenario. But with Lehman, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Washington Mutual gone, we have run out of companies that can suddenly go under and trigger a new financial crisis. The big survivors are partially government owned, and of course zero interest rates help a lot. More banks are going under, but they will be smaller, regional banks with excessive exposure to commercial real estate. Ilene: How does this affect your actions in the markets? Mad Hedge: The best and least risky trades were in the early part of the year. Now, there’s a lot more risk in all markets. I’m neutral right now. If stocks dropped from here, I might be a buyer, but only in energy, commodities, and technology, and of course in emerging markets like Brazil, India, China, Korea, and Vietnam. Gold, silver and commodities have all had huge runs. My inner wimp has me in cash, waiting for better opportunities. I haven’t been playing the short side, because it’s a nightmare trying to short a liquidity driven market with interest rates at zero. There is no return on low risk investments now. Capital always moves to risky assets when interest rates are zero. Just look at Japan in the 1980s. There PE multiples soared from 10 to 100 purely driven by liquidity. For the last three years of that run the fundamental analysts were left twisting slowly in the wind. Artificially low interest rates boost asset prices to artificially high prices. It always ends in tears, but can play out for a while. You want to have an asymmetric risk reward metric in your favor, as we did in March of this year. Now, we don’t have that. The next downward move in the markets will more likely be due to disappointing economic data, earning misses, etc., not due to a total collapse of the system. We may sell off, but I don’t think it will be to new lows. It’s hard to see new lows with interest rates at zero. Instead, I see the “square root” recovery scenario mentioned earlier. The market may start drifting lower as people start seeing this possibility. That might set up a trading range for the S&P 500 which could last for years, something like 800-1,200. During the nineties, Japan peaked at ¥39,000, then traded in a ¥20,000-¥25,000 range for five years, before the final collapse to ¥7,000. That’s one scenario for the US. Ilene: You’ve had an amazing career. Let me ask you about some of the people you’ve interviewed. What was Ronald Reagan like? Mad Hedge: Although I never agreed with him politically, you couldn’t help but like the guy. He always had a joke ready. He was a lot smarter than he let on. Ilene: And Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister of Britain? Mad Hedge: Her nickname as “The Iron Lady” was well deserved. She could stare holes right through you. She treated journalists like a disapproving school teacher, which of course, she was. Ilene: How about the terrorist leader, Yassir Arafat, of the PLO? Mad Hedge: His body guards almost shot me when I reached to turn over a cassette in my tape recorder. I always thought he was a terrible leader. That is why the Palestinians never got anywhere, and why the Israelis left him alone. Ilene: Meeting China’s Deng Xiaoping must have been amazing. Mad Hedge: I am 6’4” and he was only 4’9”, so of course there were plenty of opportunities for humor. I could never envision this guy going on the Long March. He had a tremendous wit. Someone asked him why China kept its borders closed, and wasn’t this an imposition on human rights. He said if he opened the borders, the surrounding countries would get flooded with people. He asked “How many Chinese do you want? 20 million? 30 million?” I also met Zhou Enlai during the Cultural Revolution. He was a brilliant man, the last man on a bell shaped curve of 500 million. Ilene: I read somewhere that you interviewed four US Secretaries of the Treasury. Yes, Miller Reagan, Schultz, and Brady. And I visited the French chateau of a fifth, C. Douglas Dillon. I keep a collection of dollar bills they signed. My goal in life was always to get in the way of history, and let it run me over. It’s been an amazing life. I wouldn’t trade it for anything. Ilene: What about Apocalypse Now? Mad Hedge: I happened to be in town to interview Ferdinand Marcos, the president of the Philippines. If you look hard, I’m in the USO scene. Most of the other “GI’s” in that scene were European and Australian hippies rounded up from the Youth Hostels of Manila by Francis Ford Coppola’s agents. Good luck, though. I was a lot younger and thinner then. Ilene: Thanks a lot. It’s been great talking to you.

    Submitted by reader Grant Dossetto

    Thanks to the invaluable work of modern financial writers and economists, conservatives have found it easier to defend capitalism against the salacious charge that markets were responsible for the enduring unemployment seen during the Great Depression.  Amity Shlaes’ The Forgotten Man and the work of Lee Ohanian and Harold Cole, of UCLA and the University of Rochester respectively, have made a compelling case that the Great Depression resulted from the failure of wages, in real terms, to adjust to macroeconomic deflation.  This failure could have a benign cause, a result of imperfect information and the inability of business to properly assess the productivity shock that resulted from the crash of 1929.  This theory would certainly explain why a severe recession could turn into a prolonged recession.  It remains suspect that poor economic decision making could last for over a decade. 
        In fact, if the labor force was not reduced dramatically by our first ever peace time draft and the ramp up in preparation for World War II we do not know when the Depression would have ended.  The true culprit was policy from Washington as pointed out by the Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morganthau who wrote in May of 1939, “We have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work. And I have just one interest, and if I am wrong ... somebody else can have my job. I want to see this country prosperous. I want to see people get a job. I want to see people get enough to eat. We have never made good on our promises ... I say after eight years of this Administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started ... And an enormous debt to boot!”  Policies aimed at wage stabilization were begun under President Hoover and accelerated under FDR.  As a result of the National Recovery Act, industries were forced to submit Codes of Fair Competition.  In essence, each industry’s Code was a legalized cartel with output, productivity and wages all strictly regulated and backed by the authority of the Federal Government.  The tragic story of the Schechters is a haunting embodiment of this control.  The Schechters owned a small poultry business and allowed customers to choose which chickens they wish to purchase.  This small example of independence earned the Schechters jail terms.  Farm controls resulted in slaughtered livestock left to rot in the sunshine and dairy products dumped at the side of the road as millions went hungry.
        The NRA, along with much of the original New Deal, was tossed by the Supreme Court.  Government power needed to be consolidated though, and Congress remained undeterred by judicial rebuke.  In 1935, the Wagner Act was passed allowing for collective bargaining by employees through unions.  Previously, this had been prosecuted under antitrust legislation.  The National Labor Relations Board was created to mediate negotiations between business and unions.  Although it has become popular through photos of sit-ins by the UAW against GM in Flint, among many other examples, to cloak early unions as knights crusading for “fair” wages it was, in essence, a continuation of the NRA administration of wage protection.  People were paid more to do less.  The result was massive underemployment among the economy at large.  Rates touched as high as 30% despite numerous government work programs.  The swelled ranks of the unemployed ensured that demand for final products could never recover.  Without pricing power and rising costs businesses retrenched and curried favor with politicians rather than creating the conditions for economic recovery.
        This recession has seen wages decline, both real and nominally, the average work week reach record lows, and productivity rise sharply.  Companies cut workers quickly as the unemployment rate is now at 17% according to recent U6 statistics.  It would stand to reason that our current troubles could never morph into a prolonged depression.  Unfortunately that is not the case and, logically, government is the reason why the macroeconomic performance will continue below trend for years to come.  The United States government has not just guaranteed losses in money market funds in the past year, it has, through the Federal Reserve, propped up failing financial institutions, doubled the money supply by dumping cash out of its discount window in exchange for evermore questionable collateral, and has bought nearly $300 billion of its own Treasury debt and nearly $1 trillion of agency debt.  The government has done everything it can short of ad hoc devaluation of our currency to increase the amount of money in the system and create a resultant increase in asset prices. 
        The government has rationalized that its unprecedented steps have staved off deflation.  This is only partly true.  It has staved off asset deflation, it has not ended the threat of demand pull deflation.  Since the lows of last winter, commodities and financial assets have rallied seemingly without interruption.  Oil has doubled from the low thirties to nearly seventy dollars a barrel, copper has doubled in price, silver has recently exploded as high as seventeen dollars, and gold now stands north of one thousand dollars per ounce.  The stock market has increased nearly sixty percent with the S&P now around 1,020, a far cry from the ominous intraday low of 666.  The Nasdaq has proven even more resistant to sluggish fundamentals and the Dow Jones Average has also yielded healthy six month returns.  Equity strength should portend bond weakness but that has not been the case.  Bonds also remain highly priced pushing the 30 year yield to below four percent.
        This remarkable equity and commodity performance has come even though the economy at large has shed over 2.5 million new jobs without one month of employment growth.  Initial claims remain in the mid-500,000s, continuing claims remain near record highs, and emergency claims continue to set monthly records.  Employment is not the only indicator of continued economic weakness.  Car sales remain poor except when government finances short term programs such as cash for clunkers.  Realtors are already asking for an expansion of the first time home buyer tax credit to keep housing sales from retreating further, pulling prices with them.  Popular industries such as video games are even feeling the pinch.  Game sales are down several months running and console prices have been slashed.  The Sony PlayStation 3 is now less than half of its initial retail price, less than three years after its initial launch.  The Nintendo Wii, the best selling of the latest generation consoles, will see a price reduction of 20% for the holiday season.  Gasoline prices have decoupled from oil with per gallon prices in the Michigan area now standing at $2.30 and falling.  Refiners are one of the worst performing industries as they cannot add margins sufficient to cover costs.  Our refinery capacity continues to shrink, down to just 84%.  It is expected that natural gas supplies will reach storage capacity by the end of November while the excess is dumped onto the market forcing down spot rates.  Because of operation flow orders mandating only 80% capacity as of Labor Day, we saw this phenomenon a month ago driving spot prices below $2 per million cubic feet.  Even with expansionary prints, regional surveys, from Dallas to Chicago, Richmond to Kansas City, have shown contractionary readings for prices received.  Much like Depression era work programs failed to create permanent employment, short sighted fiscal programs cannot create permanent product demand.
        By now, the problem should be obvious.  As pricing power declines, raw materials costs are rising (highlighted by the 65 prices paid number in the August ISM and 63 in September).  This should erode margins which were the source of the earnings beats of the 2nd quarter.  As prices fall, total revenue will continue to miss expectations.  Credit is contracting at historical rates with commercial real estate and option ARM resets looming.  Record foreclosures portend future losses and the shutdown of banks at an escalating rate.  Credit will not expand soon increasing the likelihood of further price decreases as consumers increase personal savings rates. 
        The government reflation experiment has ensured that company costs cannot reach equilibrium with weak final goods markets.  This is similar to the Great Depression except that artificial wage inflation has been replaced by artificial commodity inflation to create the disequlibrium.  To cut rising costs, the only option is to reduce salaried employees, or shut down completely due to losses in core operations.  Rising unemployment will create further weakness in final goods.  This portends continued macroeconomic performance below trend for a length of time not seen since the Depression.  Asset prices will eventually fall to the market solution, government intervention aimed at avoiding this harsh reality will only delay the inevitable and probably assure a more painful destination in the process.

    Another interview from Consuelo Mack and her series on "Great Investors". This comes from Peter Bernstein, who passed away in June at the age of 90. The interviews were taped in 2005 and 2007. Mr. Bernstein was an economist, financial consultant, and author of ten books, including Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk.

    From the 2005 taping, Mr. Bernstein talks about how the "consequences (of one's decision) matter more than the probabilities." He believes "passionately in diversification." His take on investment opportunities: "the United States is very well worked over as an investment opportunity, so I think one goes abroad."

    From the 2007 interview, he states that "we can't manage returns....but we can manage our risks." This is very true and very consistent with my rule #6 of "11 Rules For Better Trading". Rule #6 states: "Money management, money management, money management. It is so important that it is worth saying tree times. There are so few factors you can control in the markets, but his is one of them. Learn to exploit it."

    The thing that worries him the most is the Dollar.

    The interview is 30 minutes in length.


    On one hand Geithner says the recovery is stronger than expected, on the other he says it's not time to roll back the stimulus. Please consider Geithner Says Recovery Signs Are ‘Stronger’ Than Expected.
    Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said signs of economic recovery are “stronger” and have appeared “sooner” than expected, while reiterating it’s not yet time to roll back stimulus programs.

    Financial conditions have improved “dramatically,” particularly in the U.S., where the housing market has stabilized, Geithner said in a statement issued in Istanbul today. Still, jobless rates are “unacceptably high” and the financial system remains damaged. As a result, it’s too soon for governments to withdraw stimulus, Geithner said.

    “Planning for an eventual exit is the responsible and necessary thing to do, but we are not yet in the position where it would be prudent to begin to withdraw fiscal and monetary policy support,” Geithner said in remarks released after a meeting of finance ministers and central bankers from the Group of Seven nations.

    “Exit will not be like flipping a switch,” he said. “Instead, as conditions stabilize and growth strengthens, we will unwind the extraordinary policy measures we’ve taken, phasing them out carefully to avoid a damaging cliff.”
    Signs, Signs, Everywhere A Sign

    One might expect to see a few signs given the $trillions in expansion of the Fed's balance sheet along with the massive stimulus programs coming from Congress.

    However, cash-for-clunkers just blew up and we will soon find out what housing does after $8,000 handouts are taken off the table, and the Fed's monetization of treasuries stops.

    Certainly the stock market has recovered, but it is highly debatable if the stock market is any kind of leading indicator. I will have more in a look at leading indicators next week.

    If one wants to consider signs, look no further than the treasury market which is flashing a huge warning message with a flattening of the yield curve. The 10-year note has fallen from a high of 4 to 3.22, 78 basis points of flattening.

    If the treasury market was expecting a sustainable recovery, yields at the low end would not be sitting near 0 with yields on the top end falling like a brick.

    This is the same warning message people have ignored before.

    Yes Timothy, there are signs. However, the signs I am looking at suggest this recovery is not what you make it out to be.

    Mike "Mish" Shedlock
    http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
    Click Here To Scroll Thru My Recent Post List

    One of the foremost experts on structured finance and derivatives presents a holistic overview of not only the current economic fiasco, and in 10 brief minutes with Max Keiser she provides more succinct, unbiased and relevant information that most pundits are able to convey in years on and off TV, but also highlights the bigger problem of how the administration keeps treating the US public as a bunch of stupid infants, throwing paper blankets over raging systematic fires that are anything but doused. And yet, the administration's ploy so far is successful, unfortunately speaking volumes about the intellectual rigor of the average gullible American.

    Futhermore, Zero Hedge joins in endorsing Mr. Keiser's glowing recommendation of Janet's book "Dear Mr. Buffett: What An Investor Learns 1,269 Miles From Wall Street" a must read for anyone who wishes to get a deep understanding of the real severity of America's economic debacle (we receive absolutely no compensation for recommending this book).

    Barry Ritholtz

    Free Ivy-League Lectures on the Economy

    Online Classes.org has a list of 50 recommended Ivy League economic classes. (I have been partial to the MIT online economic classes, which this site omits). Regardless, here are a few worth exploring:

    General Economics

    The basics of the field of economics:

    1. Beyond Freakonomics: New Musings on the Economics of Everyday Life: University of Chicago professor and economist Steven Levitt further explains his theory on everyday economics in this lecture. [Princeton]
    2. Game Theory: Learn more about how game theory can be applied to economics in this lecture from Yale professor Ben Polak. [Yale]
    3. Financial Markets: This lecture series from professor Robert Shiller will teach you about the basics of the economic system and how each part fits together. [Yale]
    4. Economic Theory for an Innovative World: Learn why this economist thinks existing models should be changed so that businesses can foster innovation and change. [Columbia]
    5. Higher Education and the Recession: Check out this lecture to find out how higher education is being affected by the recession and how it might trickle down into local communities. [Cornell]
    6. Why Stock-price Volatility Should Never Be a Surprise, Even in the Long Run: Here you can gain a better understanding of how stocks work, and why you shouldn’t expect them to remain stable all the time. [UPenn]
    7. Close-up on Vicki Bogan: Listen to this lecture to get a better understanding of financial decision making. [Cornell]

    Understanding the Economic Crisis

    1. Understanding the Crisis in the Markets: A Panel of Harvard Experts: Get an explanation of the financial crisis from some of the best and the brightest by watching this panel discussion at Harvard. [Harvard]
    2. Capitalism and Confusion: Here, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen speaks about the current financial crisis. [Cornell]
    3. The Subprime Drama Continues, but for How Long?: Has the subprime crisis run its course? This lecture from Richard Herring attempts to address many of the issues surrounding this complex topic. [UPenn]
    4. Origins of the Financial Mess: Alan Blinder, a Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School and co-director of Princeton`s Center for Economic Policy Studies, discusses the financial crisis in this lecture. [Princeton]
    5. Financial Crises: Check out this series of lectures to learn about the roots of a financial crisis, responses and results. [Princeton]
    6. The Financial Crisis: Implications for Washington, Wall Street and Main Street: Here you can get some insights from Cornell experts on the financial crisis and what it means for business both big and small. [Cornell]
    7. Soft Landing Economy: This lecture from 2006 shows just how wrong many predictions about the seriousness of the market downturn really were. [UPenn]

    Proposed Solutions to the Economic Crisis

    Once you’ve learned a little more about where the financial crisis stands, you can listen to these lectures that propose a variety of solutions, sometimes conflicting, on what to do to help it recover.

    1. Temporary Nationalization Necessary to Save Troubled Banks: This lecture from Columbia Business School Professor Stiglitz takes the stance that the government should take control of failing banks to ensure economic stability. [Columbia]
    2. Preventing the Next Financial Crisis: Pay close attention to this lecture series that brings together numerous scholars, researchers and experts to discuss how future financial disasters can be averted. [Columbia]
    3. Economics Advice for President Obama: Several economists at Cornell share their thoughts on what the government should do in this informative discussion. [Cornell]
    From the NY Times: Retailers Expect Flat Christmas Sales This Year
    [A] lot of people are thinking about it, and taking surveys to test the mood of the American consumer, and deciding that this Christmas will be as bad as last — which is to say, one of the worst on record.

    Retailers are relieved to hear that prediction. Flat sales this holiday season would at least mean that things had stopped getting worse ... several reports published in the last few days, including surveys by Nielsen and Deloitte, forecast no change in holiday sales from last year to this year.
    And that suggests that seasonal retail hiring will be weak too. Here is a repeat of a graph from a post a couple weeks ago: Seasonal Retail Hiring

    Typically retail companies start hiring for the holiday season in October, and really increase hiring in November. This graph shows the historical net retail jobs added for October, November and December by year.

    Seasonal Retail Hiring Click on graph for larger image in new window.

    This really shows the collapse in retail hiring in 2008. This also shows how the season has changed over time - back in the '80s, retailers hired mostly in December. Now the peak month is November, and many retailers start hiring seasonal workers in October.

    Given the expectation of no growth in holiday spending, retailers will probably be very cautious hiring again this year.

    If anyone needs indirect evidence of a "mysterious force" that has been forcing the market away from normal behavior for the seventh month in a row now, one simply needs to look at the dramatic continuing underperformance of quant factors, which in turn force quant models to generate false signals and result in major pain for these traditional allocators of capital and market buffers. Quant models, which rely on a statistically "normal" market, are terminally broken, best visualized by YTD drubbing of traditional market natural and L/S indices. But don't take our word for it. For the latest on this ongoing phenomenon, and for what is probably a good representation by proxy of the mysterious permabid phenomenon (call it however you will), we present excerpts from the latest institutional letter by Matt Rothman, head of U.S. Equity Quantitative Strategies at Barclays.

    This month’s performance for quantitative factors was unsettling. All three of our Quantitative Themes markedly underperformed. Market Sentiment was down -2.1%. Quality was down -3.1%. And Valuation was down -3.6%. While we have seen bigger monthly moves in these themes in recent years, the fact that all three of these themes underperformed significantly at the same time is noteworthy. Indeed, this simultaneous underperformance of all our themes suggests to us that a disruption may have been (or still is) occurring in this space.


    This sobering thought has me searching for the appropriate words and so I find it necessary to turn to my truest and most reliable muse but I am still struggling to find the most appropriate reference. Is it best to paraphrase the opening of Side 1 of Darkness on The Edge of Town – that is the song, Badlands? Or is better to allude to the eerily appropriate last song of the vastly underrated and misunderstood Nebraska album – that is, Reason to Believe? Or still yet, is it the newest Springsteen song which world-premièred Wednesday night at the Meadowlands, where yours truly was privileged enough to be among the lucky people standing inches from the stage as The Boss belted out, for the first time, Wrecking Ball?


    But to be clear, we do not want to belittle the seriousness of the situation. This month marks the 5th out of 7 months that our long/short strategy has underperformed. Our trailing 12 month performance number is sobering even if driven primarily by our performance in April 2009. And that a potential disruption in the space could still be so pernicious with quant aum down as much as we estimate it to be over the past 2+ years, well, that is not comforting either.

    And while the current situation is very reminiscent of August 2007 in that it generated major underperformance for quants, at least that period managed to rectify in a very short period of time, granted accompanied by a violent swing in the market. The fact that we are now in month 7 of ongoing quant underperformance, without any notable public implosions should raise red flags. One explanation, the one that Zero Hedge has been promoting, is that as traditional L/S and M/N quants have been redeemed and otherwise slighted, other new players have muscled in and taken their spot: most notably incipient market structure monopolists such as Goldman Sachs.

    We have searched for prior occasions where we have seen rolling monthly simultaneous underperformance of a similar magnitude. There were few instances of analogous behavior: August 1958; October/November 1974; May/June 1993; May 2001; October, November and December 2001; November 2002; and May/June 2003. Notably, August 2007 was not a comparable period as the model misbehavior was short-lived and self-corrected quickly. In a number of these periods, there was no active quantitative money management community – computers, while invented, were rare and quite expensive in the early periods – and so it is important to recognize that these disruptions can clearly have a variety of sources.

    Or one major one...

    And probably the most relevant observation from Rothman, highlighting that even as the status quo presumably persists, the likelihood of major shifts behind the scenes becomes greater and greater. Then again, as BGI is in the process of being transferred to BlackRock, the last thing the financial community needs is awareness of major unwinds occurring under everyone's noses.

    Equally importantly, we have still not been able to find any direct evidence of an unwind. Based on our conversations with the Barclays Capital trading desks and with numerous clients, we have no direct evidence to support that an unwind has been happening. Like others, we have seen the press reports that a major pension manager was significantly restructuring their allocations to outside managers, particuliarly portable alpha (quantitative?) managers. We would only be speculating to think this was the cause of quantitative model misbehavior into the quarter end. Yet, this hypothesis does not strike us as entirely unreasonable either. We just don’t know. But we sure can observe our model’s behavior which is certainly abnormal.

    As Evidence A of "abnormal behavior" and what are likely major ongoing redemptions, be it in portable alpha or otherwise, please see the YTD performance of the HFRX Equity Market Neutral Index: down -6.3% through 9/30. But at least all other pro cyclical indices are performing well, alas not well enough for them to pass their high water mark yet. Just ask New York headhunters how many hedge funds are actually hiring.

    By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

    Why isn’t the government breaking up the giant, insolvent banks?

    We Need Them To Help the Economy Recover?

    Do we need the Too Big to Fails to help the economy recover?

    No.

    The following top economists and financial experts believe that the economy cannot recover unless the big, insolvent banks are broken up in an orderly fashion:

    • Dean and professor of finance and economics at Columbia Business School, and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush, R. Glenn Hubbard
    • The leading monetary economist and co-author with Milton Friedman of the leading treatise on the Great Depression, Anna Schwartz
    • Economics professor and senior regulator during the S & L crisis, William K. Black
    • Professor of entrepreneurship and finance at the Chicago Booth School of Business, Luigi Zingales

    Others, like Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, think that the giant insolvent banks may need to be temporarily nationalized.

    In addition, many top economists and financial experts, including Bank of Israel Governor Stanley Fischer – who was Ben Bernanke’s thesis adviser at MIT – say that – at the very least – the size of the financial giants should be limited.

    Even the Bank of International Settlements – the “Central Banks’ Central Bank” – has slammed too big to fail. As summarized by the Financial Times:

    The report was particularly scathing in its assessment of governments’ attempts to clean up their banks. “The reluctance of officials to quickly clean up the banks, many of which are now owned in large part by governments, may well delay recovery,” it said, adding that government interventions had ingrained the belief that some banks were too big or too interconnected to fail.

    This was dangerous because it reinforced the risks of moral hazard which might lead to an even bigger financial crisis in future.

    If We Break ‘Em Up, No One Will Lend?

    Do we need to keep the TBTFs to make sure that loans are made?

    Nope.

    Fortune pointed out in February that smaller banks are stepping in to fill the lending void left by the giant banks’ current hesitancy to make loans. Indeed, the article points out that the only reason that smaller banks haven’t been able to expand and thrive is that the too-big-to-fails have decreased competition:

    Growth for the nation’s smaller banks represents a reversal of trends from the last twenty years, when the biggest banks got much bigger and many of the smallest players were gobbled up or driven under…

    As big banks struggle to find a way forward and rising loan losses threaten to punish poorly run banks of all sizes, smaller but well capitalized institutions have a long-awaited chance to expand.

    BusinessWeek noted in January:

    As big banks struggle, community banks are stepping in to offer loans and lines of credit to small business owners…

    At a congressional hearing on small business and the economic recovery earlier this month, economist Paul Merski, of the Independent Community Bankers of America, a Washington (D.C.) trade group, told lawmakers that community banks make 20% of all small-business loans, even though they represent only about 12% of all bank assets. Furthermore, he said that about 50% of all small-business loans under $100,000 are made by community banks…

    Indeed, for the past two years, small-business lending among community banks has grown at a faster rate than from larger institutions, according to Aite Group, a Boston banking consultancy. “Community banks are quickly taking on more market share not only from the top five banks but from some of the regional banks,” says Christine Barry, Aite’s research director. “They are focusing more attention on small businesses than before. They are seeing revenue opportunities and deploying the right solutions in place to serve these customers.”

    And Fed Governor Daniel K. Tarullo said in June:

    The importance of traditional financial intermediation services, and hence of the smaller banks that typically specialize in providing those services, tends to increase during times of financial stress. Indeed, the crisis has highlighted the important continuing role of community banks…

    For example, while the number of credit unions has declined by 42 percent since 1989, credit union deposits have more than quadrupled, and credit unions have increased their share of national deposits from 4.7 percent to 8.5 percent. In addition, some credit unions have shifted from the traditional membership based on a common interest to membership that encompasses anyone who lives or works within one or more local banking markets. In the last few years, some credit unions have also moved beyond their traditional focus on consumer services to provide services to small businesses, increasing the extent to which they compete with community banks.

    Indeed, some very smart people say that the big banks aren’t really focusing as much on the lending business as smaller banks.

    Specifically since Glass-Steagall was repealed in 1999, the giant banks have made much of their money in trading assets, securities, derivatives and other speculative bets, the banks’ own paper and securities, and in other money-making activities which have nothing to do with traditional depository functions.

    Now that the economy has crashed, the big banks are making very few loans to consumers or small businesses because they still have trillions in bad derivatives gambling debts to pay off, and so they are only loaning to the biggest players and those who don’t really need credit in the first place. See this and this.

    So we don’t really need these giant gamblers. We don’t really need JP Morgan, Citi, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley. What we need are dedicated lenders.

    The Fortune article discussed above points out that the banking giants are not necessarily more efficient than smaller banks:

    The largest banks often don’t show the greatest efficiency. This now seems unsurprising given the deep problems that the biggest institutions have faced over the past year.

    “They actually experience diseconomies of scale,” Narter wrote of the biggest banks. “There are so many large autonomous divisions of the bank that the complexity of connecting them overwhelms the advantage of size.”

    And Governor Tarullo points out some of the benefits of small community banks over the giant banks:

    Many community banks have thrived, in large part because their local presence and personal interactions give them an advantage in meeting the financial needs of many households, small businesses, and agricultural firms. Their business model is based on an important economic explanation of the role of financial intermediaries–to develop and apply expertise that allows a lender to make better judgments about the creditworthiness of potential borrowers than could be made by a potential lender with less information about the borrowers.

    A small, but growing, body of research suggests that the financial services provided by large banks are less-than-perfect substitutes for those provided by community banks.

    It is simply not true that we need the mega-banks. In fact, as many top economists and financial analysts have said, the “too big to fails” are actually stifling competition from smaller lenders and credit unions, and dragging the entire economy down into a black hole.

    The Giant Banks Have Recovered, And Are No Longer Insolvent?

    Have the TBTFs recovered, so that they are no longer insolvent?

    Negatory.

    The giant banks have still not put the toxic assets hidden in their SIVs back on their books.

    The tsunamis of commercial real estate, Alt-A, option arm and other loan defaults have not yet hit.

    The overhang of derivatives is still looming out there, and still dwarfs the size of the rest of the global economy. Credit default swaps have arguably still not been tamed (see this).

    Indeed, Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said recently:

    The U.S. has failed to fix the underlying problems of its banking system after the credit crunch and the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

    “In the U.S. and many other countries, the too-big-to-fail banks have become even bigger,” Stiglitz said in an interview today in Paris. “The problems are worse than they were in 2007 before the crisis.”

    Stiglitz’s views echo those of former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who has advised President Barack Obama’s administration to curtail the size of banks, and Bank of Israel Governor Stanley Fischer, who suggested last month that governments may want to discourage financial institutions from growing “excessively.”

    While the big boys have certainly reported some impressive profits in the last couple of months, some or all of those profits may have been due to “creative accounting”, such as Goldman “skipping” December 2008, suspension of mark-to-market (which may or may not be a good thing), and assistance from the government.

    Some very smart people say that the big banks – even after many billions in bailouts and other government help – have still not repaired their balance sheets. Tyler Durden, Reggie Middleton, Mish and others have looked at the balance sheets of the big boys much more recently than I have, and have more details than I do.

    But the bottom line is this: If the banks are no longer insolvent, they should prove it. If they can’t prove they are solvent, they should be broken up.

    The Government Lacks the Power to Break Them Up?

    Does the government lack the power to break up the TBTFs?

    Wrong.

    One of the world’s leading economic historians – Niall Ferguson – argues in a current article in Newsweek:

    [Geithner is proposing that] there should be a new “resolution authority” for the swift closing down of big banks that fail. But such an authority already exists and was used when Continental Illinois failed in 1984.

    Indeed, even the FDIC mentions Continental Illinois in the same breadth as “too big to fail” banks.

    And William K. Black (remember, he was the senior regulator during the S&L crisis, and is a Professor of both Economics and Law) – says that the Prompt Corrective Action Law (PCA), 12 U.S.C. § 1831o, not only authorizes the government to seize insolvent banks, it mandates it, and that the Bush and Obama administrations broke the law by refusing to close insolvent banks.

    Whether or not the banks’ holding companies can be broken up using the PCA, the banks themselves could be. See this.

    And no one can doubt that the government could find a way to break up even the holdign companies if it wanted.

    FDR seized gold during the Great Depression under the Trading With The Enemies Act.

    Geithner and Bernanke have been using one loophole and “creative” legal interpretation after another to rationalize their various multi-trillion dollar programs in the face of opposition from the public and Congress (see this, for example).

    And the government could use 100-year old antitrust laws to break them up.

    So don’t give me any of this “our hands are tied” malarkey. The Obama administration could break the “too bigs” up in a heartbeat if it wanted to, and then justify it after the fact using PCA or another legal argument.

    Is Temporarily Nationalizing the Giant Banks Socialism?

    Many argue that it would be wrong for the government to break up the banks, because we would have to take over the banks in order to break them up.

    That may be true. But government regulators in the U.S., Sweden and other countries which have broken up insolvent banks say that the government only has to take over banks for around 6 months before breaking them up.

    In contrast, the Bush and Obama administrations’ actions mean that the government is becoming the majority shareholder in the financial giants more or less permanently. That is – truly – socialism.

    Breaking them up and selling off the parts to the highest bidder efficiently and in an orderly fashion would get us back to a semblance of free market capitalism much quicker.

    The Real Reason the Giant Banks Aren’t Being Broken Up

    So what is the real reason that the TBTFs aren’t being broken up?

    Certainly, there is regulatory capture, cowardice and corruption:

    • Joseph Stiglitz (the Nobel prize winning economist) said recently that the U.S. government is wary of challenging the financial industry because it is politically difficult, and that he hopes the Group of 20 leaders will cajole the U.S. into tougher action
    • Economic historian Niall Ferguson asks:

      Guess which institutions are among the biggest lobbyists and campaign-finance contributors? Surprise! None other than the TBTFs [too big to fails].

    • Manhattan Institute senior fellow Nicole Gelinas agrees:

      The too-big-to-fail financial industry has been good to elected officials and former elected officials of both parties over its 25-year life span

    • Investment analyst and financial writer Yves Smith says:

      Major financial players [have gained] control over the all-important over-the-counter debt markets…It is pretty hard to regulate someone who has a knife at your throat.

    • William K. Black says:

      There has been no honest examination of the crisis because it would embarrass C.E.O.s and politicians . . .
      Instead, the Treasury and the Fed are urging us not to examine the crisis and to believe that all will soon be well. There have been no prosecutions of the chief executives of the large nonprime lenders that would expose the “epidemic” of fraudulent mortgage lending that drove the crisis. There has been no accountability…

      The Obama administration and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke have refused to investigate the nature and causes of the crisis. And the administration selected Timothy Geithner, who with then Treasury Secretary Paulson bungled the bailout of A.I.G. and other favored “too big to fail” institutions, to head up Treasury.

      Now Lawrence Summers, head of the White House National Economic Council, and Mr. Geithner argue that no fundamental change in finance is needed. They want to recreate a secondary market in the subprime mortgages that caused trillions of dollars of losses.

      Traditional neo-classical economic theory, particularly “modern finance theory,” has been proven false but economists have failed to replace it. No fundamental reform can be passed when the proponents are pretending that there really is no crisis or need for change.

    • Harvard professor of government Jeffry A. Frieden says:

      Regulatory agencies are often sympathetic to the industries they regulate. This pattern is so well known among scholars that it has a name: “regulatory capture.” This effect can be due to the political influence of the industry on its regulators; or to the fact that the regulators spend so much time with their charges that they come to accept their world view; or to the prospect of lucrative private-sector jobs when regulators retire or resign.

    • Economic consultant Edward Harrison agrees:Regulating Wall Street has become difficult in large part because of regulatory capture.

    But there is an even more interesting reason . . .

    The number one reason the TBTF’s aren’t being broken up is [drumroll] . . . the ‘ole 80’s playbook is being used.

    As the New York Times wrote in February:

    In the 1980s, during the height of the Latin American debt crisis, the total risk to the nine money-center banks in New York was estimated at more than three times the capital of those banks. The regulators, analysts say, did not force the banks to value those loans at the fire-sale prices of the moment, helping to avert a disaster in the banking system.

    In other words, the nine biggest banks were all insolvent in the 1980s.

    And the Times is not alone in stating this fact. For example, Felix Salmon wrote in January:

    In the early 1980s, when a slew of overindebted Latin governments defaulted to their bank creditors, a lot of big global banks, Citicorp foremost among them, became insolvent.

    So the government’s failure to break up the insolvent giants – even though virtually all independent experts say that is the only way to save the economy, and even though there is no good reason not to break them up – is nothing new.

    William K. Black’s statement that the government’s entire strategy now – as in the S&L crisis – is to cover up how bad things are (”the entire strategy is to keep people from getting the facts”) makes a lot more sense.

    John Mauldin

    Another Finger of Instability

    October 2, 2009
    By John Mauldin

    Fingers of Instability
    Ubiquity, Complexity Theory, and Sandpiles
    Stability Leads to Instability
    A Stable Disequilibrium
    3 Billion and Counting
    The Texas Senate Race – A Game Changer
    60 Years and Counting

    “To trace something unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power. Danger, disquiet, anxiety attend the unknown – the first instinct is to eliminate these distressing states. First principle: any explanation is better than none… The cause-creating drive is thus conditioned
    and excited by the feeling of fear …”

    -Friedrich Nietzsche

    This weekend I turn 60 and have been a little more introspective than usual. I am often told that the letter I wrote well over three years ago on ubiquity and complexity theory and the future of the economy was the best letter I have ever done. I went back to read it, and it has aged well. I basically outlined how a financial crisis would unfold, and now it has.

    On reflection, I think that there are perhaps other, even larger, events in our future than the recent credit crisis and recession; yet, just as in 2006, there is a great deal of complacency. But as we will see, there are fingers of instability building up that have the potential to create large disruptions, both positive and negative, in our future. And for the political junkies in the room, I offer a brief insight into what may be one of the more intriguing behind-the-scenes developments in recent years. Now, to the letter.

    “Any explanation is better than none.” – Nietzsche

    And the simpler the explanation, it seems in the investment game, the better. “The markets went up because oil went down,” we are told (except that when oil went up, then there was another reason for the movement of the markets). But we all intuitively know that things are far more complicated than that. However, as Nietzsche noted, dealing with the unknown can be disturbing, so we look for the simple explanation.

    “Ah,” we tell ourselves, “I know why that happened.” With an explanation firmly in  hand, we now feel we know something. And the behavioral psychologists note that this state actually releases chemicals in our brain that make us feel good. We become literally addicted to the simple explanation. The fact that what we “know” (the explanation for the unknowable) is irrelevant or even wrong is not important in achieving the chemical release. And thus we look for reasons.

    The credit crisis happened because of Greenspan’s monetary policy. Or maybe it was
    a collective mania. Or any number of things. Just as the proverbial butterfly flapping its wings in the Amazon triggers a storm in Europe, maybe an investor in St. Louis triggered the credit crisis. Crazy? Maybe not. Today we will look at what complexity theory tells us about the reasons for earthquakes, tornados, and the movement of markets. Then we look at how the world and that investor in St. Louis are all tied together in a critical state. Of course, what state and how critical are the issues.

    Ubiquity, Complexity Theory, and Sandpiles

    We are going to start our explorations with excerpts from a very important book
    by Mark Buchanan, called Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen. I HIGHLY recommend it to those of you who, like me, are trying to understand the complexity of the markets. Not directly about investing, although he touches on it, it is about chaos theory, complexity theory, and critical states. It is written in a manner any layman can understand. There are no equations, just easy-to-grasp, well-written stories and analogies.

    As  kids, we all had the fun of going to the beach and playing in the sand.  Remember taking your plastic buckets and making sandpiles? Slowly pouring the sand into an ever bigger pile, until one side of the pile started an avalanche?

    Imagine, Buchanan says, dropping one grain of sand after another onto a table. A pile soon develops. Eventually, just one grain starts an avalanche. Most of the time it is a small one, but sometimes it builds on itself and it seems like one whole side of the pile slides down to the bottom.

    Well, in 1987 three physicists,  named Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt Weisenfeld, began to play the sandpile game in their lab at Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York. Now, actually piling up one grain of sand at a time is a slow process, so they wrote a computer program to do it. Not as much fun, but a whole lot faster. Not that they really cared about sandpiles. They were more interested in what are called
    nonequilibrium systems.

    They learned some interesting  things. What is the typical size of an avalanche? After a huge number of tests with millions of grains of sand, they found that there is no typical number.

    “Some involved a single grain; others, ten, a hundred or a thousand. Still  others were pile-wide cataclysms involving millions that brought nearly the whole mountain down. At any time, literally anything, it seemed, might be just about to occur.”

    The piles were indeed completely chaotic in their unpredictability. Now, let’s read this next paragraph from Buchanan slowly. It is important, as it creates a mental image that helps me understand the organization of the financial markets and the world economy.  (emphasis mine)

    “To find out why [such unpredictability] should show up in their sandpile game, Bak and colleagues next played a trick with their computer. Imagine peering down on the ile from above, and coloring it in according to its steepness. Where it is relatively flat and stable, color it green; where steep and, in avalanche terms, ‘ready to go,’ color it red. What do you see? They found that at the outset the pile looked mostly green, but that, as the pile grew, the green became infiltrated with ever more red. With more grains, the scattering of red danger spots grew until a dense skeleton of instability ran through the pile. Here then was a clue to its peculiar behavior: a grain falling on a red spot can, by domino-like action, cause sliding at other nearby red spots. If the red network was sparse, and all trouble spots were well isolated one from the other, then a single grain could have only limited repercussions. But when the red spots come to riddle the pile, the consequences of the next grain become fiendishly unpredictable. It might trigger only a few tumblings, or it might instead set off a cataclysmic chain reaction involving millions. The sandpile seemed to have configured itself into a hypersensitive and peculiarly unstable condition in which the next falling grain could trigger a response of any size whatsoever.”

    Something only a math nerd could love? Scientists refer to this as a critical state. The
    term critical state can mean the point at which water would go to ice or steam, or the moment that critical mass induces a nuclear reaction, etc. It is the point at which something triggers a change in the basic nature or character of the object or group. Thus, (and very casually for all you physicists) we refer to something being in a critical state (or use the term critical mass) when there is the opportunity for significant change.

    “But to physicists, [the critical state] has always been seen as a kind of theoretical freak and sideshow, a devilishly unstable and unusual condition that arises only under the most exceptional circumstances [in highly controlled experiments]… In the sandpile game, however, a critical state seemed to arise naturally through the mindless sprinkling of grains.”

    Thus,  they asked themselves, could this phenomenon show up elsewhere? In the earth’s crust, triggering earthquakes, or as wholesale changes in an ecosystem – or as a stock market crash? “Could the special organization of the critical state explain why the world at large seems so susceptible to unpredictable upheavals?” Could it help us understand not just earthquakes, but why cartoons in a third-rate paper in Denmark could cause worldwide riots?

    Buchanan concludes in his opening chapter, “There are many subtleties and twists in the story … but the basic message, roughly speaking, is simple: The peculiar and
    exceptionally unstable organization of the critical state does indeed seem to be
    ubiquitous in our world. Researchers in the past few years have found its
    mathematical fingerprints in the workings of all the upheavals I’ve mentioned
    so far [earthquakes, eco-disasters, market crashes], as well as in the
    spreading of epidemics, the flaring of traffic jams, the patterns by which
    instructions trickle down from managers to workers in the office, and in many
    other things. At the heart of our story, then, lies the discovery that
    networks of things of all kinds – atoms, molecules, species, people, and
    even ideas – have a marked tendency to organize themselves along similar
    lines. On the basis of this insight, scientists are finally beginning to
    fathom what lies behind tumultuous events of all sorts, and to see patterns at
    work where they have never seen them before.”

    Now, let’s think about this for a moment. Going back to the sandpile game, you find
    that as you double the number of grains of sand involved in an avalanche, the  likelihood of an avalanche becomes 2.14 times more likely. We find something
    similar with earthquakes. In terms of energy, the data indicate that earthquakes become four times less likely each time you double the energy they release. Mathematicians refer to this as a “power law,” a special mathematical pattern that stands out in contrast to the overall complexity of the earthquake process.

    Stability Leads to Instability

    So what happens in our game? “… after the pile evolves into a critical state, many grains rest just on the verge of tumbling, and these grains link up into ‘fingers of instability’ of all possible lengths. While many are short, others slice through the pile from one end to the other. So the chain reaction triggered by a single grain might lead to an avalanche of any size whatsoever, depending on whether that grain fell on a short, intermediate or long finger of instability.”

    Now, we come to a critical point in our discussion of the critical state. Again, read this with the markets in mind (again, emphasis mine):

    “In this simplified setting of the sandpile, the power law also points to something else: the surprising conclusion that even the greatest of events have no special or exceptional causes. After all, every avalanche large or small starts out the same way, when a single grain falls and makes the pile just slightly too steep at one point. What makes one avalanche much larger than another has nothing to do with its original cause, and nothing to do with some special situation in the pile just before it starts. Rather, it has to do with the perpetually unstable
    organization of the critical state, which makes it always possible for the next grain to trigger an avalanche of any size
    .”

    Now, let’s couple this idea with a few other concepts. First, Nobel laureate Hyman
    Minsky points out that stability leads to instability. The more comfortable we
    get with a given condition or trend, the longer it will persist and then, when
    the trend fails, the more dramatic the correction. The problem with long-term
    macroeconomic stability is that it tends to produce unstable financial
    arrangements. If we believe that tomorrow and next year will be the same as
    last week and last year, we are more willing to add debt or postpone savings in
    favor of current consumption. Thus, says Minsky, the longer the period of
    stability, the higher the potential risk for even greater instability when
    market participants must change their behavior. (And, three years later, we can
    now all see that truth. But it was not as obvious to a lot of people in 2006.)

    Relating this to our sandpile, the longer that a critical state builds up in an economy,
    or in other words, the more “fingers of instability” that are allowed to
    develop a connection to other fingers of instability, the greater the potential
    for a serious “avalanche.”

    Or, maybe a series of smaller shocks lessens the long reach of the fingers of
    instability, giving a paradoxical rise to even more apparent stability. As the
    late Hunt Taylor wrote, in 2006:

    “Let us start with what we know. First, these markets look nothing like anything I’ve ever encountered before. Their stunning complexity, the staggering number of tradable instruments and their interconnectedness, the light-speed at which information moves, the degree to which the movement of one instrument triggers nonlinear reactions along chains of related derivatives, and the requisite level of mathematics necessary to price them speak to the reality that we are now sailing in
    uncharted waters.

    “… I’ve had 30-plus years of learning experiences in markets, all of which tell me that technology and telecommunications will not do away with human greed and ignorance. I think we will drive the car faster and faster until something bad happens. And I think it will come, like a comet, from that part of the night sky where we least expect it.”

    A second related concept is from game theory. The Nash equilibrium
    (named after John Nash) is a kind of optimal strategy for games involving two
    or more players, whereby the players reach an outcome to mutual advantage. If
    there is a set of strategies for a game with the property that no player can benefit
    by changing his strategy while (if) the other players keep their strategies
    unchanged, then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute
    a Nash equilibrium.

    A Stable Disequilibrium

    So we ended up in a critical state of what Paul McCulley called a “stable disequilibrium.” We have players of this game from all over the world tied inextricably together in a vast dance through investment, debt, derivatives, trade, globalization, international business, and finance. Each player works hard to maximize their own personal outcome and to reduce their exposure to “fingers of instability.”

    But the longer we go on, asserts Minsky, the more likely and violent an “avalanche” is. The more the fingers of instability can build. The more that state of stable disequilibrium can go critical on us.

    Go back to 1997. Thailand began to experience trouble. The debt explosion in Asia began to unravel. Russia was defaulting on its bonds. Things on the periphery, small fingers of instability, began to impinge on fault lines in the major world economies. Something that had not been seen before happened: the historically sound and logical relationship between 29- and 30-year bonds broke down. Then country after
    country suddenly and inexplicably saw that relationship in their bonds begin to correlate, an unheard-of event. A diversified pool of debt was suddenly no longer diversified.

    The fingers of instability reached into Long Term Capital Management and nearly brought the financial world to its knees.

    So, where are the fingers of instability today? Where are the fault lines that could trigger another crisis? Are there any early warning signs? I see two possibilities, one positive and one negative.

    Chad Starliper sent me the following graph. It shows the debt-to-GDP ratio for the US, adding in various levels of debt. For instance, the ratio of debt to GDP for all levels of government debt is 87%. But if you add household and business debt along with the GSE (government-sponsored enterprises) like Fannie and Freddie, the ratio
    rises to 331%. If you add in future benefits of Social Security and Medicare, the number becomes more like 1,000%.

    The Obama administration tells us that the government deficit is going to be well over $1 trillion a year for at least ten years. And that does not take into account the outlier years in the 2020s when the really heavy lifting of Social Security and Medicare kicks in.

    There is a truism that goes a little like, “If something can’t happen, then it won’t.” Let me make a prediction. We won’t have a trillion-dollar deficit in ten years. Why? Because it can’t happen. The market will simply not allow it.

    As I have written, we can run large deficits almost forever, as long as the deficits are less than nominal GDP. While it may not be the wise thing to do, it does not bring down the system.

    But when you start adding to the deficit in amounts significantly larger than nominal GDP, there is a limit. Each dollar, like the grains of sand, adds to the potential instability of the system. Is it $2 trillion more? $3 trillion? No one can know, but the longer it goes, the worse the ensuing financial earthquake will be.

    The current political class and their intentions are dangerously close to killing the golden goose. It is one thing to steal the eggs; it is an altogether different thing to kill the goose through ignorance of the consequences. And the size of the deficit, for as long as they plan to have it, will most assuredly kill the goose.

    Just as I was writing in 2006 about the potential for a crisis, and yet the party went on for quite some time, I think the party can limp along now. But there will come a point when the party is over. Interest rates on the long end will rise precipitously, forcing mortgages up and making the deficit even worse. It will be an even worse crisis than the one we have just gone through. And there will be fewer options for policy makers, and none of them will be good or pleasant. And it will take most people unawares. They will see the current trend and project it into the future. And they will be hit hard.

    Can we avoid this calamity? Yes, we can wrestle the US budget deficit back under some kind of control, close to nominal GDP or on a clear trajectory to get there within a reasonable time (say, a few years). As noted above, we can run deficits close to nominal GDP almost forever. But there is no political willpower to do that now. And so, the market will at some point force the hand of the political class. That investor in St. Louis, or China or (????) will decide not to buy government debt at such low rates. The avalanche will start. And everyone will be surprised at the ferocity of the crisis. Except you, gentle reader. You have been warned.

    Let me re-emphasize that point. If we do not get our act together, the results could be truly serious. And it is not just the US. Japan, as I have written, unless it changes, will hit the wall in the next few years. There are some really sick actors in Europe. You are going to have to be far more nimble and prepared for this next crisis, should it arise, than you were for the last one. Over the next few months, I will be devoting some space to helping us think through how we do that.

    3 Billion and Counting

    And now for something a little more positive.  From the beginning of the wireless revolution and the development of the internet, it was not until 2001 that we finally had one billion people connected. It only took another six years to add another billion. And sometime in 2011, somewhere in the world, we will add yet another billion. We are adding some 70,000 people a day, with smarter and cheaper computers, phones, and netbooks. By some estimates, there will be five billion connected to the network by 2015.

    A study done in 2005 of 21 developing countries by Leonard Waverman of the London Business School “… showed that an extra 10 mobile phones per 100 people in a typical developing country leads to an additional 0.59% of growth in GDP per person.” (Jump Point)

    Think of each one of those additional connected people as a grain of sand. We have already seen a large surge in productivity from the internet and mobile phones. Farmers in India now know what the prices are for their products and don’t have to take lowball offers from middlemen. Fishermen in Indonesia can call around and find where they can get the best price for their day’s catch.

    Tom Hayes argues in his book Jump Point that, because of the growing connectivity, rather large changes are coming to the way we organize our lives. It is a very interesting book and one that I will review in depth at some point.

    But what Hayes calls the Jump Point is what I referred to as critical mass. “In mathematics it is called a ‘jump discontinuity.’ In engineering, this is known as a ’step phase change.’ In climatology, it is called an ‘abrupt delta.’ I call it a Jump Point – a change in the environment, in this case the business environment, so startling
    that we have no choice but to regroup and rethink the future.” (from the introduction)

    Not all of the changes are benign. The potential for business and marketing models to be turned on their head is rather striking. I recommend the book to those who are thinking about the future. It is easy to read, provocative, and well written. You can get it at Amazon.com.

    I wrote this three years ago: “Today more than
    ever your portfolio should be targeting absolute return strategies. In a world
    with fingers of instability that may be connected in ways we have not seen in
    the past, caution is the order of the day. If we do see a slowing US economy
    later this year, the average complacent investor is not going to be happy as
    his diversified portfolio all seems to be going south at the same time.”

    That is still true today. To talk with my
    recommended managers around the world you can go to
    www.accreditedinvestor.ws if your
    net worth is $1.5 million or more. If you are in the US and are still on your
    way to becoming an accredited investor, you can sign up at
    http://www.cmgfunds.net/public/mauldin_questionnaire.asp

    The Texas Senate
    Race – A Game Changer

    Indulge
    me for a moment while I delve into a little inside politics. I used to be very
    involved in Texas politics, but when I sold my business in 1999 and had to go
    back to work for a living, I mostly left out political commitments, although I
    do keep up and have a lot of friends. There is something happening in Texas
    that has the potential to shake things up, and I thought I would give my
    readers a heads up.

    Long-time Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison has
    let everyone know that she intends to come back to Texas and run for governor
    next year against current governor Rick Perry, who is going to run for his
    third term. Hutchison has indicated that she will resign sometime this fall,
    which will give Perry the right to appoint a Senator to fill the seat. He has
    told associates that if he does, the appointment will be a game changer. Who in
    the Texas political landscape could be termed a game changer? Not one of the
    half dozen middle-aged white guys who would love the appointment. Not that some
    of them would be bad choices, just not a game changer. Another woman? There is
    not one who has run a statewide race and has the necessary experience.

    Then
    there is my long-time good friend Michael Williams. Michael has run statewide
    three times as the chairman of the Texas Rail Road Commission which, despite
    the name, is responsible for energy as well as railroads. It is a very powerful
    post in Texas. He is wildly popular with the grass roots and conservatives in
    the state. He is one of the best speakers on the stump in the country. He has a
    powerful command of the energy problem we face. He is totally electable as a
    Senator. And he is black.

    Now that is the definition of a game changer. He
    will burst on the national scene with a presence. If Governor Perry truly wants
    to do something that will change the game not just for Texas but for the
    country, he will appoint Michael at his first opportunity and allow him to run
    in the primary as a sitting Senator. Michael will be at my birthday party
    Saturday night, along with his beautiful and extremely smart wife, Donna. Next
    week on the 12th of October I will be hosting a small private
    fundraiser at my home for those interested in meeting Michael.
    You can click here to respond.

    And for the locals wanting to help
    in the campaign, Michael’s web site is
    http://www.williamsfortexas.com.

    60 Years and Counting

    I
    turn 60 on Sunday, although we will be celebrating with parties on Friday and
    Saturday. For whatever reason, when I turned 50 I was apprehensive. I can quite
    honestly say that I am excited about this birthday, and the future. For all the
    problems we are facing as a country and as a world linked together, I think
    this is the most exciting time to be alive in the history of the world. And the
    next 30 years are going to be much better than the last 60!

    And
    you, gentle reader, are part of my reason to be so optimistic about the future.
    I continue to be amazed that so many people find the writings of this humble
    analyst to be worth their time. In truth, we are all constantly bombarded with
    more and more emails, advertisements, phone calls, letters, books, papers, and
    information, and it is getting harder and harder to focus on what is really
    critical. You give me the most important gift that anyone can receive in the
    Information Age, and that is the gift of your attention. You have hundreds of
    opportunities to divert it elsewhere, and yet you give me some of your precious
    time. I am grateful, and will always strive to make this letter worthy of your interest.

    Finally, my good friend Sir Ed
    Artis of Knightsbridge fame, who is now in the Philippines, writes that he
    urgently needs funds to ship needed medical and relief supplies that have been
    already donated and are waiting on the docks. The disaster in the Philippines
    is quite tragic and calls out to those of us around the world who can help. You
    can go to http://currentmissions.blogspot.com/
    to learn more and to donate.

    My daughter Tiffani points out that
    I have guests arriving for my party and I need to hit the send button, so have
    a great week. I am going to run and enjoy my friends and some great Texas
    barbeque.

    Your always in a critical state analyst,


    John Mauldin

    John@frontlinethoughts.com

    Copyright 2009 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved

    If you would like to reproduce any of John Mauldin’s E-Letters you must include the source of your quote and an email address (John@frontlinethoughts.com) Please write to Wave@frontlinethoughts.com and inform us of any reproductions. Please include where and when the copy will be reproduced.

    John Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA) which is an investment advisory firm registered with multiple states. John Mauldin is a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, (MWS) an NASD registered broker-dealer. MWS is also a Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) registered with the CFTC, as well as an Introducing Broker (IB). Millennium Wave Investments is a dba of MWA LLC and MWS LLC. All material presented herein is believed to be reliable but we cannot attest to its accuracy. Investment recommendations may change and readers are urged to check with their investment counselors before making any investment decisions.

    Barry Ritholtz

    Star Trek Meets Monty Python

    This is why YouTube even exists:

    Tyler Durden

    Deep Thoughts From Dogbert

    It's funny cause it's so not true

    Dilbert.com

    h/t Bankster

     Nach der neuen IWF-Prognose, die in Deutschland wegen des minimalen Plus von 0,3 % so sehr gefeiert wurde, wird Deutschland 2010 mit Italien das schwaechste Glied der G7 sein. Es wird die hoechste Arbeitslosenrate haben und das zweitniedrigste Wirtschaftswachstum (Abb. 15014).
    My first post in this series explained why frustration is perhaps the most destructive force affecting active traders. The second post outlined cognitive strategies for preventing and overcoming trading frustration. This final post will explain a solution-focused approach for dealing with the frustrations that can generate overtrading, missed opportunities, and impulsive decision-making.

    Whereas cognitive techniques for dealing with trading problems focus on changing negative patterns of thinking about ourselves and markets, solution-focused approaches start from the premise that--at times--we are already enacting the positive patterns ("solutions") that we desire. Instead of focusing on what we're doing wrong and trying to prevent ourselves from doing it (which only keeps us problem-focused), we instead craft solution patterns out of our best trading.

    There was a period in which I found myself trading too much and losing money needlessly. I recognized that I was in a frustrated state when I was putting the trades on. In the back of my mind, I sensed that they were poor trades from their inception.

    I also recognized that there were times in which I traded in a very harmonious state of mind. I had clarity about what I was doing and it felt as though the market was coming to me. I wasn't trying to make things happen.

    From the solution-focused vantage point, I began to dissect those harmonious periods. The idea was that, if I could figure out what I was doing right at those times, I could turn those "best practices" into routines--and ultimately into habit patterns.

    One of the clearest conclusions that emerged from this analysis was that, during my harmonious trading, I had an explicit "top-down" perspective on the markets. I focused clearly on what was happening at larger time frames and aligned myself with the market's broader structure (trending/non-trending) and themes. During my frustrated trading, I worked from "bottoms-up", looking for short-term setups regardless of the market's broader picture.

    Little wonder that I would get run over on those bottoms-up trades, catching the next ticks, but missing the next points. My frustration stemmed, not just from my losses, but also from my feelings about what I was doing. At some level, I was frustrated with myself for not trading the way I know how to trade. In short-circuiting my decision-making process, I felt that I was losing a part of myself, my integrity.

    From the solution-focused frame, I found music that--for me--captured a bit of the harmonious feeling that I experienced when I traded well, with integrity. Before I started trading, I engaged in my market preparation, listened to the music, and established a clear, written large-picture view of the market. That became as much a part of my morning routine as washing up, making my coffee, and doing my stretching exercises.

    The solution part was shifting myself to the harmonious frame of mind, while reminding myself of integrity. I didn't try to analyze or fight frustration; rather, I became better at sustaining a mode in which frustration could not flourish.

    As I stressed in a recent post, at times we are already the traders we desire to be. Solution-focused methods are structured techniques for more consistently accessing the person we already are at our best.

    For those interested in a detailed presentation of solution-focused methods, my chapter in the training text The Art and Science of Brief Psychotherapies is a good overview. Trading perspectives devoted to the solution-focused perspective can also be found in this post and its links, as well as Chapter Four of The Daily Trading Coach.
    .
    Tim Knight

    One Last Gasp?

    The FOMC fake-out on September 23rd seems to have changed everything. On that day, the market went from one that was completely confounding to me to one which I feel like old friends with again. It has been a redemptive experience.

    What would make sense at this point would be to get another lift this week - one last gasp, if you will. Whether it crosses into a new yearly high or not almost doesn't matter, although it would make it extra delicious if it did push to a nominal new high, ideally above 10,000 on the Dow. Revenge is a dish best served cold.

    At the moment, most major indexes perfectly touched their trendlines at Friday's lows.

    1003-indu 

    1003-mdi

    Although over in NASDAQ-land, the indexes have breached their trendlines and - - if things pan out as I hope - - will wriggle their way up to the undersides of those former support lines.

    1003-ndx

    The other interesting thing is how the VIX exploded from nearly 20 to nearly 30 over just eight days. An easing off this rapid advance also lines up with the notion of a general rise in the week ahead.

    1003-vix

    As I've mentioned recently, I've held on to all my short positions with the exception of the large day-trading-ish ones, because in spite of the fact I think I'll lose some ground if the market pushes higher.......

    1. It is too risky and time-consuming to leap in and out of a bunch of small positions;
    2. I think the prospect of them moving much lower in the weeks and months ahead makes it worthwhile to let them sit basically forever, adjusting stops along the way

    This is, by the way, how I prefer to trade. I don't get my jollies out of day trading. I'd much, much, much rather have a huge portfolio of instruments that slowly break down over time. It's a heck of a lot less work.

    I would add in closing that gannsecret's mention of October 9th as "the top" didn't go past me (in spite of the fact that I have missed, without exaggeration, the most recent 8,000 comments or so). I'm keeping that in the back of my mind, since some other charts agree with that zone. I eagerly anticipate the week ahead. As usual, it's time for me to do a lot of reading. Have a good Saturday, my friends!


    Barry Ritholtz

    Dilbert Does Warren Buffett

    The new rallying cry: Assemble the Illuminati!

    69230.strip

    Greg Mankiw

    Kocherlakota to the Fed

    As has been reported, Narayana Kocherlakota is the new President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. A few observations:

    1. Bob Lucas told the Wall Street Journal, "He's probably the most abstract thinker ever to head a Federal Reserve bank." That is true and, indeed, an understatement. It is almost like Albert Einstein was hired to be CEO of General Electric.

    2. Narayana has done some very interesting research. My favorite is his work on dynamic optimal taxation. But very little of his work is relevant to the day-to-day concerns of central bankers. If Fed watchers want to figure out his views about monetary policy, they will have a hard time finding much in his written work.

    3. Why did he want this job? Unlike Ben Bernanke, who had written extensively in applied macroeconomics, Narayana is not pursuing a path that seems natural in light of his past work. I suspect his interest in the job was in part based on a desire for a major change in career path, such as when Michael Spence or Hugo Sonnenschein made the shift from economic theory into university administration. I wonder how much Narayana will enjoy the typical responsibilities of a Federal Reserve Bank President, such as talking about the latest data on local economic conditions with the Minnetonka Chamber of Commerce.

    4. Given his unusual background (unusual, that is, for a Bank President), I look forward to hearing Narayana in a few years, after he has had a chance to reflect on the interaction between macroeconomic theory of the sort practiced at the University of Minnesota and the conduct of macroeconomic policy. Is Minnesota-style theory more useful for policymaking than it is usually given credit for in policy circles? If so, how? If not, should it move in new direction? Narayana is now in a position to be a credible messenger between two distant islands within the economics profession. It will be noteworthy to see what messages he chooses to convey.

    5. Narayana is very smart and, by all reports, a very nice guy. I wish him luck in his new job.
    Here is a graph with an estimate of the impact of the preliminary estimate of the annual benchmark revision. (ht John)

    Percent Job Losses During Recessions Click on graph for larger image.

    The dashed line is an estimate of the impact of the large benchmark revision (824 thousand more jobs lost).

    The graph compares the job losses from the start of the employment recession in percentage terms (as opposed to the number of jobs lost).

    Instead of 7.2 million net jobs lost since December 2007, the preliminary benchmark estimate suggests the U.S. has lost over 8.0 million net jobs during that period.

    Even before the annual revision, the current employment recession was already the worst recession since WWII in terms of percent of job losses. The benchmark revision shows this recession was even deeper. The revision will be reported in February ... just something to remember over the next few months.
    By Paul Krugman

    Obama’s Anzio

    Obama is pinned down in his too-small beachhead, taking heavy casualties.
    "I would have thought they would have let it float by now, it's in China's interest, it's in the world's interest for them to do it. Whether they do it this year or 2011, but it's coming. They are opening it up more and more each quarter, so it's coming"
    "China saved up huge reserves for a rainy day, now it's raining and they're spending those reserves. You contrast that with the UK or the US for instance which has no reserves, has nothing but huge debts and they're borrowing, or printing, or taxing to spend their money… I'd rather be in the East than in the West."
    By Paul Krugman

    Party of Beavis and Butt-head

    Middle-aged adolescents rule.

    Barron’s Alan Abelson calls the September employment report “An absolute horror.”

    He notes that as bad as things look on the surface, “the more you dig into the numbers, the worse they get.” He references my pal Doug Kass, who explains why those expecting a “V-recovery” and a robust consumer snap back are kidding themselves.

    While Doug and I diverged about how far the market momentum might carry — I said further, he said not-so-much — we are in agreement as to the economic effects of labor under-utilization and years of credit card over-utilization: An anemic US consumer:

    “As Doug Kass, our hedge-fund-manager friend, who was a whiz at arithmetic when he was 10 years old and still can do his sums, totes it up, there are 2.2 million of these marginally attached souls, who would like to work but haven’t been able to land a job and aren’t receiving benefits. Add in some 9.2 million involuntary part-timers and the aforementioned 15.1 million formally unemployed, and the jobless total swells to over 26 million.

    A compassionate portfolio manager (if there is such an animal), Doug tries to fathom in flesh-and-blood terms what those dry-as-dust dry statistics mean. And what he envisions are 26 million people not going to malls for extras, or taking the kids to the movies, hunting the cheapest victuals they can find at the supermarket and who are denying themselves the pleasures of travel, eating out, upgrading to Windows 7 or buying iPhone apps.

    Now conceivably, they may not miss the Windows 7 or buying iPhone apps. (Apple and Microsoft might not agree.) Still, 26 million, even give or take a million, is an awesome number of unemployed men and women. The ironic conclusion Doug draws from this dismal picture as an investment pro is that corporate revenues are destined to continue to drag, and companies straining to realize those absurdly inflated Street expectations for 2010-11 earnings will continue to focus on cutting costs, which translates into cutting jobs.”

    That sounds just about right . . .

    >

    Source:
    Downright Scary
    ALAN ABELSON
    Barron’s October 5, 2009
    http://online.barrons.com/article/SB125452481422260689.html

    Barry Ritholtz

    Pellegrini Fund Returns 80%

    Paolo Pellegrini saw the trouble in rising housing prices early. He helped John Paulson’s fund engineer a massive bet against subprime mortgages. Paulson & Co. gained 590% in 2007 — more than $3.5 billion.

    Seeking to show he was no one hit wonder, Pellegrini opened his own fund this year — and its up 80%.

    Bloomberg Video:

    Pellegrini Calls U.S. Stimulus Policies Wrong Solution

    Pellegrini Sees “Anemic” Real Returns on U.S. Stocks

    >

    Embed (with pre-roll)

    >

    Paolo Pellegrini interview with Bloomberg in January 09 is here.

    >

    Source:
    Pellegrini 80% Return Proves Paulson Protege No Fluke at Fund
    Richard Teitelbaum
    Bloomberg, Oct. 2 2009
    http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=akryRHYHS0Sg

    As Beijing slowly unlocks from its 60th anniversary celebrations – the streets are still relatively empty but more and more people are going out, although my local Starbucks still hasn’t reopened, forcing me to go elsewhere for my hardcore caffeine fix – a lot is still going on in the rest of the world. Both the US and the IMF have come out with releases that help us to pick through the problems that China and the world are facing.

    Before discussing these releases, let me make a quick digression to an event that a lot of people have been asking me about. Two weeks ago China Construction Bank announced that it would rollover 24.7 billion yuan in bonds that it had “purchased” from its AMC, Cinda, for another 10 years. Bank of China and ICBC, which sit on 473 billion yuan worth of AMC bonds, will probably do the same when their AMC bonds come due.

    What does this all mean? Remember that as part of the recapitalization of the banks after the NPL fiasco of 10-15 years ago, the AMCs (asset management companies) were created to purchase and liquidate the bad debt. There is a big argument as to whether or not they took out all the garbage loans, but at any rate they bought a lot of bad debt and, since they had no assets of their own, paid for them with issues of medium term bonds, which they exchanged in two tranches. One tranche was for 100% of the face value of one portion of the bad loans they took on, and the other was for 50% of face of the rest of the bad loans they acquired.

    The problem of course is that these bad loans were worth a lot less than either 100% of face or even 50% of face. In fact they have been liquidated at a rate of about 20% of face. This leaves the AMCs bankrupt and unable to repay the bonds, so when they came due the bonds were simply rolled over. There is a sort of comfort letter from the Ministry of Finance (its exact value is in dispute), so the banks have been able to get away with treating the bonds as money good. The point of all this is to remind us that all the .losses for the earlier spate of bad loans, even assuming that all the bad loans were identified and cleaned up (which I doubt) have not been resolved.

    Someone (the banks? The Ministry of Finance?) will eventually have to pay up. If the process is allowed to drag on for many years, I suspect that the banks will pay out of retained earnings, but since retained earnings at the banks consist primarily of the very wide spread between the lending rates and the interest rates that banks are allowed to pay depositors, ultimately this means that households will be forced to recapitalize the banks. If there is a short term problem, however, perhaps leading to a crisis of confidence in the banks, I suspect that the MoF (unless debt at the sovereign level in the mean time becomes a problem) will explicitly guarantee the bonds or take them directly on the government balance sheet.

    US unemployment picture is ugly

    To return to the rest of the world, unemployment in the US is not getting better. Yesterday the Labor Department released figures that showed the US unemployment rate climbing to a fresh 26-year high of 9.8% in September. According to an article in the Financial Times:

    Official figures on Friday showed that non-farm payrolls dropped by 263,000, making it the 21st consecutive month that the US economy has shed jobs. The data were worse than even the most grim expectations, as economists predicted a 175,000 drop in payrolls, and followed a decline of a revised 201,000 jobs in August when the unemployment rate was 9.7 per cent.

    Although I think most economists are expecting that US economic growth in the third quarter was a fairly healthy 3%, as far as China is concerned it is not the future growth in the US economy that matters so much as future growth in US consumption. A jobless recovery in the US, if that is what we get, probably means that dragging household consumption will not be the engine of US growth, and even less will it be the engine of Asian growth, which it was for so many years. Any Asian and Chinese recovery predicated on a revival of out-of-control US consumption is likely to be disappointed.

    On Thursday the IMF released its World Economic Outlook, which was mildly positive on the global economy, arguing that “the recovery has started, financial markets are healing, and in most countries growth will be positive for the rest of the year as well as in 2010,” although in line with the US employment report it worried that “the pace of recovery is expected to be slow and, for quite some time, insufficient to decrease unemployment” (later in the report they say “the current rebound will be sluggish, credit constrained, and, for quite some time, jobless”). The report also argued that because most of the “recovery” has been based on public spending and, I guess especially in Asia, gearing up capacity without much regard for demand, an economic recovery was likely to be slow and risky.

    The IMF seems increasingly to be agreeing with the “global imbalances” analysis of the economy, probably to the dismay of China and other surplus countries. Early in the report it says:

    To complement efforts to repair the supply side of economies, there must also be adjustments in the pattern of global demand in order to sustain a strong recovery. Specifically, many economies that have followed export-led growth strategies and have run current account surpluses will need to rely more on domestic demand and imports.

    This will help offset subdued domestic demand in economies that have typically run current account deficits and have experienced asset price (stock or housing) busts, including the United States, the United Kingdom, parts of the euro area, and many emerging European economies. To accommodate the shifts on the demand side, there will need to be changes on the supply side.

    Surplus countries must consume more

    The interesting thing for me was this focus on surplus countries. Although there does seem to be an economic rebound, the report says, the recovery will be weak unless countries with large trade surpluses step up domestic demand. To keep growth up, surplus countries like China must boost domestic spending, and appreciate their currencies. This pretty tough claim will probably not make Beijing, Berlin or Tokyo very happy, although it does chime with US views on global trade imbalances. In their own words:

    To complement efforts to repair the supply side of economies, there must also be adjustments in the pattern of global demand in order to sustain a strong recovery. Specifically, many economies that have followed export-led growth strategies and have run current account surpluses will need to rely more on domestic demand—notably emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere and Germany and Japan.

    This will help offset subdued domestic demand in economies that have typically run current account deficits and have experienced asset price (stock or housing) busts, including the United States, the United Kingdom, parts of the euro area, and many emerging European economies. In these economies, private consumption and investment are unlikely to pick up the slack that will be left by diminishing fiscal stimulus, given that household incomes and corporate profits will be subdued and balance sheet repair will be under way for some time, implying higher saving rates.

    The authors of the report do not seem terribly optimistic about the prospects for a sustainable spurt in surplus-country domestic demand in the near term (“This process of rebalancing global demand will be drawn out.”) but I am not sure, perhaps because the IMF is after all a very politicized institution, that they specify the trade consequences. They acknowledge that there will be a problem with expected increases in savings in one part of the world conflicting with high savings elsewhere, and they don’t seem very optimistic about prospects for a surge in investment, but it seems to me that they shy away from working out how this will happen and how the pain will be distributed (through the trade account, I would argue).

    What about overinvestment?

    In a section in Chapter 4 of the report entitled “Do Precrisis Conditions Help to Predict Medium-term Output Losses?” there was an interesting discussion about the relationship between output losses associated with a crisis and pre-crisis investment levels. On especially commented on section had this:

    The prominent role of investment and capital losses suggests that the level and evolution of precrisis investment would be good predictors of eventual output losses. Indeed, regression results provide strong evidence that economies with high precrisis investment-to-GDP ratios, measured as the average investment-to-GDP ratio during the three years before the crisis, tend to have large output losses.

    In contrast, the investment gap, defined as the deviation from its historical average of the investment-to-GDP ratio during the three years before a crisis, is not statisti­cally significant. We return to potential interpretations of these results later in this section, but it is worth mentioning that the precrisis investment share is particularly robust as a leading indica­tor, even after controlling for the level of the current account balance. This suggests that countries that have high investment rates tend to experience larger output declines follow­ing banking crises, irrespective of whether the investment is financed by foreign or domestic savings.

    For those of us who worry about China’s having recently increased its already-excessively-high investment rate, this passage was an uncomfortable read. In addition for people like me, who believe strongly that the very process of misallocated investment will act as a damper on future consumption growth (and I think this is becoming much more widely accepted, or at least discussed, in policy circles), the combination of warnings over overinvestment and pleas for more consumption from trade surplus countries is deeply worrying. By the way, for a short and quick view of why I think consumption won’t grow, you can check a recent debate held by the New York Times on the subject of Chinese consumption growth.

    So what about all this excess investment? The State Council recently made a lot of noise about its determination to curb excess capacity. Here is the Financial Times version of the story:

    China has issued a stark warning about the risk from rising overcapacity in the economy, saying it could hamper recovery and lead to a surge in non-performing bank loans. The State Council, the country’s cabinet, issued a new plan to combat overcapacity in seven industries, barring new aluminium smelters for three years and criticising “blind expansion” in parts of the steel and cement industries.

    The cabinet statement, which came late on Tuesday evening in Beijing, follows a crescendo of warnings from senior officials. It also outlined measures to restrict manufacturing of equipment for “green” industries of wind and solar power. China’s economy has rebounded sharply in recent months due to an investment boom – much into infrastructure – fuelled by increased public spending and a surge in lending by the state-owned banks.

    But over the past three months many government officials have begun to publicly warn that the credit binge could create overcapacity in heavy industry, which could produce a new round of bad bank loans.

    The article in the South China Morning Post adds some color, and a partial explanation of why all these angry statements about preventing excess capacity over the past few years have had so little effect:

    In unusually blunt wording, the cabinet also pointed its finger at local authorities. “Some regions have acted illegally. We are once again seeing cases of illegitimate approvals, of construction starting before it has been approved, and of construction starting even as the approval process is underway,” it said.

    The cabinet’s strident warning about overcapacity underscored why officials have been circumspect about the economy, repeatedly saying that it has shown signs of recovering from the global financial crisis but is still not on solid ground.

    It is hard to give up investing

    The truth is everyone in the world is against the creation of “excess” capacity, but as long as Beijing has in place policies that explicitly subsidize investment and production, it will take an awful low more than fulminating against wasteful investment to eliminate it. I would argue that wasteful investment is the automatic consequence of policies that lower the cost of capital to “unreasonable” levels, implicitly socialize risk, and otherwise subsidize producers in the name of boosting employment.

    Since Beijing has very explicitly chosen to attack rising unemployment in the short term – probably wisely, although also probably more ferociously than was optimal – there is little they can do to prevent a massive rise in wasteful investment. You cannot take an economy with the highest investment rate in history, and already massive waste, and very quickly force investment rates up even higher, without also increasing waste. The problem with all this wasted investment, of course, is that someone must pay for it, and that “someone” will undoubtedly be Chinese households, who will then almost certainly go on to disappoint us by failing to splurge on consumption.

    And are they really serious about tackling excess capacity? Here is what Bloomberg said in an article earlier this week about the shipping industry:

    China and South Korea’s support for shipbuilders may add to a glut of capacity, slowing a recovery in freight rates and vessel prices. The world’s two largest shipbuilding nations have taken steps this year to aid shipyards and safeguard jobs as customers delay or scrap orders amid tumbling world trade. That support will likely ensure more vessels enter service, even as lines mothball and scrap existing ships because of a lack of cargo.

    “The Chinese and Koreans, in particular, will make sure that these ships come,” Philip Clausius, chief executive officer of lessor First Ship Lease Trust, told a conference in Singapore yesterday. The “daunting number” of ships that “will hit the market over the next three, four, five years will make the recovery a rather slow and painful one.”

    China’s bid to become the largest shipbuilding nation by 2015 may also worsen the glut as it competes for market share, said Matthias Umlauf, senior economist at HSH Nordbank AG. The world’s shipyards have dry-bulk ship orders with a combined capacity of 64 percent of the existing fleet, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

    China has “the chance to become the world’s largest shipbuilding nation and they will not let this chance go,” said Umlauf. “They will support their national champions and that will definitely add to the overcapacity situation.”

    As I have said many times before, I don’t see how pressures to increase savings in the US and other trade-deficit countries will not conflict with pressures in China, Germany, and other trade-surplus countries to maintain policies that force up savings rates, especially if sustainable global investment rates decline. The only outcome, I think, is increasing trade tensions. In that light, today Bloomberg reported a very worrying escalation of the conflict:

    The two largest groups representing U.S. companies in China said the Asian nation has enacted a series of policies discriminating against foreign investors and imports. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-China Business Council said in testimony today that Chinese contracting rules, technical standards and licensing requirements were protectionist. Chinese officials have made the same charge against the U.S. following President Barack Obama’s imposition of tariffs on Chinese tire imports.

    Both organizations have previously defended China, calling it a large and growing market for U.S. exports and lobbying to fend off legislation aimed at punishing China for currency policies and government subsidies. The criticisms of the two U.S. groups reflect mounting tensions that economists said could spark a spiral of retaliatory measures between the countries.

    “There are growing indications that China’s movement toward a market economy has stalled,” Jeremie Waterman, senior director for China at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, testified to a hearing at the U.S. Trade Representative’s office today. “The voices of protectionism in both countries are on the rise.”

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