Tagesarchiv für den 10.10.2009

From Eric Dash at the NY Times: Small Banks Failure Rate Grows, Straining F.D.I.C.

A few numbers from the article:
... About $870 billion, or roughly half of the industry’s $1.8 trillion of commercial real estate loans, now sit on the balance sheets of small and medium-size banks like these, according to an analysis by Foresight Analytics, a research firm. ... And as a group, small banks have written off only a tiny percentage of the losses that analysts expect them to incur.

In fact, applying only the commercial real estate loss assumptions that federal regulators used during the stress tests for the big banks last spring, Foresight analysts estimated that as many as 581 small banks were at risk of collapse by 2011.

By contrast, commercial real estate losses put none of the nation’s 19 biggest banks, and only about 5 of the next 100 largest lenders, in jeopardy.
....
[Gerard Cassidy, a veteran banking analyst] projects that as many as 1,000 small banks will close over the next few years and that their losses will be more severe. “It’s a repeat [of savings and loan crisis] on steroids,” he said.
This gives us a ballpark feel for the coming CRE losses. Local and regional banks are exposed to about $870 billion in CRE loans. Not all of the loans will go bad, and the loss severity will be far less than 100%. So the losses may be in the $100 to $200 billion range; small compared to the residential mortgage losses, but still very significant.
Tim Knight

Your Data Stylist

If anyone plans to stay at the Amalfi Hotel in Chicago, as I just did, you might find this guide to personnel terms handy. Because they are used - without one hint of irony or embarrassment.

1010-jobs


Brett Steenbarger, Ph.D.

Divergences on the Radar


We registered a new bull market closing highs for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DIA; above) and S&P 500 Index (SPY) on Friday. Falling short of their bull highs thus far are the NASDAQ 100 and Russell 2000 averages, as well as the XLB, XLI, XLV, XLF, and XLU sectors. We made 1305 20-day highs on Thursday across the NYSE, NASDAQ, and ASE and 970 on Friday. That compares with over 3000 fresh 20-day highs in mid-September.

This past week's rally may broaden out in coming days; thus far, however, it's worth noting that the rally has been inconsistent: pushing up large caps in the U.S. and emerging market stocks (EEM), while much of the rest of the world (EFA)--particularly Japan (EWJ) and the U.K. (EWU)--and smaller cap issues in the U.S. have lagged.
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Karl Denninger

Government Violates The Citizens (Again)

This is going to be an ongoing series, I suspect - tracking government abuse of the citizenry via debt-shifting.

What am I referring to?  Simple: Back-door bailouts of banks and industry (notably the auto industry) through farcical programs that con the citizens of the nation to take on unsustainable debt, thereby transferring what should be a corporate or bank failure to into a whole bunch of personal bankruptcies.

There are two programs in particular that exemplify this attempt; "cash for clunkers" and the various machinations in the housing space, including the insanely loose FHA credit procedures.

Cash for Clunkers violated two basic premises: It destroyed perfectly good capital assets (older cars that were in good running condition; indeed, it required 12 months of continual insurance coverage and registration - that is, proof of being in good running order for the past year - to qualify!) and replaced them with a vehicle that had a presumed debt load on it.

Now we find out that indeed (as I have long suspected) the government's insane FHA approvals of patently unsustainable loans was an intentional act:

Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, said in an interview that the defaults were, in essence, worth it.

“I don’t think it’s a bad thing that the bad loans occurred,” he said. “It was an effort to keep prices from falling too fast. That’s a policy.”

Got that?  It's a policy to intentionally bankrupt people so as to allow banks who have made bad mortgages a chance to avoid their own bankruptcy.

That is, those who made bad decisions as lenders, you get a pass.  Your pain is passed to consumers by intentionally lowering standards for lending beyond the point of safety, on purpose, knowing full well that this will generate a significant number defaults.

This in turn prevents prices from contracting to where you could afford the house, that is, it causes you to overpay.  This in turn causes you to go bankrupt instead of the bank that made the bad loan to the previous owner.  In addition by preventing the house from contracting in price to it's actual sound value it stops other banks who made bad loans from going bust as well.

You, on the other hand, will get foreclosed upon and possibly forced into bankruptcy, all so that the banks who did evil and unsupportable things don't have to take their medicine.

This is "a policy" according to Barney Frank.  It is, in fact, THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

Feeling sore yet?

Believe me, they're just getting started.

The Dollar's depreciation is intentional.  If economic activity picks up (it hasn't yet, despite what you're told) this will instantaneously echo into oil prices.  How badly?  The last time the dollar was here oil was at $150 and gas was aiming for $5/gallon.  We're going back there - or higher.  There are people who claim the federal government's official desire is to see the dollar index (/DX) at forty or lower, a devaluation of another fifty percent, and a 2/3rds devaluation from just a few years ago.

This of course will triple the cost of imports from that point of a few years ago.  It will boost the relative wages of those in other nations by 300%, while cutting your relative wages by 2/3rds, again, all referenced to just a few years back.

Can you survive this without becoming destitute?

One in six American households currently receive food stamps and according to a report by Deutche Bank 40% of homes will be under water on their mortgage by 2011.  The government added $1.7 trillion to the public debt last fiscal year (ending September 30th), taking in $2.1 trillion in taxes and fees.  The claim is made that the "budget" was $3.1 trillion; in reality, $3.8 trillion was spent, an "overage" of $700 billion or 22%.  (As an aside the CBO claims the "deficit" was significantly smaller but they ignore the off-balance-sheet games; tax receipts and the addition of debt are hard numbers, both published, and expose the chicanery.  Performed by a private business this would be a felony violation of securities laws and result in jail time; our government lies like this daily.)

People claim that "inflation" of the money supply allows debt to be paid off easier but this is only true if your wages remain constant in inflation-adjusted terms while prices are stable, or wages keep up with prices.  The problem is that they haven't since the turn of the century.  Per-capita income has risen only 3.2% (in total, not annually!) since 2000 in inflation-adjusted terms, and this presumes you believe government inflation numbers averaging about 2.5% annually.  How does that square with your grocery bill?  Your electric bill?  The cost of medical insurance and care, college tuition, homeowners insurance or a trip to the dentist?

Remember too that these "per capita income numbers" include those who made billions bilking Americans out of their homes during the bubble years.  Subtract those "outliers" back out and middle class America really got rooked at paycheck time.

If you think this is all the punishment you're due, you're deluded.  Taxes are going to go up.  Way up.  They have to, in order to close the gap between income and outgo for the government.  Guess who will get that bill?  The mirror is right over on the bathroom wall if you're having trouble identifying the sucker.....  This of course will further squeeze that so-called "income" you once had - if you keep your job.

Just remember folks, as you are saying "please sir, would you do that to me again" that you've asked for this.  You bought into the "ownership society" and demanded that everyone be able to have a house - whether they could afford one or not.  This in turn drove up the price (supply and demand 'yanno) until people couldn't afford to pay, at which point the banks simply stopped caring about anything resembling sustainable lending.

When that blew up instead of forcing the people who made bad bets (especially those fat cat bankers) to take their medicine the government decided instead to screw you again, this time with a formal policy of allowing bad loans to be intentionally made by the FHA.  So says Barney Frank.

The surprise here is that given the rank admissions coming from both Fraud Street and our Congressfolk we have yet to see any sort of real protest.

Why not?

With over 20 million lost jobs in the last decade and 8.2 million since 2007 you'd think those folks would band together and descend on Washington DC to demand that the idiocy stop, refusing to leave until Congress resigns en-masse.  Have they?  Nope.  Why not?  Good question - are we really that dumb?  Does America truthfully not realize what is being done to them? 

I guess not.

You're being shorn and then violated America - repeatedly.

Yet America's slumber continues, as does my amazement.

Molecool

Mole’s Treasure Map

I’m buried in work this weekend in preparation for next week’s business trip. No, not ‘another’ vacation - which some put it after I took five measly days off for the first time in over a year. So, I probably won’t have time for my traditional weekend update, which however does not matter as our treasure map for next week is quite simple. Let me get into character:

Here be how  ye pigheaded, pea-brained bugbears get t’ Mole’s booty: Follow th’ path o’ doomed bears straight up an’ wait fer sunset at th’ 1100 marrrk. Then turrn an’ secure a spot in Indiana Jones’ roller coaster from hell, this time descendin’ downwarrrd. Th’ booty be buried at th’ orange square - but ye canna proceed tharr directly since th’ direct path be infested wi’ cattle prod wieldin’ OPX rage sufferin’ market makers.

Blue Rum be still a possibility but we`d need a drop almost immediately startin’ Mondee mornin’. As I already mentioned on Thursdee night to ye craven, feather-plucked catspaws - I think that one be a bit o’ a stretch an’ I only give ‘t about a 30% probability starboard now.

Quite obvious what`s goin’ on an’ ’tis a wake up call fer ye weedy ueber-bearrrs. P3 confirmation will nay occur unless we be seein’ them cross downward.

Gold:Silver: No surprise here fer reeky, dizzy-eyed rats loverrs - we need t’ be seein’ this thin’ pull up t’ confirm a drop - seems we could complete a fifth wave here an’ take ou’ 58.5.

Th’ motto fer next week: Stop wastin’ me time an’ put somethin’ in th’ box!

Now be off, ye hideous, hunch-backed lout!


Tyler Durden

The New Yorker On Martin Armstrong

Genius or madman, at least his thoughts are getting prominence. (Also, another example of stretching a $0 marketing and advertising budget.)

Full Nick Paumgarten article below, compliments of Barry Ritholtz.

 

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The Secret Cycle.pdf485.82 KB

It is no secret that Julian Robertson is not a huge fan of long-dated bonds. In his recent CNBC interview he had some downright nasty words about the back-end of the UST curve, especially if the "downside contingency" case of foreign purchases ceasing, were to pass. However, while many have known about his propensity for the bond steepener trade, his latest trade position is the so called Constant Maturity Swap trade. Moving away from an outright steepener makes sense as it can now only profit from a tail end widening, since the front end of the curve is at zero. Unless Bernanke follows Sweden into negative rates territory, the steepener upside potential has just been mechanically limited by 50%. As for his current preferred iteration of expressing Treasury bearishness, CMS, here is some recent commentary from JR on the topic:

"The insurance policy I would buy is called a CMS Rate Cap, which is the equivalent of buying puts on long-term Treasuries. If inflation happens the way it could, long-term Treasuries are just going to explode. Less than 30 years ago, long-term interest rates got to 20%. I can envision that seeming like a very low interest rate compared to what might occur in the future."

No surprise then, that Morgan Stanley's Govvy desk has started pimping this trade (including some hedged and Knock Out variants) to anyone who wants to imitate that original Tiger. In a recent version of their Interest Rate Strategist, the key proffered trade is precisely Shorting back-end rates, with the following summary recommendations:

  • Buy a 5 year Cap on 30 year CMS struck ATM (5.38%) for 105 bps
  • Buy a 5 year Cap on 30 year CMS struck ATM. Sell a 5 year Cap on 30 year CMS struck at 8.38%, for a net cost of 65 bps.
  • Buy a 5 year Cap on 30 year CMS struck at 5.38% that knocks out in 1 year if 30 year CMS is above 5.38% for 62 bps.

Here is MS' entire modest proposal:

In the past month, longer-dated volatility has declined and longer-dated rates have rallied (Exhibit 1). Getting short back-end rates – with defined downside – is becoming increasingly attractive. We maintain our long-held belief that, in the long run, the curve will steepen significantly, and we continue to believe that long-dated rate caps will benefit from the higher rates and higher volatility that will come from increased Treasury issuance and an end to the public stimulus programs.


Specifically, we propose a selection of the following trades:

  • Buy a 5y cap on 30y CMS struck ATM (5.38%) for 105bp
  • Buy a 5y cap on 30y CMS struck at 5.38%, Sell a 5y cap on 30y CMS struck at 8.38%, for a net cost of 65bp
  • Buy a 5y cap on 30y CMS struck at 5.38% that knocks out in 1y if 30y CMS is above 5.38%, for 62bp

Inflation and long-end supply remain substantial concerns, particularly for longer maturities. Our economists expect 10y UST gross issuance to more than double from 2008 to 2009, and for 30y UST gross issuance to more than triple. After 2009, we also project 10y UST issuance to increase by $40 billion per year, and long bond gross issuance by approximately $50 billion per year (Exhibit 2). This is while the Fed is projected to keep short-term rates on hold in order to stimulate the economy and maintain a steep curve.

 

We aim to target 30y rates. This is because we project 30y UST gross issuance to keep increasing at a faster pace than 10y gross issuance (Exhibit 2). Moreover, we expect the curve to steepen in periods of high inflation.

 

We also target longer expiries (3-5y). Two reasons behind this: first, we have been in a secular downward trend in longer-term rates since the mid 1980s (Exhibit 3). This is a trade for us to break out of that range – we expect such a shift to occur over a longer period of time as opposed to in the next year. Second, flows out of lower yielding money market funds into the belly of the curve are expected to keep longer rates bid, at least for the next couple of months, in our view. This is something that we can exploit by entering into a knock-out cap.

 


Investors looking to decrease the upfront cost of the option can accomplish this in one of two ways: either by limiting their upside, or by playing the timing of the sell-off in longer-dated rates.
Limiting the upside would involve selling an OTM cap against the ATM cap that the investor is long. For instance, if the investor sells a 300bp OTM cap against buying long an ATM cap, this cheapens the upfront cost of the option to 65bp, or by 38%. Note that OTM skew on longer tails has richened substantially over the past three months. Exhibit 4 graphs the spread between 100bp OTM 5y30y payors and 100bp OTM receivers, normalized by the level of at-the-money vol – the higher this spread, the more expensive payor skew is relative to receiver skew. Over the past three months, OTM payor skew has become increasingly expensive. This is why we prefer monetizing and selling it as opposed to moving the strike of the CMS cap that we’re long further out of the money.

Playing the timing of the sell-off in longer-dated rates would cheapen the upfront cost of the cap by selling a shorter-expiry option against the longer-expiry cap. Flows out of money market funds into the belly of the curve are likely to keep the long end somewhat bid in the near term, in our view. Investors can monetize this by entering into a 5y cap on 30y CMS rates that knocks out in 1y if 30y CMS is above a strike of their choosing. For instance, a 5y cap on 30y CMS struck ATM (5.38%) that knocks out in 1y if 30y CMS is above 5.38% has an upfront cost of 62bp; if investors move the strike of the knock-out to 6%, the cost increases to 79bp. Note that a 2y knockout cheapens the cap even more than the 1y knockout. The principal risks to the outright CMS Cap are either that rates continue to rally, or that vol falls. Note that both of these risks are mitigated with a 1x1 cap spread, or with a knock-out cap. In each of the three trades, however, the maximum downside for investors is equal to the initial premium invested.

If last week's pounding of the 30 year is any indication, Robertson may just be on the right trade yet again. The demonstratory selling of 30 years both into and after the Auction was obviously agenda driven, and it is doubtful it bypassed Bernanke's, and the PD's attention. Yet as China is increasingly boxed and realizes fully well it needs to buy some Treasuries (lest it sends the world a signal that it is willing to write off its $2.5 trillion in dollar reserves), it is conceivable that going forward it will merely focus in the 1-3/5 Year Tenor range, as it leaves anything 10 years and out to other, Fed financed chums. Some desks have in fact argued that what the ABX trade was for subprime, and CMBX was for CRE, the CMS trade will end up being for Treasuries. Although be careful: while your opponents in the first two were subprime borrowers and Cohen & Steers respectively (hardly admirable opponents), in the last trade you are taking on the Federal Reserve and the full faith and credit of the US head on. For if the Fed losses control of the 10-30 year span, it might as well go home, since that means 30 Year mortgages will skyrocket,maybe all the way into double digit territory, thus destroying all hopes of inflating the GSE bubble.
Yet as Soros showed in the 90's, Central Banks can lose. All that needs to happen to topple Ben, is for the bond vigilantes to come out in force and support Robertson's fatalistic view on USTs. Not even the worlds most overheating printing press can take on the combined power of all the bond vigilantes in the world. Although, it is arguable if one can take on the Fed via passive strategies such as CMS. Someone with real guts would have to be the first to go all out and short the back-end. If substantiated by a sufficient number of synthetic bearish positions, at that point it will be merely a matter of time before Bernanke is finally forced to fold his endless deck of Aces.
For some additional color on CMS, we recommend this paper from Goldman Sachs.
Barry Ritholtz

QOTD: “The banks run the place”

Want to know why Financial Reform has been dead in the water so far ?

“The banks run the place. I will tell you what the problem is — they give three times more money than the next biggest group. It’s huge the amount of money they put into politics.”

- Representative Collin C. Peterson  (D- Minnesota), NYT

And this:

“And the banks — hard to believe in a time when we’re facing a banking crisis that many of the banks created — are still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place.”

-Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), WJJG 1530 AM’s “Mornings with Ray Hanania.”

We no longer live in a democracy — its a corptocracy, where the government gets sold to the highest bidder.

John McCain was sure right about this — whatever happened to that guy? The maverick MaCain who tried to rein in lobbyists and campaign contributions?

Barry Ritholtz

Principles of Economics, Translated

An oldie but a goodie:

Brett Steenbarger, Ph.D.

Chasing Yield, Not Risk


Low interest rates are pushing individual and professional investors into higher-risk assets in the search for yield. This has been happening for a while, as mutual fund inflows into municipal bond funds have topped 1 billion dollars for 11 consecutive weeks. This has pushed yields down over the past six months (chart above; props to Bloomberg).

Interestingly, investors can only be pushed so far along the risk continuum: as mutual fund assets for bond funds have increased, those for stocks have declined--even as the stock market has risen. That is hardly the psychology of a bubble in the making.

It's only after investors shun fixed income and pursue a bull market in stocks that I suspect we'll be ready to set up for a fresh bear. That might not happen until the Fed is in the mode of raising rates, which in turn might not happen until inflation replaces unemployment as the dominant headline. If that's the case, the bull could have further to run.
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Davon betroffen sind hauptsächlich kleine und mittlere Betriebe. Ursache: immer mehr Abschreibungen bei den Banken aufgrund „fauler“ Kredite und strengere Kreditvergaberichtlinien => Kreditklemme voraus? Kommt mir irgendwie bekannt vor…

Gefunden bei marketwatch.com:

Capitol Report

Oct. 9, 2009, 6:00 a.m. EDT

Banks cutting back on loans to businesses

Credit squeeze on entrepreneurs threatens to derail recovery

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — U.S. banks are reducing their lending at the fastest rate on record, tightening the credit squeeze and threatening to leave many otherwise viable businesses unable to borrow money to expand their businesses, meet their payroll or refinance their maturing debts.

Bank loans falling

Bank loans falling

According to weekly figures provided by the Federal Reserve, total loans at commercial banks have fallen at a 19% annual rate over the past three months, while loans to businesses have dropped at a 28% annualized pace.

Last autumn, bank lending temporarily expanded when other sources of funding from the shadow banking system dried up after the collapse of Lehman Bros. Since then, however, total outstanding bank loans have dropped at an accelerating pace. See the data.

The decline in bank lending mostly affects smaller businesses. Larger corporations have alternative sources of funding, including retained earnings, corporate bonds, securitized loans and new equity. Those other sources of capital have increased in recent months, but not enough to offset the decline in bank lending.

In the first and second quarters, the U.S. private sector consumed more capital than it raised for the first time in more than 60 years. Negative net investment is „the hallmark of depression and difficult to reverse,“ said economist Leigh Skene of Lombard Street Research.

The big drop in credit also shows up as slower money growth. In the past 13 weeks, the money supply has fallen 0.3%. Most new money is created by borrowing, as banks credit the borrower’s account with the proceeds of a loan. Conversely, the money supply is reduced when debts are paid off or written off. Deflation is not a threat — it’s already here.

The question is whether the decline in lending will be reversed soon.

If the drop-off in lending is mainly due to weak demand by businesses, then there’s some hope that the recent upward momentum in industrial output and sales could lead to more optimistic business sentiment, greater demand for capital, and more lending by banks.

But if the decline is mainly due to weak banks unable or unwilling to lend, then a turnaround in credit creation may have to wait until banks’ balance sheets are repaired, a process that could be delayed by further expected defaults in consumer loans, mortgages and commercial real-estate loans.

Running on fumes

The credit squeeze on small businesses remains a major hurdle for the economy to overcome.

Despite more than a trillion dollars from the Fed and from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, „the banking system has still not fully recovered,“ New York Fed President Bill Dudley said in a speech this week.

The biggest banks raised billions in new capital, as ordered by Washington after the stress tests, but „banks are still capital constrained and hesitant to expand their lending,“ Dudley said.

„Most importantly, some significant classes of borrowers — namely commercial real estate and small business — are almost wholly dependent on the banking sector for funds, and those funds are not easily forthcoming,“ he said.

Dudley said the credit squeeze is the most important factor that will „inhibit the pace of the economic recovery.“

Businesses with fewer than 50 employees have been responsible for about one-third of job creation over the past few decades. In the 2001 recession, these small businesses were remarkably well-shielded, accounting for just 9% of job losses, said Melinda Pitts, an economist for the Atlanta Fed, writing on Macroblog. Read more.

In the early part of this recession, however, small businesses have accounted for 45% of job losses. If small businesses can’t get financing, „then the post-recession employment boost these firms typically provide may be less robust than in previous recoveries,“ Pitts said.

„The economy is running on fumes,“ said Brian Bethune, U.S. financial economist for IHS Global Insight. Although the Fed and the Congress have been trying to buy time for the economy while waiting for the banking system to recapitalize itself, Bethune worries that the support won’t be strong enough or will be shut off too quickly.

„We need a longer bridge,“ he said. „There’s a lot of risk in the first half“ of 2010.

More write-downs, weak demand

The decline in bank lending reflects several factors.

First, banks are writing off more bad loans, which directly reduces the amount of outstanding loans. Data for third-quarter write-offs are not yet available, but in the second quarter, they surged to a record $44.5 billion, nearly matching the total write-offs in the six years from 2002 to 2007. For commercial and industrial loans, write-offs rose to $7.8 billion for the quarter, according to bank data reported to the Fed.

Weaker demand and constrained supply are also factors in the decline in lending. According to the Fed’s quarterly survey of bank lending officers, banks have tightened their standards for commercial and industrial loans at the same time that demand has fallen for such loans.

According to the banks, the main reason for the decline in lending to businesses has been weaker demand. Reduced creditworthiness of the borrowers ranked as the second-most important reason.

The banks also complain that tighter regulation and a special assessment to replenish the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. are hurting their ability to lend.

The need for capital has dried up as the recession worsened.

Many companies see little need to invest right now. About one-third of total manufacturing capacity in the country is sitting idle. Spare capacity is also rising in commercial real estate, especially in apartments, retail, offices and hotels. Fewer small businesses are planning to expand, invest or hire than at any time in more than 30 years, according to the National Federation of Independent Business.

Still, many businesses need credit to keep their operations going, or to expand into markets being abandoned by other, less nimble companies.

Many companies also need to roll over their debt because corporate loans tend to have short maturities. About $3 trillion in commercial real-estate loans mature in the next three years, Skene said. About half of those loans came from banks. Most of the $1.3 trillion outstanding in leveraged loans will also need to be rolled over in the next few years, he said.

„This is why the Fed hasn’t flinched,“ Bethune said. The most recent Fed statement said the recovery would likely be subdued. The Fed and Congress have „lots of things in place to get us out“ of the credit squeeze, he said. But he warns, „it will take us years.“

Rex Nutting is Washington bureau chief of MarketWatch.

Infoportal Deutschland u. Globalisierung

Immer mehr unfairer Wettbewerb durch Waehrungsmanipulation

Es ist letztlich egal, ob der internationale Wettbewerb durch Importbeschraenkungen oder durch kuenstliche Exportsubventionen verfaelscht wird, weil auch letztere am Ende zur Gegenwehr durch Abwehrmassnahmen auf der Importseite fuehren muessen. Nun ist die Welt schon mitten drin in diesem gefaehrlichen Spiel.

Laut nachfolgendem Artikel nicht wirklich viel: noch nicht mal die Hälfte der von Zwangsversteigerung bedrohten Kreditnehmer könnten gerettet werden – und viele davon würden bald schon wieder „unter Wasser“ kommen…

Gefunden bei nytimes.com:

Panel Says Obama Plan Won’t Slow Foreclosures

By PETER S. GOODMAN

Published: October 9, 2009

A day after the Obama administration proclaimed significant progress in its effort to spare troubled homeowners from foreclosure, an oversight panel on Friday sharply criticized the program and declared it would leave millions of Americans vulnerable to losing their homes.

In a report mild in language but pointed in substance, the Congressional Oversight Panel — a watchdog created last year to keep tabs on taxpayer bailout funds — said the administration’s program would, “in the best case,” prevent “fewer than half of the predicted foreclosures.”

The report rebuked the administration for failing to shape a program that addressed the most significant engines of the foreclosure crisis — soaring joblessness and exotic mortgages with low introductory interest rates that give way to sharply higher payments over the next three years. Many of those mortgages are too large to qualify for modification under the administration’s plan. People who lose their jobs often lack enough income to qualify for relief.

The administration’s plan appears “targeted at the housing crisis as it existed six months ago, rather than as it exists now,” asserted the oversight panel in its report. “The panel urges Treasury to reconsider the scope, scalability and permanence of the programs designed to minimize the economic impact of foreclosures and consider whether new programs or program enhancements could be adopted.”

In a telephone briefing with reporters, the oversight panel’s chairwoman, Elizabeth Warren, said the administration’s housing program was so limited that it was unlikely to keep pace with the growing wave of foreclosures.

“Even when Treasury’s programs are running at full speed, foreclosures are estimated to outpace modifications by about two to one,” Ms. Warren said. “It simply isn’t clear that the programs in place will do enough to tame the crisis and have a significant impact on the broader economy.”

The Treasury acknowledged that its anti-foreclosure program was limited, with the effect of rising unemployment not fully checked. But the department said other relief efforts, like extended jobless benefits and continued health insurance for people who lose work, were better suited to alleviating economic distress than the housing program.

“In developing this program, it was critical that we address challenges that could be solved quickly with the tools available to us to ensure the most effective use of taxpayer money,” said Meg Reilly, a Treasury spokeswoman.

The administration’s decision to limit the cost of its one program aimed at helping homeowners could become more contentious as the foreclosure crisis grinds on. Populist anger has flashed over the rescues of major institutions including Citigroup and the American International Group — the most prominent components of a $700 billion taxpayer-financed bailout — while homeowners struggle.

“These Treasury people are all from Wall Street, and they’re not doing anything but protecting Wall Street,” said Melissa A. Huelsman, a Seattle lawyer who represents homeowners fighting foreclosure. “They don’t care in the least about protecting homeowners.”

When the Obama administration began its $75 billion Making Home Affordable program in March, it said the plan would spare as many as four million households from foreclosure. On Thursday, Treasury announced that 500,000 homeowners had since had their payments lowered on a trial basis, celebrating this as a milestone.

But the report from the oversight panel directly challenged the administration’s characterizations.

Most prominently, the panel had grave uncertainty about whether large numbers of the trial loan modifications — which typically run for three months — would successfully be converted to permanent terms.

As of the beginning of September, only 1.26 percent of trial modifications that had made it through the three-month trial period had become permanent, the report found. Of course, very few of those trial loans had reached their three-month expiration because the program only recently began processing large numbers of applications. As of Sept. 1, the Obama plan had produced 1,711 permanent loan modifications.

Some homeowners complain they have received trial modifications only to have them canceled for what seem dubious reasons — checks sent but supposedly never received, documents once in the file but suddenly missing.

“We’re on the phone arguing with mortgage companies every day,” said Dan Harris, chief executive of Home Retention Group, a company that negotiates with mortgage companies for loan modifications on behalf of homeowners, adding that trial modifications for four of his clients had been canceled over the last month. “It’s incredible.”

Major mortgage companies say they have significantly increased staffing to better manage the flow of paperwork, while notifying customers of the need to send in fresh documents to make their trial modifications permanent. But the companies offer no assurances that a large number of trial modifications will indeed become permanent.

“The process is too new,” said Dan Frahm, a spokesman for Bank of America. “We don’t know the number.” He estimated that 15 percent to half of all trial modifications would fail to become permanent.

The Treasury expressed hopes that a newly streamlined process that allowed borrowers to submit documents to mortgage companies more easily would help make large numbers of trial modifications permanent.

“We are intent on working with servicers to ensure that eligible borrowers receive permanent modifications,” said the department spokesperson, Ms. Reilly.

The oversight panel’s report expressed chagrin that the vast majority of loan modifications did not lower loan balances, leaving many homeowners still “under water,” or owing more than their homes were worth.

This tends to lower all property values, the report noted, because underwater borrowers have less incentive to care for their homes, and greater reason to stop making payments and default.

An Obama administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity, citing a lack of authorization to speak publicly, said the Treasury would have preferred that the program focused more on writing down principal balances but ultimately opted against it because “that would make it significantly more expensive to the taxpayer.”

In Wauwatosa, Wis., Theresa Lutz, 47, has been seeking to lower the payments on her home for several months. She is a graphic designer whose working hours were cut last summer. In September, her employer cut her salary by 6 percent. That has made it difficult for her to pay her monthly mortgage of $1,307.

As Ms. Lutz described it, her mortgage company, Wells Fargo, initially agreed to lower her payments. But then, last week, the bank informed her that she would have to come up with a fresh $3,000 to compensate the investor who owned her loan.

A Wells Fargo spokesman, Kevin Waetke, said that information had been conveyed “in error” and “the customer has been notified that payment does not need to be made.”

As Ms. Lutz struggled to clarify her agreement with Wells Fargo, she expressed dismay at news of the oversight panel’s report, and its finding that not enough help seemed to be on the way.

“It looks to me like Wall Street is too invested in our government,” she said. “Big business is winning out over the average person.”

Today, and lasting through the next set of Congressional Hearings on Derivatives this week, we are going to be looking at the “untowards” influence on Congress.

Let’s start out today with a simple interactive graphic:

Wash Influence
via WSJ

>

Source:
Congress Helped Banks Defang Key Rule
SUSAN PULLIAM and TOM MCGINTY
WSJ, June 3, 2009
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124396078596677535.html

CalculatedRisk

Banks Reducing Lending to Small Businesses

From Rex Nutting at MarketWatch: Banks cutting back on loans to businesses
U.S. banks are reducing their lending at the fastest rate on record ... According to weekly figures provided by the Federal Reserve, total loans at commercial banks have fallen at a 19% annual rate over the past three months, while loans to businesses have dropped at a 28% annualized pace.
...
The question is whether the decline in lending will be reversed soon.

... if the decline is mainly due to weak banks unable or unwilling to lend, then a turnaround in credit creation may have to wait until banks' balance sheets are repaired, a process that could be delayed by further expected defaults in consumer loans, mortgages and commercial real-estate loans.
There is more on small businesses including excerpts from NY Fed President William Dudley's speech: A Bit Better, But Very Far From Best, and from Atlanta Fed research economist Melinda Pitts: Prospects for a small business-fueled employment recovery

Net Employment by Business Size Click on graph for larger image in new window.

Graph Credit: Melinda Pitts, Atlanta Fed research economist and associate policy adviser

This graph breaks down net job gains and losses by firm size since 1992. During the current employment recession, small firms have accounted for about 45% of the job losses - much higher than during the 2001 recession.

Dr. Pitts cautions:
Looking ahead, it's not clear whether small businesses will continue to play their traditional role in hiring staff and helping to fuel an employment recovery. However, if the above-mentioned financial constraints are a major contributor to the disproportionately large employment contractions for very small firms, then the post-recession employment boost these firms typically provide may be less robust than in previous recoveries.
Tyler Durden

Merrill’s Contra-Bear Argument

Merrill Lynch (excuse me, BofA/ML as they like to put on the lead left side of REIT prospectuses), presents its case for why optimism dominates and all theories voices by perma-bears "have little founding in economic theory or history." What is notable from the below multi-pronged perspective on the definition of the term "recession" is that BofA/ML's entire argument rests on the premise of a fiat currency as taken for granted. Eliminate that, and the construct of imminent recovery from any and every economic cataclysm becomes immediately flawed. Ironically, the only reason there is no mass violence and civil uprisings right now (which would have been the case had RBS and HBOS gone under, an event which according to Bloomberg was mere hours away), is because printing presses the world over went into overdrive with wanton monopoly money (or nightcrawlers as they have been penned elsewhere in the blogosphere) creation (or destruction, depending on your perspective). From BofA/ML, on why permabears are fools:

All you gotta do is act naturally

It is important to realize that in the absence of negative shocks, the economy has a natural tendency to (eventually) return to full employment. After all, the modern, activist anti-recession policies generally didn’t exist before the 1950s. The economy recovered from many recessions in the past without the help of the Fed or fiscal authorities. Economists do not fully agree on the mechanisms (or the speed) of a natural recovery. However, we think the following theories all have some validity:

  • Keynesian: Recessions occur due to a “coordination problem”: a shock hits and causes everyone to pull back on activity for fear that others will be cutting back as well. Recoveries are a reversal of these pullbacks. This is akin to the “feedback loops” view of the cycle.
  • Classical: Recessions cause wages and prices to weaken to the point where demand for workers and products rebounds.
  • Austrian school: A recession is a period of cleansing or “creative destruction,” where less productive industries die but it takes time for more productive industries to be born. Once resources start moving to the more productive sectors, a boom sets in.
  • Financial accelerator model: This is another feedback loop theory. When the economy weakens, lenders tighten lending standards causing further economic weakness, and that in turn causes even tighter lending standards. The opposite happens during recoveries: a better economy makes more people creditworthy, causing more credit and more spending. This is a favorite of Ben Bernanke.
  • Accelerator models: Recessions occur when firms react to weak sales by cutting production even more dramatically, driving inventories lower. The opposite occurs in the recovery: as sales pick up, firms try to boost production to match sales and stop the collapse in inventories.
  • Pent-up demand: A related view is that by the end of recessions, companies and households have delayed many essential purchases—the car is getting rusty, the house needs a new roof, the computer needs updating, the machine tool becomes outdated. This pent-up demand drives spending once a semblance of confidence returns.

The one notable exception to this view is Marxism. In Marxist theory the capitalist world is doomed to ever worsening cycles of boom and bust, culminating in its collapse and the assent of communism. Needless to say, we do not ascribe to this view.


The bottom line: the economy can grow without ever-increasing government stimulus. While policy actions play an important role in many theories of economic recovery, and most economists believe active policy helps the economy recover faster, there are many reasons to expect a natural normalization in economic activity. Extreme perma-bear stories have little founding in economic theory or history.

It needs no pointing out that the current recovery has no analog in history, as it is so much more than a manufacturing recession. To get educated on that, we recommend the BofA/ML gentlemen read the work of their former colleague David Rosenberg. 1950s was not known for a time where several hundred billion in securitizations were rolled out each and every year to profit from the stupidity of the subprime investors (and of Iceland). Our credit recession strikes at the core of the fiat currency system. Ironically, the Marxist view, the one slighted by BofA/ML, is precisely the one that would have been most appropriate if the Fed had not decided to interfere with the biggest wealth transfer in recorded history (from middle to upper class). And the most ironic outcome, is that we may have well skipped the recession part altogether: numerous pundits will attest that America exists in a state of Corporate Communism at this point. So just why again is a Marxist view irrelevant? Oh yes, it is so far below tenured economists (of the BofA/ML cadre) to even consider the alternative that their entire worldview has been flawed from the beginning.

The truth is much simpler: after Lehman fell, the financial system, which relies exclusively on two taken for granted concepts: confidence and trust (which at their core are one), saw itself in an unprecedented $26 trillion hole, as the two core precepts for a functioning fiat economy were pulled, very much like the proverbial rug under the house of cards. The tally of the damage was done by both SIGTARP and former Goldman banker Nomi Prins (attached).

 

 

What is the conclusion: the collapse of the liquidity pyramid, the disappearance of securitization, and the near-death experience of a fiat system has had an opportunity cost of $26 trillion, which had to be funded, backstopped and guaranteed by the heart (but not soul cynics would add, as that has already been sold to Satan or Wall Street, whichever comes first) of the currency devaluation system itself: the US Federal Reserve. An opportunity for what? Simply to perpetuate a current broken system which rewards only entities such as the aforementioned BofA/ML (the firm would have been bankrupted 100 times over if it had not been for the relevant parties stepping in at the right time), affording Messrs Harris and Matus (whom we have lots of respect for otherwise) the luxury of spewing such unsubstantiated optimistic drivel even though their paychecks are still guaranteed by the US taxpayer (perhaps they could take their optimistic cheerleader role with a little more humility in this light). And what is the flipside? A global reset: where the debts of every man, woman and child in the US could have been wiped clean (several times over). Of course, that would mean the end of the current banking system as we know it, as all those bank balance sheets have loans as assets, either securitized or in whole, that are intricately tied with the current broken iteration of capitalism (that and waging wars, but that is a topic for another day). This would also include mortgages, which at last count were about $12 trillion in notional. If Obama is so focused on making the home ownership dream a reality, he could have easily accomplished that, and at less than half the cost to the US middle class. After all the latter will be the only one left picking up the pieces when this latest ponzi scheme blows up. Which, like any bubble, it will, sooner or later. However this time the fate of the Fed (in other words America itself) is tied in with that of the bubble. Its burst, when it comes, will be the end of the current paradigm, call it what you will. And what is most unfortunate, is that the BofA/ML Messrs. Harris, Matus, Hanson, Helwing, Bigg and Dutta, are all too well aware of this.

AttachmentSize
tallyjuly2009.pdf466.87 KB

AEI Discussion on Government Response to the Financial Crisis

Friday

The American Enterprise Institute in Washington hosted this discussion on the steps taken by the government to stabilize the financial markets. We heard viewpoints from journalists, corporate executives and academics.
Washington, DC

By Paul Krugman

The madness of the monetary hawks (wonkish)

It seems to be really hard for central bankers to accept the need for prolonged easy money, even if all the data say that's what is needed.
John Mauldin

Killing the Goose

Killing the Goose
October 9, 2009
By John Mauldin

Killing the Goose
What Were We Thinking?
Let’s Play Turn It Around
Detroit, the Red Sox and the Yankees, and Traveling Too Much

Peggy Noonan, maybe the most gifted essayist of our time, wrote a few weeks ago about the vague concern that many of us have that the monster looming up ahead of us has the potential (my interpretation) for not just plucking a few feathers from the goose that lays the golden egg (the US free-market economy), or stealing a few more of the valuable eggs, but of actually killing the goose. Today we look at the possibility that the fiscal path of the enormous US government deficits we are on could indeed kill the goose, or harm it so badly it will make the lost decades that Japan has suffered seem like a stroll in the park.

And while I do not think we will get to that point (though I can’t deny the possibility), for reasons I will go into, there is the very real prospect that the upheavals created by not dealing proactively with the problems (or denying they exist) will be as bad as or worse than the credit crisis we have gone through. This is not going to be something that happens overnight, and the seeming return to normalcy that so many predict has the rather alarming aspect of creating a sense of complacency that will only serve to “kick the can” down the road.

This week we look at the problem, and then muse upon what the more likely scenarios are that may play out. This is a longer version of a speech I gave this morning to the New Orleans Conference, where I also offered a path out of the problems. This letter will be a little more controversial than normal, but I hope it makes us all think about the very serious plight we have put ourselves in.

Let’s review a few paragraphs I wrote last month: “I have seven kids. As our family grew, we limited the choices our kids could make; but as they grew into teenagers, they were given more leeway. Not all of their choices were good. How many times did Dad say, ‘What were you thinking?’ and get a mute reply or a mumbled ‘I don’t know.’

“Yet how else do you teach them that bad choices have bad consequences? You can lecture, you can be a role model; but in the end you have to let them make their own choices. And a lot of them make a lot of bad choices. After having raised six, with one more teenage son at home, I have come to the conclusion that you just breathe a sigh of relief if they grow up and have avoided fatal, life-altering choices. I am lucky. So far. Knock on a lot of wood.

“I have watched good kids from good families make bad choices, and kids with no seeming chance make good choices. But one thing I have observed. Very few teenagers make the hard choice without some outside encouragement or help in understanding the known consequences, from some source. They nearly always opt for the choice that involves the most fun and/or the least immediate pain, and then learn later that they now have to make yet another choice as a consequence of the original one. And thus they grow up. So quickly.”

What Were We Thinking?

As a culture, the current mix of generations, especially in the US, has made some choices. Choices which, in hindsight, leave the adult in us asking, “What were we thinking?”

We made a series of bad choices and suffered the credit crisis because of it. Now, as a nation, we are in the middle of making an even worse choice, one that will leave us with no good choices – only choices of pretty bad to awful. Let’s begin with a quote from a recent client letter by my friends at Hayman Advisors (in Dallas).

“Western democracies, communistic capitalists, and Japanese deflationists are concurrently engaging in what may be the largest, global financial experiment in history. Everywhere you turn, governments are running enormous fiscal deficits financed by printing money. The greatest risk of these policies is that the quantitative easing will persist until the value of the currency equals the actual cost of printing the currency (which is just slightly above zero).

“There have been 28 episodes of hyperinflation of national economies in the 20th century, with 20 occurring after 1980. Peter Bernholz (Professor Emeritus of Economics in the Center for Economics and Business (WWZ) at the University of Basel, Switzerland) has spent his career examining the intertwined worlds of politics and economics with special attention given to money. In his most recent book, Monetary Regimes and Inflation: History, Economic and Political Relationships, Bernholz analyzes the 12 largest episodes of hyperinflations – all of which were caused by financing huge public budget deficits through money creation. His conclusion: the tipping point for hyperinflation occurs when the government’s deficit exceed 40% of its expenditures.

“According to the current Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projections, US federal expenditures are projected to be $3.653 trillion in FY 2009 and $3.766 trillion in FY 2010, with unified deficits of $1.580 trillion and $1.502 trillion, respectively. These projections imply that the US will run deficits equal to 43.3% and 39.9% of expenditures in 2009 and 2010, respectively. To put it simply, roughly 40% of what our government is spending has to be borrowed. [Emphasis mine]

“One has to ask whether the US reached the critical tipping point. Beyond the quantitative measurements associated with government deficits and money creation, there exists a qualitative aspect to such a scenario that may be far more important. The qualitative perceptions of fiscal and monetary policies are impossible to control once confidence is lost. In fact, recent price action in metals, the dollar and commodities suggests that the market is already anticipating the future.”

Let me point out that the deficits for 2010 assume a rather robust recovery, and so they could turn out to be much worse, especially if unemployment continues to rise and Congress decides (rightly) to extend unemployment benefits.

The interest on the national debt in fiscal 2008 was $451 billion. Even though the debt has exploded, the interest for fiscal 2009 is down to “only” $383 billion. My back-of-the-napkin estimate says that is over 20% of total 2009 tax receipts. I guess when you take interest rates to zero and really load up on short-term debt, it helps lower interest costs. (More on that future problem later.) http://www.savingsbonds.gov/govt/reports/ir/ir_expense.htm

The fiscal deficits are projected to be about 11% of nominal GDP, which is now roughly $14.3 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office currently projects that deficits will still be $1 trillion in ten years.

Last spring I published as an Outside the Box a very important paper by Dr. Woody Brock on why you cannot grow government debt well above nominal GDP without causing severe disruptions to the overall economic system. If you have not read it, or would like to read it again, click here.

I am going to reproduce just one table from that piece. Note that this was Woody’s worst-case assumption, adding 8% of GDP to the debt each year, and not the 11% we are experiencing today. The Congressional Budget Office projections are now even worse, and that assumes a very rosy 3% or more growth in the economy for the next five years. Under Woody’s scenario, the national debt would rise to $18 trillion by 2015, or well over 100% of GDP, depending on your growth assumptions. Take some time to study the tables, but I am going to focus on 2015 and not the outlier years.

$1.5 trillion dollars means that someone has to invest that much in Treasury bonds. Let’s look at where the $1.5 trillion might come from. Let’s assume that all of our trade deficit comes back to the US and is invested in US government bonds. Today we found out that the latest monthly trade deficit was just over $30 billion, or $370 billion annualized (which is half what it was a few years ago). That still leaves $1.13 trillion that needs to be found to be invested in US government debt (forget about business and consumer loans and mortgages).

Killing the Goose

$1.13 trillion is roughly 8% of total US GDP. That is a staggering amount. And again, that assumes that foreigners continue to put 100% of their fresh reserves into dollar-denominated assets. That is not a safe assumption, given the recent news stories about how governments are thinking about whether to create an alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency. (And if I was watching the US run $1.5 trillion deficits with no realistic plans to cut back, I would be having private talks too. They would be idiots not to do so.)

There are only three sources for the needed funds: either an increase in taxes or people increasing savings and putting them into government bonds or the Fed monetizing the debt, or some combination of all three.

Now the Fed is in fact monetizing a portion of the debt as part of its quantitative easing program, and US consumers are saving more. Tax receipts are way down. I can tell you there is a great deal of angst in New Orleans tonight about the Fed monetization. This is traditionally a “gold bug” conference, and many of the participants and speakers see only inflation in our future.

Long-time readers know that I think the Fed has been able to get away with its rather large monetization program because of the massive deflationary forces let loose in the world by the credit crisis, which is forcing a monster deleveraging regime all over the world. Where has all the money gone that the Fed has printed? Right back onto the Fed’s balance sheet as bank reserves. The banks are not lending, so this money does not get into the system in the usual manner associated with fractional reserve banking. Until that happens, and is accompanied by increasing wages and employment, inflation is not in our immediate future.

And this brings us to our conundrum. You cannot continue to run deficits significantly larger than nominal GDP for too long without risking the demise of the economic system. Ask Argentina or any of the other nations where hyperinflation occurred, as detailed in the study mentioned above. But we are in a deflationary environment, so the Fed can monetize the debt far more than any of us suppose without risking immediate and spiraling inflation.

But there is a limit to the Fed’s ability to do so without causing real inflation. First, as long as the Fed is independent, at some point they will simply have to tell Congress we can no longer monetize the debt. While I am sure that some of you doubt they would do so, the Fed officials and economists I have been around are pretty adamant about that. There is a line they will not be pushed past. It may be further than I like, but it is there.

The Fed cannot simply buy up all the debt needed to fund the government. Again, no one on the FOMC would either advocate or allow that. That would in fact start us down a very dangerous path rather quickly. Therefore, they must have a large number of willing bond buyers outside the Fed. The good news, gentle reader, is that we will find someone to buy that debt. That is also the bad news. Let’s go back 30 years.

Legend now has it that Paul Volker single-handedly took the inflation bull by the horns and ripped them off. Now, it took fortitude to do that in the face of certain recession and high unemployment. Those were not fun days. But his partner in the deed was the bond market. Bond investors simply demanded higher returns, because they were really worried about inflation.

At some point, if we do not get the government deficit under control, the bond market is once again going to react. Seemingly overnight, real (inflation-adjusted) rates are going to rise, and will do so rapidly. And I am not talking about 1 or 2%. You just cannot have 8% of a $14-trillion GDP go into US government debt every year, forever, at today’s low real rates.

Let’s play a thought game. If you take 8% of US consumer spending and save it, and it finds its way into government bonds, you have reduced consumer spending and therefore the actual GDP. But how about those who want to invest in stocks? Foreign bonds and currencies? New businesses? Loans of all types? How much are we going to have to save to get the necessary capital? How high will the saving rate have to be to finance all those other activities in a world where debt securitization is still anemic?

Some will point to Japan and their government debt-to-GDP ratio, which will soon be over 200%, a far cry from where we are today. Why can’t we grow our debt to 200%? Because the Japanese have long had a culture of saving and investing in government bonds. It’s what you do to support the country. But even they will run into a wall as their savings rate continues to drop, because so many of their citizens are retired and are now selling bonds to finance retirement. They too are running massive fiscal deficits, on the order of the size of the US deficits. And does anyone really want to have two lost decades, like Japan?

How long can we go before there is an upheaval? I don’t know. The markets can remain irrational or complacent for a lot longer than most of us think. It could be years. Or not. Suddenly, it will be July 2008 and the bond vigilantes stampede.

But now, we seemingly can borrow with no consequences. The deflation that is in the air, plus the lack of bank lending holds, down the normal inflation impulses. We as a nation are leveraging ourselves up. We’re partying like it’s still 2005. The music is playing and we are dancing. Our Congress is trying to figure out how to run even higher deficits.

At some point, the consequences will be significant. There are two paths, and it is not clear which one we will take. First, we might see inflation kick in and actual rates rise. Since so much of our national debt is short-term debt, that means yet another rise in the deficit as rates rise. Mortgage rates rise, putting pressure on the housing market. There will be even more pressure on commercial mortgages. Consumer debt will be harder to get and cost more. It will mean funding costs for businesses will rise, and that hurts employment. It would be a return to the 1970s of high interest rates and stagnant growth in a very slow-growth environment.

Second, we could see deflation kick in and, even though rates stay more or less where they are, real (after-deflation) rates could rise as they did in the ’30s and in Japan.

Some of my most knowledgeable friends argue for the inflation side, and others take the deflation side. I tend to think the Fed will fight deflation until we get inflation, but the consequences will not be pleasant. There is no benign path.

How can we avoid such an upheaval? The only way is to make some very difficult choices. There have to be some adults making the choices, as the teenagers now in control clearly cannot make them.

As I have written in the past, we can run deficits of 2% of GDP for a very long time, which in a few years would be about $300 billion. It is my belief that if the bond market and world investors saw a credible plan to put us on a path to a deficit no larger than 2% of GDP, the dire upheaval that is in our future could be avoided.

But that will mean some painful choices. It is not a matter of pain or no pain, it is just deciding when and how bad it will be. The longer we wait, the worse the consequences.

Let’s Play Turn It Around

There are businessmen who are called turnaround specialists. They come into companies that are sick but have a basic competency, and that with the right management can be made into viable concerns. Generally, the choices the new management makes are painful to those involved, but they are necessary if the enterprise is to remain a going concern.

So, for the next few pages, I am going to suggest some things we can do to turn the US around. They are not easy fixes, and I know a lot of readers will not like what they read or will disagree on points. But something like this is going to have to be done, or we risk killing the goose.

First, we must acknowledge the deficit is out of control, and spending must be cut. If we raise taxes by as much as the Obama administration now wants to, we will most assuredly put the country back into a deep recession in 2011. Think what raising taxes in 1937 did to a nascent recovery. A $3-trillion-dollar budget is 20% of the US economy. That is just simply too much.

Quick fact. The most credible studies show that government expenditures exert no multiplier effect on the economy. Actually, they show them to be very slightly negative. This is not just in the US. However, the tax effect has a multiplier of 3! If we raise taxes by $300 billion in 2011, that will slam the economy in the face. Further, we will collect less taxes than projected, as economic activity will fall.

You cannot cure a too much debt problem with more debt. We cannot borrow our way into prosperity. Every crisis of the past decades has been a result of too much debt and leverage and we seem to want to repeat the past mistakes, hoping that this time it will be different. It won’t.

Ok, now let’s play the Turnaround Hammer Game.

+ We should start with a 5% acrossthe-board cut in spending in all programs. Federal employees, except for military personnel, should see a 5% cut in pay as part of that program. The average federal worker makes $75,419 a year, while the average in the private sector is $39,751. The rest of us are taking pay cuts in the form of higher taxes. No cost of living increases, etc. We are on an austerity program and need to do what it takes. If a program is deemed too important to be cut, then another program has to be cut more.

Then the next year another 2.5% cut across the board. And then an absolute freeze on the overall budget size until the deficit is 2% or less of GDP.

+ Social Security must be fixed now. We all know that it is going to have to be done, so why not just do it? Means testing should be a part of the mix. As an idea, for every $10,000 in income a retiree has, he gets $1,000 less in SS payments. And increase the retirement age down the road. When SS was launched, retirement age was 65. But the average life span was 65. There are other things we can do, but whatever our poison of choice is, we need to take it.

+ Medicare must be revised, with real health-care reform. The national debt is $56 trillion if we count unfunded liabilities, much of which is Medicare. It will become a nightmare around the middle of the next decade. Adding more expenses now without cutting elsewhere makes no sense. If we kill the goose, no one will get anything excect very empty promises.

Side note: there actually is a lot of waste in the system. Software should be written that analyzes every patient and procedure and produces an outcomes-based analysis of what is reasonable, rather than throwing every test at every patient. And the government should make sure, even if it has to spend the money, that the updated system is in place in every hospital and clinic in the country. And doctors should be given access to it so they can decide what type of care is appropriate to prescribe. And health-care reform means tort reform.

Today, I got a note from a friend of mine who just had yet another heart attack. It seems his stent is now blocked by 50%. He is a vet, and his primary care is the Veterans Administration. The Veterans Hospital system will not do a procedure to unblock the stent until it is 70% blocked. He does not have any money, so he is simply waiting to have another heart attack. I am really looking forward to government-run health care.

+ Each year we allow almost 1 million immigrants into the US, mostly family of people already here. I suggest that for the next two years we stop that. Instead, let anyone who can buy a home, passes basic screening, and can demonstrate the ability to pay for health insurance immigrate to the US and get a temporary green card. If they behave, then the card becomes permanent after four years.

We almost immediately put a floor on the housing market, absorb the excess homes, and within a year the housing-construction market, along with the jobs that are now gone, will be back. That is stimulus that costs the taxpayers nothing.

+ While I can’t believe I am writing this, taxes are going to have to rise, if for no other reason than this Congress is hell bent on raising taxes. But rescinding the entire Bush tax cuts, plus adding a 10% surcharge as Congress wants to do in one fell swoop, is an absolute guarantee of a recession. So do it gradually over (say) 4 years, and then reinstitute the cuts when the deficit is under 2% of GDP. Remember the negative tax-multiplier effect of raising taxes. And the definitive work on that was done by Obama’s chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Christina Romer.

We should consider a VAT tax and a major cut/reorganization of the corporate tax. We need to encourage corporations to hire more, and you do that by taxing less. Let’s make our corporations more competitive, not less. Our taxes are much higher than those of any of our major competitors. And please forget that insane carbon tax. If you want to cut emissions, do it straightforwardly by raising taxes significantly on gasoline. Don’t back-door it on consumers. (And I am NOT advocating such a policy.)

+ An aggressive tax benefit for new venture-capital money that is invested in new technologies will result in new industries. The only way we can grow our way out of this mess is to create whole new industries, like we did in the late ’70s and ’80s. (Think computers and the internet and telecom.)

+ Unemployment is likely to continue to rise and last longer than ever before. We have to take care of the basic needs of those who want work but can’t find it. Unemployment insurance should be extended to those who are still looking for work past the time for benefits to expire, and some program of local volunteer service should be instituted as the price for getting continued benefits after the primary benefits time period runs out. Not only will this help the community, but it will get the person out into the world where he is more likely to meet someone who can give him a job. But the costs of this program should be revenue-neutral. Something else has to be cut.

+ We have to re-think our military costs (I can’t believe I am writing this!). We now spend almost 50% of the world’s total military budget. Maybe we need to understand that we can’t fight two wars and support hundreds of bases around the world. If we kill the goose, our ability to fight even one medium-sized war will be diminished. The harsh reality is that everything has to be re-evaluated. As an example, do we really need to be in Korea? If so, why can’t Korea pay for much of the cost? They are now a rich nation. There are budgetary fiscal limits to being the policeman for the world.

+ Glass-Steagall, or some form of it, should be brought back. Banks, which are subject to taxpayer bailouts, should not be in the investment banking and derivatives-creating business. Derivatives, especially credit default swaps, should be on an exchange, and too big to fail must go. Banks have enough risk just making loans. Leverage should be dialed down, and hedge funds selling what amounts to naked call options in any form, derivative or otherwise, should be regulated.

Let me see, is there any group I have not offended yet? But something like I am suggesting is going to have to be done at some point. There is no way we can continue forever on the current path. At some point, we will hit the wall. The fight between the bug and the windshield always ends in favor of the windshield. The bond market is going to have to see a credible effort to get back to a reasonable deficit, or we risk a very difficult economic environment. The longer we wait, the worse it will be.

It is not going to be easy to persuade a majority of Americans that we need to do something now. More realistically, we are going to probably have to begin to experience a crisis of some type to get politicians motivated to do something.

This last Tuesday, I spoke to the Financial Leadership Association at the University of Texas at Dallas. It was mostly undergraduates, and my assigned topic was how financial research impacts our investment decisions. In touched on the topic above, in less detail, but pointing out that at some point we are going to have to bring the deficit under reasonable control. I got some push-back, as some could not understand why we just couldn’t keep running deficits, as we simply owe it to ourselves. I tried to explain, but for a few of them I was not getting through (though I think most got it). And these were the finance students! I shudder to think what the sociology department would be like.

We are not going back to normal, although it is likely we will see some form of Statistical Recovery. But we cannot get complacent. Somewhere out there is the real potential for another crisis, which will dwarf the last one. You will not want to be long much of anything when it happens, except hedged or liquid investments. Though admittedly, this could go on for a long time. I just don’t know how long “long” is. Other than it will be too long and then not long enough.

Detroit, the Red Sox and the Yankees, and Traveling Too Much

I leave for Detroit next Friday and speak at a private conference on Saturday, then rush to the airport to fly to New York. My friend Barry Habib has second-row behind-home-plate tickets to what we hope is a Yankees – Boston Red Sox playoff championship game. That would have to be one of the most exciting games to watch – the emotions will run as high as in any sporting event around. So I find myself in the strange position of cheering on both the Yankees and the Red Sox in the first round of playoffs, and hoping that there is not a four-game sweep in the second.

Dinner with the guys at Yahoo Tech Ticker on Monday, and then an early train to Philadelphia, where I will speak at a conference hosted by my friends and partners at CMG. Dinner that night, a very early flight to Dallas, change airports, fly to Houston to speak at Salient Partners, then a late-night flight back to Dallas, up early to fly to Orlando to be with Jon Sundt of Altegris at the Commonwealth conference, fly back early (sigh) Saturday morning to Dallas, drive home, pack, and take an overnight flight to Buenos Aires to start a speaking tour with new Latin American partner Enrique Fynn, then on to Montevideo, Uruguay, Sao Paulo. and Rio de Janeiro, and then back to Montevideo for a day of R&R. Then back home Monday. I am already tired.

Tomorrow I get to hear Karl Rove (wonder if he will remember me from our Texas days?), Howard Dean, Charles Krauthammer, and a lot of friends, then a series of parties tomorrow night. I always enjoy coming to The Big Easy for this conference. (Note to Chinese and Spanish translators: the Big Easy is a nickname for New Orleans. I can’t expect them to know that one.)

It is time to hit the send button, as I have to speak at my next session. You have a great week, and remember that together we will get through all the coming problems. Just keep paying attention.

Your worried about all the unintended consequences analyst,


John Mauldin
John@frontlinethoughts.com Copyright 2009 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved

The American Enterprise Institute in Washington hosted this discussion on the steps taken by the government to stabilize the financial markets. In the first session, AEI resident scholar Vincent R. Reinhart presented his findings gleaned from a series of conversations with market participants. Angel Ubide of Tudor Investment Corporation; Greg Ip, the U.S. economics editor of The Economist; and Christopher Whalen of Risk Analytics then responded.

AEI Discussion on Government Response to the Financial Crisis

My rant on the “Alliance of Convenience” between the Congress, the Primary Dealers and the Fed starts around 0:49 of the 01:43:10 program.

After, I had a thought: Should the GOP draft Sheila Bair as the next presidential candidate?  A conservative centrist republican with financial savvy?

Barry Ritholtz

Freelove Freeway

I have been loving original British version of The Office with Ricky Gervais.

Its been on Cartoon Network Friday nights at midnight.

What makes this so surprising is that it s actually a good song, out of place in the absurdist comedy:

This is the full uncut version of the classic ‘Freelove Freeway’ that David Brent (Ricky Gervais) sung during Series 1 Episode 4

Here is the original studio version:

David Brent/Ricky Gervais – Freelove Freeway

Lyrics and alternative video versions after the jump . . .

Guitar composition(BBC)

• Lyrics:

Pretty girl on the hood of a Cadilac, yeah….
Shes broken down on freeway nine.
I take a look and her engines started,
I leave her purring and I roll on by….bye bye

Free love on the free love freeway,
The love is free and the freeways long…
I got some hot love on the hot-love freeway
I aint going home cos my babys gone
A little while later, see a senorita,
Shes caught a flat trying to make it home,
She says “Por favor, can you pump me up?”
I say “Muchos gracias, adios. Bye Bye.”

Free love on the freelove freeway,
The love is free and the freeways long
I got some hot love on the hotlove highway,
Ain’t going home cause my baby’s gone.

Little while later I see a cowboy crying,
“Hey buddy, what can I do?”
He says “I lived a good life, had about a thousand women.”
I said “Why the tears?”, he says “cause none of them was you.”
Free love on the free love freeway,
where the love is free and the freeway is long…
I got some hot love on the hot-love freeway
I aint going home cos my babys gone

~~~


Free Love Freeway (The Office) – David Brent

~~~

Single being recorded in Studio:

This is the version shown on TV:

Live in Concert:

Paul Hickey

Arm Yourself For Earnings Season

Now that earnings season has started, the quarterly numbers and subsequent price reaction for stocks will be making news over the next few weeks. There's no way better to prepare yourself for earnings season than with the Bespoke Interactive Earnings Report database. This database provides detailed earnings analysis for nearly 3,000 stocks. We take the analysis to the next level...


Barry Ritholtz

Are Stocks Fully Valued?

As noted previously, at times, things like “valuation” or the economy or earnings don’t matter — until they suddenly do.

Here’s Rosie via Abelson:

“David Rosenberg, of Gluskin Sheff, notes that on an operating (”scrubbed”) basis the price/earnings ratio of the Standard & Poor’s 500 has expanded a whopping 10 points since its March low, and stands at 27.6. Historically, Dave observes, when the economy is making the switch from contraction to expansion, as it did in the third quarter, the P/E is 15.

Trailing earnings are untouched by clairvoyance, in contrast to forward earnings, which depend heavily on projecting the future. But such estimates have their drawbacks, particularly since Wall Street forecasters are a cheerful lot predisposed toward upbeat prognostication.

A year ago, equities were trading at a modest 12 times forward estimates. In fact, as Dave puts it, with perfect hindsight, the market at the time was really trading at 30 times forward earnings.

Currently, Dave reckons, the S&P 500 is priced for $83 in operating earnings, or double the most recent four-quarter trend, and normally it takes five years for profits to double from a recessionary low. Such a feat would be more than a little impressive, since revenues, for the first time ever, have registered four quarters in a row of double-digit decline.

Given the going estimates for operating earnings of $48 a share this year, $53 next year, $63 in 2011 and $81 for 2012, he concludes that “the market is basically discounting an earnings stream that even the consensus does not see for another two to three years.” In Dave’s book, stocks remain more than fully priced.”

I have no idea when, but Dave’s approach will eventually be correct. However, it will also eventually be 2011, two in the morning and April.

The difference is, we know precisely when those things will occur. I have no idea when valuation will matter again . . .

>

Previously:
What Does the Economy Have to Do with the Market? (October 6th, 2009)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/10/what-does-the-economy-have-to-do-with-the-market/

The Most Hated Rally in Wall Street History (October 8th, 2009)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/10/the-most-hated-rally-in-wall-street-history/

Are Stocks Cheap? (June 14th, 2009)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/06/are-stocks-cheap-2/

Is the U.S. market “cheap”? (November 14th, 2008)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2008/11/is-the-us-market-cheap/

SPX Earnings & Multiples ? (October 25th, 2008)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2008/10/spx-earnings-multiples/

Source:
Ganging Up on the Dollar
ALAN ABELSON
Barron’s OCTOBER 12, 2009
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB125512886963677017.html

Brett Steenbarger, Ph.D.

Weekend Reading: Markets and More – Volume One

* Very important issue: When will the Fed begin its exit from monetary ease?

* Thanks to a sharp reader for this article on the costs of a weak dollar policy;

* A look at gold volatility and many more worthwhile perspectives;

* Killing the economic goose with debt;

* Changing geopolitics of natural gas;

* Europe as the loser in the financial crisis?

* Ten best dividend stocks;

* Thoughts on FHA as a sub-prime lender;

* Russia's stock market on the rise;

* Looking under the hood of bond ETFs;

* ETFs that can benefit from U.S. push into emerging markets;

* Rundown of financial news;

* The high cost of high school dropout.
.
From Peter Goodman at the NY Times: Panel Says Obama Plan Won’t Slow Foreclosures
In a report mild in language but pointed in substance, the Congressional Oversight Panel — a watchdog created last year to keep tabs on taxpayer bailout funds — said the administration’s program would, “in the best case,” prevent “fewer than half of the predicted foreclosures.”
...
When the Obama administration began its $75 billion Making Home Affordable program in March, it said the plan would spare as many as four million households from foreclosure. On Thursday, Treasury announced that 500,000 homeowners had since had their payments lowered on a trial basis, celebrating this as a milestone.

But the report from the oversight panel directly challenged the administration’s characterizations.

Most prominently, the panel had grave uncertainty about whether large numbers of the trial loan modifications — which typically run for three months — would successfully be converted to permanent terms.

As of the beginning of September, only 1.26 percent of trial modifications that had made it through the three-month trial period had become permanent, the report found. Of course, very few of those trial loans had reached their three-month expiration because the program only recently began processing large numbers of applications. As of Sept. 1, the Obama plan had produced 1,711 permanent loan modifications.
emphasis added
The numbers that matter are the permanent loan modifications and the redefault rate. With the report next month we should know much more ...

Gefunden bei tagesschau.de:

Milliarden für die Bankenrettung

Wer bekommt die Staatshilfen?

Mehr als 20 Unternehmen haben bislang bei dem Bankenrettungsfonds Hilfen beantragt. Doch welche Banken nehmen wieviel staatliche Unterstützung in Anspruch? Darüber herrscht schweigen bei dem SoFFin.

Von Oliver Feldforth, Hessischer Rundfunk

Welchen Banken helfen Steuerzahler eigentlich? Bei dieser Frage tut der Staat alles, um Details im Dunkeln zulassen. Ein Jahr nach der Pleite des Immobilienfinanzierers Hypo Real Estate ist nur bruchstückhaft bekannt, wo die Milliarden für die Bankenrettung landen. Der Fonds für Finanzmarktstabilisierung (SoFFin) weigert sich zu sagen, welche Bank wieviel Hilfe bekommen hat. Die SoFFin will diese Finanzunternehmen schützen. Denn würde sie Ross und Reiter nennen, dann hätten es die genannten Banken noch schwerer am Kapitalmarkt Kredit zu bekommen.

Eigentlich ist die SoFFin, wie jede Behörde, auskunftspflichtig. Doch in diesem Fall konstruiert sie ein eigenes Sonderrecht: „keine konkrete Auskunft“. Und das, obwohl es hier um extrem hohe Sonderausgaben öffentlichen Geldes geht. So nennt der staatliche Sonderfonds, der den Banken helfen soll, nur Eckpunkte: 23 Unternehmen hätten hier Hilfen beantragt, insgesamt wünschten sie 232,8 Milliarden Euro Unterstützung.

„Bürgschaft ist nur eine Brücke“

Bis jetzt sind aber nur Stabilisierungshilfen des Staates über die SoFFin in Höhe von 152,6 Milliarden gezahlt worden. 130 Milliarden Euro entfallen dabei auf Garantien. Der Staat bürgt also für Kredite, die eine Bank aufnehmen will. Sollte diese Bank dann zahlungsunfähig werden, springt der Staat ein und zahlt den Kredit zurück. Steuergeld wird also nur dann angetastet, wenn ein Kredit platzt. Das hat es bis jetzt noch nicht gegeben. „Die Garantie oder Bürgschaft ist nur eine Brücke in den Finanzmarkt“, erklärt der Bankenfachmann Professor Reinhard Schmidt von „House of Finance“ an der Universität Frankfurt am Main.

Ohne diese Brücke hätten manche Geldhäusern kaum Geld geliehen bekommen. Und wenn, dann wäre es sehr teuer geworden. Die Bürgschaft gibt es für die Bank nicht umsonst. So zahlt die Commerzbank jährlich für genutzte Staatsgarantien über fünf Milliarden Euro eine Gebühr von 47 Millionen Euro jährlich. Und das, obwohl der Steuerzahler bis jetzt nicht in die Pflicht genommen wurde.

Der Staat hat sich aber auch mit Eigenkapital direkt an Banken beteiligt. Bis jetzt hat die SoFFin dafür 21,9 Milliarden Euro ausgegeben. Allein drei Milliarden Euro hat sie für Aktien der strauchelnden Hypo Real Estate (jetzt: Deutsche Pfandbriefbank) bezahlt. 1,8 Milliarden Euro haben die gut 25 Prozent Commerzbank-Aktien gekostet, die der Bund erworben hat. Außerdem hat der Staat für 16,4 Milliarden Euro stille Einlagen der gelben Bank gezeichnet. Die sollen neun Prozent Zinsen bringen, allerdings nur, wenn das Geldhaus Gewinne macht und damit rechnet in der nächsten Zeit niemand.

Trotzdem wünscht sich Bankenfachmann Schmidt, der Staat hätte stärker direkt Aktien der Banken gekauft, statt für stille Einlagen zu zahlen. Bei steigendem Aktienkurs könne der Steuerzahler so am Ende noch Geld verdienen. In anderen Ländern hätte das schon gut funktioniert.

Unübersichtlich wird es für den Finanzexperten Dieter Hein von „fairesearch“ bei den Landesbanken Bayerns und Baden Württembergs. „Hier geben die Landesregierungen Milliarden, auch um den Bund und seine Behörde SoFFin rauszuhalten“. Es geht hier offensichtlich darum, dass die Länder ihre jeweiligen Landesbanken schonen wollen, denen ein radikaler Schrumpfkurs droht.

„Kaum Interesse an Bad Banks“

Das Neueste, das der Staat geschaffen hat um die Banken stützen, sind die sogenannte „Bad banks“. Mit diesem Instrument des Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetzes will die Bundesregierung den Banken helfen, Papiere, die nicht mehr zu veräußern sind oder deren Wert drastisch eingebrochen ist, aus der Bank herauszunehmen. Sie sollen in eine „Bad Bank“ verlagert werden. Da die keine richtigen Banken seien, unterliegen sie auch nicht den strikten Bilanzierungregeln, mit der Notwendigkeit zu sofortigen Abschreibung, sagt Bankenfachmann Schmidt und nennt sie auch deswegen „Bilanzhilfen“. Der Staat habe mit eng gesteckten Regeln aber verhindert, dass die Banken ihre Verluste auf den Steuerzahler leicht abschieben können. Deswegen sei das Interesse nach „Bad Banks“ gering, so Schmidt.

Lediglich die Westdeutsche Landesbank hat Antrag für eine solchen „Hilfsbank“ gestellt.

Grundsätzlich sind die Experten mit dem Eingreifen der Bundesregierung zufrieden. „Ihr Handeln war ohne Alternative“ meint Dieter Hein. Sie habe schnell und gut gehandelt, „Sonst hätten die Lobbyisten das Gesamtkonzept wieder zerschossen“, so Hein. Ob das ganze am Ende ein Erfolg werde, sei aber noch offen. Denn an den massiven Abschreibungen, die die Banken in jüngster Zeit wegen Kreditausfällen vornehmen müssten, sähe man, dass die Wirtschaft noch nicht endgültig über den Berg sei.

Stand: 10.10.2009 13:03 Uhr


Das allein ist ja schon unglaublich – aber dieser Tochtergesellschaft wurden 2006 Gelder in 6-stelliger Millionenhöhe für „Beratungsdienstleistungen“ überwiesen – und das Geld ist nun offensichtlich „verschollen“…

Gefunden bei ftd.de:

Betrugsverdacht

HSH Nordbank entdeckt Tochter auf Kanalinseln

Die Landesbank muss einen weiteren Skandal verdauen: Das krisengeschüttelte Institut räumte Unregelmäßigkeiten in seiner Niederlassung in London ein.

von Nina Luttmer Frankfurt

Im Zusammenhang mit „unklaren Geschäftsvorfällen“ habe das Institut die Londoner Polizei eingeschaltet. Es bestehe der Verdacht auf Vermögensdelikte zulasten der Bank. Auch die deutsche Finanzaufsicht BaFin sowie die britische FSA seien informiert worden.

Darüber hinaus nannte die HSH Nordbank am Mittwoch nur wenige Details. In Finanzkreisen hieß es allerdings, die interne Revision der Bank habe im Juni bemerkt, dass die HSH eine Tochtergesellschaft auf den Kanalinseln habe, von deren Existenz das Management nichts wusste.

Dort habe es 2006 einen Zahlungseingang, offenbar von der HSH Nordbank, im sechsstelligen Euro-Bereich gegeben. In zwei Raten sei dieses Geld bis 2008 dann auf Konten auf den Kaimaninseln überwiesen worden und zwar als Aufwendungen für Beratungsdienstleistungen. Dort verliert sich die Spur des Geldes offenbar.

Die HSH Nordbank hat dem Vernehmen nach Anzeige gegen unbekannt gestellt. In gut informierten Kreisen hieß es, der Verdacht richte sich gegen einen ehemaligen Topmanager der Londoner Niederlassung. „Ziel war und ist eine lückenlose Aufklärung der Vorgänge“, teilte die HSH Nordbank am Mittwoch mit. Der Vorstandsvorsitzende Dirk Jens Nonnenmacher habe mehrfach deutlich gemacht, dass ein Verdacht von Unregelmäßigkeiten jeglicher Art umgehende und rückhaltlose Aufklärung nach sich ziehe.

Die durch die Finanzkrise schwer in Nöte geratene HSH ist in den vergangenen Monaten immer wieder in die Schlagzeilen geraten: sei es wegen hoher Bonuszahlungen an Nonnenmacher, Sexskandalen in New York oder umstrittenen Zahlungen an die Investmentbank Goldman Sachs .

Aus der FTD vom 08.10.2009

© 2009 Financial Times Deutschland

Fortune magazine asks several economists their opinions about President Obama's financial industry regulatory proposals. Overall, they're not impressed.

Prof. Richard Carnell, Fordham University Law School:
It places naive faith in regulation. Yet regulation failed disastrously over the past decade. Bank regulators had ample powers to keep banks safe but did too little, too late.
Byron Wien, Vice Chairman, Blackstone Advisory Services:
There are two areas where I think regulation is needed. The first is bank leverage. The rules are on the books and it's up to the Fed to implement them. ... The second is derivatives and there we really need to write some new regulation providing greater transparency, margins, risk sensitivity, and awareness.
Prof. Darrell Duffie, Stanford University:
I think [the regulatory plan] is a major step in the right direction, but there's room for improvement. ... The regulatory plan could improve, most importantly, by providing additional clarity on how large systemic financial institutions can be safely resolved. There can also be further improvements in the price transparency of over-the-counter derivatives.
Michael Lind, New America Foundation:
I think this is doomed. ... In the U.S., discretionary regulation tends to be corrupted. I want structural separation between retail banking and casino banking, where retail money couldn't be used to finance the proprietary trading.
Jaret Seiberg, Concept Capital:
The fundamental problem during this crisis was that when times were good no one had the political will to pull the plug.
Robert Pozen, MFS Investment Management:
The Federal Reserve should monitor the system and then work with the functional regulator to fix problems. At the same time, we should fill the gaps in the functional regulation.

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