Tagesarchiv für den 11.10.2009

Brett Steenbarger, Ph.D.

Indicator Update for October 11th




Last week's indicator review suggested that the summer lows in stocks would likely hold on the market's pullback, with eventual tests of the bull highs to come. That happened in spades, as stocks rose sharply from their lows, making fresh closing lows in the Dow (DIA) and S&P 500 (SPY) averages and taking the sectors back to short-term uptrends.

Interestingly, we're seeing progressively weaker upside momentum on market moves higher, as illustrated in the Cumulative Demand/Supply Index (top chart). A similar pattern can be seen in other momentum measures, such as the McClellan Oscillator. Even more concerning, we're seeing a number of divergences in the making as we register closing price highs for the bull market. This is nicely illustrated by the number of stocks across the NYSE, NASDAQ, and ASE that are making fresh 20-day highs minus lows (middle chart). Thus far, that number is significantly lagging behind its mid-September levels.

Note also the pullback in the bond market (bottom chart, kudos to Barchart.com). To this point, stock market strength has been accompanied by bond market strength--a change from the bear market dynamic, which saw rising bond prices as a safe haven from falling stocks. Most recently bonds and stocks have risen together on the prospect of continued central bank ease. The latest pullback in bonds may be nothing more than a brief pause in a march toward sub-3% on the 10-year note, but it's on my radar as a possible stumbling block for stocks. Should the market become more concerned about inflation and a Fed "exit plan", that could lead to selling in shares as well as bonds.

To this point, I continue to view the market as having made a momentum peak in mid-September, with further price peaks to follow. If that is the case, we could see further upside in stocks, but we should also see continued divergences among indicators, sectors, and indexes prior to any protracted correction.

I will be updating market indicators each morning before the market open via Twitter. You can follow the Twitter posts by tracking the last five entries on the blog page under "Twitter Trader", or you can subscribe to the Twitter feed via RSS free of charge by going to my Twitter page. Please note that I will be updating both daily and weekly price targets for SPY via Twitter, as well as the usual measures of trend status, momentum, and strength.
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Brett Steenbarger, Ph.D.

Indicator Update for October 11th




Last week's indicator review suggested that the summer lows in stocks would likely hold on the market's pullback, with eventual tests of the bull highs to come. That happened in spades, as stocks rose sharply from their lows, making fresh closing lows in the Dow (DIA) and S&P 500 (SPY) averages and taking the sectors back to short-term uptrends.

Interestingly, we're seeing progressively weaker upside momentum on market moves higher, as illustrated in the Cumulative Demand/Supply Index (top chart). A similar pattern can be seen in other momentum measures, such as the McClellan Oscillator. Even more concerning, we're seeing a number of divergences in the making as we register closing price highs for the bull market. This is nicely illustrated by the number of stocks across the NYSE, NASDAQ, and ASE that are making fresh 20-day highs minus lows (middle chart). Thus far, that number is significantly lagging behind its mid-September levels.

Note also the pullback in the bond market (bottom chart, kudos to Barchart.com). To this point, stock market strength has been accompanied by bond market strength--a change from the bear market dynamic, which saw rising bond prices as a safe haven from falling stocks. Most recently bonds and stocks have risen together on the prospect of continued central bank ease. The latest pullback in bonds may be nothing more than a brief pause in a march toward sub-3% on the 10-year note, but it's on my radar as a possible stumbling block for stocks. Should the market become more concerned about inflation and a Fed "exit plan", that could lead to selling in shares as well as bonds.

To this point, I continue to view the market as having made a momentum peak in mid-September, with further price peaks to follow. If that is the case, we could see further upside in stocks, but we should also see continued divergences among indicators, sectors, and indexes prior to any protracted correction.

I will be updating market indicators each morning before the market open via Twitter. You can follow the Twitter posts by tracking the last five entries on the blog page under "Twitter Trader", or you can subscribe to the Twitter feed via RSS free of charge by going to my Twitter page. Please note that I will be updating both daily and weekly price targets for SPY via Twitter, as well as the usual measures of trend status, momentum, and strength.
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Greg Mankiw

Nobel Update

As many of you have no doubt heard by now, Quintus Pfuffnick has turned down the Nobel Prize in Economics. (The prize ceremony conflicts with one of his final exams.) Tomorrow we will find out who his replacement will be. Here is the betting in the Nobel pool at Harvard:

Robert Barro -10%
John Taylor - 8%
Paul Milgrom - 8%
Jean Tirole - 6%
Oliver Williamson - 6%
Martin Weitzman - 6%
Eugene Fama - 5%
Richard Thaler - 5%
Lars Hansen - 4%
Paul Romer - 4%

Berkster here.  I am going to let you know ahead of time that this post will kill your browser (TK style).  I am not going to apologize becuase A) I don’t need to and B) the more charts I can post, the more clear the picture becomes.  Here we go…

As I have been scanning over almost any indicator that I (or y’all) could think of, some things became BLATANTLY obvious.  Here goes: A) We are SO ready for a drop that it is nuts.  Yeah, nothing new, as we are all in the same boat.  B) That drop is spring-loaded, but nothing has triggered it yet.  We have market indicators at extraordinarily bullish reading, even higher than at their 2007 peaks, but the problem at hand is that they are nearly all in an uptrend.  Until those uptrends are broken, I struggle to want to trade against the current trend at hand, which is most certainly up (for any timeframe longer than a couple of days).

First up, I am going to look at a few bullish percent indexes (BPs).  What I am looking for in the BPs is an extremely overbought condition (70+ on the moving averages {I use a 10 and 20, and occasionally a 5 or 50}), as SMA crossover, and a divergence to index price.

$BPNYA 10 and 20SMAs with $NYMO on top and $NYSE on bottom.

Notice the divergences, and what we currently do NOT have

Notice the divergences, and what we currently do NOT have

$BPCOMPQ same deal as above respectively.

Notice the DOUBLE divergences in the $COMPQ version.

Notice the DOUBLE divergences in the $COMPQ version.

As we all know, you only get 3 years worth of data at SC, not that we don’t love them, but we were observing a much larger degree peak in ‘07 than we are right now, so there is some chance that we may not get one of these multi-month divergences, but I am not making a call one way or another yet, too many more charts. :-)

So how ’bout that XLF?  A few things I noticed… Air above according to price-by-volume. BP breaking down, but I will warn you that this is just the daily BP, not the 10 and 20SMAs that I use for divergences.  As we know, the 2007 peak in $SPX was met with a lower high in XLF, as well as the peaks of the minor and intermediate second waves.  If the same is count to hold true, we would need XLF (15.24) to stay below it’s prior peak (15.44).  It sure would be nice, but I won’t hold my breath.

XLF with $SPX overlay and $BPFINA on top

XLF with $SPX overlay and $BPFINA on top

Mole mentioned in his earlier post that the $NYHL and/or $NAHL were still heading up.  Even though they’re at insanely bullish levels, I can’t see much good in trying to fight this current until the cluster of SMAs can finally take a turn down.  So instead I will take the suggestion from Scrillhog, and check out the $SPXA50R, commonly known as the % of $SPX stocks above their 50MA.  Now this is where it gets good…  As the last three charts have clearly been saying “Don’t fuck with the market trend,” (and if you weren’t getting that, we are NOT on the same page, and I ask you to step back a few feet and check out the larger view here) this chart says that maybe we are starting to break down.

Momentum is starting to wane... slowly.

Momentum is starting to wane... slowly.

$TNX is another market that is showing that we are awfully close to a turn.  Now Mole had asked me to do some comparisons with Spiral Calender Dates, but I can’t seem to find $TNX in Prophet (go figure).  If anyone kindly has the symbol, I will be glad to toss in that chart later.  Anyway, as you can see below, the $TNX typically precedes the $SPX at market tops and bottoms.  $SPX lagged $TNX for almost 4 months at the 2007 peak, we can expect some similar performance here.  Only this time, we ($SPX) are likely to hang around a little longer due to indicator levels that are well above the 2007 peak.  That’s my view anyway.

$TNX leading the market around...

$TNX leading the market around...

I mentioned $CPC last week (the call:put ratio) had flashed a bearish signal.  By the end of the week, the signal had reversed, complete with a turn back down in the 50SMA, which is divergent at this point, but not enough to be convincing.  I am looking for a MA cross-over somewhere under the .80 range.  The lower the 10SMA can go, the better.  I new low would be best, but we will just have to see.

Would love to see another divergence.

Would love to see another divergence.

We have all been watching LQD.  We finally got a break-down, but we need to see it continue before equities are likely to give a reaction.  Notice how at the 2007 peak, LQD had a nice break-down first, but then continued to rally well after the market was plummeting.  At this point I am curious if we will see a repeat performance, I am thinking we will.

LQD finally starts its break-down.

LQD finally starts its break-down.

Here is GLD, off to new highs and a blow-off top sometime in the future.  We are likely going to see above 1100 in /ZG, likely upwards of 110 in GLD.

Don't stop a rocket with your ass..

Don't stop a rocket with your ass..

Next up is the good ol’ $USD.  What I am looking for in this chart is a POSITIVE correlation with the $SPX.  If we could get that (either market rally with $USD rally, or market drop with $USD drop), I would feel much more confident about the bearish case.

Oh where, oh where is that positive correlation?

Oh where, oh where is that positive correlation?

Adding in the /6E chart with $SPX correlation for a different view on the above chart.

Looking for a break-down in correlation.  Not here yet.

Looking for a break-down in correlation. Not here yet.

$TRAN makes a habit of reversing before the market, but also has a tendency to rally up a bit after the market has dropped.  Will we get a repeat performance?

Watching to see where this drop "leads."

Watching to see where this drop "leads."

$UTIL is usually a laggard, and right now, it appears to be lagging the $SPX with some consolidation.  We should soon see a turn up, and should be watching for $UTIL to continue its rally for a bit after the $SPX decides to take its turn down.

No clues from $UTIL

No clues from $UTIL

And finally GS.  We have all been watching GS lead this market around by the horns (quite literally).  I really see this puppy at 210, if not above, before I would be looking to short it.  It might have a little bit of downside coming based on MACD divergence.  But on the major peaks, we are not divergent at all.  NOT a bearish sign.

Waiting for this bad boy to castrate the market for us.

Waiting for this bad boy to castrate the market for us.

So Berk, that is a lot of pretty charts, what does it all mean?  It means that semi-fundamentally the market is still in rally mode.  We all know there are targets here and targets there.  EW says this, and Gann says that.  And what has that gotten us so far?  Only more rally.  I am not going to post any standard market charts.  Mole pretty much laid out the case straight-up.  If we are going to decline, we need to start NOW (last week would have been preferable).  If we are going to rally, I think we can expect another 3-4 months of rally, producing modest new highs each time.  We are extraordinarily overbought in nearly all of the indicators I have looked at, but hey, that’s just called “being overbought in an uptrend,” until we can get a turn down in any (preferably most) of these indicators.  Of all the charts I posted here, only $TNX and $SPXA50R are a little bearish.  Most of the charts could be considered NEUTRAL at worst, in that yes, we are overbought, but yes, we are still uptrending.  Now most of these are longer term indicators, so that tells me that we should be expecting a few more months of rally (we SHOULD still expect a massive drop at any point, but know that the trend at hand is still fairly healthy).  As I noted before, when making my comparisons, I was using the 2007 peak, which is a number of degrees than the move we are currently in.  That means that I may not get all of my beautiful divergences, and that the multi-month rally I am suspecting may only be a month or two.  Only time will really tell.

I have a few more charts to toss up, but need to get a few things done first.  I’ll let this circulate and set in.

Enjoy.

Skål!


A hat tip to one of my readers flipdippy for finding this little gem.

Steve Meyers is a 20 year veteran commodities and futures trader. You can find Steve here at his site which is called Grainbeltcommodities.

I believe Steve pretty much nails it here as he describes whats fueling the recent stock rally.

The United States is now a desperate nation that's in decline.

Enjoy!
CalculatedRisk

More on When the Fed might Raise Rates

From Paul Krugman: When should the Fed raise rates? (even more wonkish)
Let me start with a rounded version of the Rudebusch version of the Taylor rule:

Fed funds target = 2 + 1.5 x inflation - 2 x excess unemployment

where inflation is measured by the change in the core PCE deflator over the past four quarters (currently 1.6), and excess unemployment is the different between the CBO estimate of the NAIRU (currently 4.8) and the actual unemployment rate (currently 9.8).

Right now, this rule says that the Fed funds rate should be -5.6%. So we’re hard up against the zero bound.

Suppose that core inflation stays at 1.6% (although in fact it’s almost sure to go lower.) Then we can back out the unemployment rate at which the target would cross zero, suggesting that tightening should begin: it’s an excess unemployment rate of 2.2, implying an actual rate of 7 percent. That’s a long way from here. ...
This is all back-of-the-envelope stuff - and maybe NAIRU or core inflation will be a little higher (although I think core inflation might be lower next year because of declining owners' equivalent rent).

If we use Krugman's analysis, and the recent CBO projections for the average annual unemployment rate (10.2% in 2010, 9.1% in 2011, and 7.2% in 2012), the Fed would not raise rates until some time in 2012.

Last month I wrote:

Fed Funds and Unemployment Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows the effective Fed Funds rate (Source: Federal Reserve) and the unemployment rate (source: BLS)

In the early '90s, the Fed waited more than a 1 1/2 years after the unemployment rate peaked before raising rates. The unemployment rate had fallen from 7.8% to 6.6% before the Fed raised rates.

Following the peak unemployment rate in 2003 of 6.3%, the Fed waited a year to raise rates. The unemployment rate had fallen to 5.6% in June 2004 before the Fed raised rates.

Although there are other considerations, since the unemployment rate will probably continue to increase into 2010, I don't expect the Fed to raise rates until late in 2010 at the earliest - and more likely sometime in 2011.
Maybe 2011. Or maybe 2012. But talk of a rate hike in early 2010 seems crazy ...
Bruce Webb

Success of the Surge

by Bruce Webb

John McCain and others have been all over TV arguing that the success of the Surge in Iraq proves that we should just go ahead and throw forty thousand more troops on top of the twenty thousand sent in March to Afghanistan. Well ignoring for the moment that where the surge increased U.S. forces by about a third and this combination of surges represents a doubling, why do we conclude that the surge was a success to start with? What was the baseline against which we have our metric?

Back in the day we had a commenter here who insisted that those of us who resisted the surge were clearly proved wrong by the calm conditions in Anbar Province, and particularly Falluljah and Ramadi, my didn't we feel silly? Well no and items like this from today show why. Deadly Blasts Target Police, Government Buildings in Iraq
Sunday, October 11, 2009; 10:33 AM
BAGHDAD -- Three car bombings targeted a police station and a government headquarters in Ramadi in western Iraq on Sunday, killing at least 18 people and underlining the precarious situation in Anbar province.
And in the same story we have this:
The bombings came a few days after a truck piled with explosives detonated outside a police station in Amiriyah, about 10 miles south of Fallujah, killing nine people. The town was once known as the stronghold of the insurgency.
The surge was marked by a sharp spike in U.S. casualties starting when troops were there in full strength in Fall 2006 and stayed high until the end of the full force of the surge the next summer, leading 2007 to be the second highest year for coalition casualties. Now certainly deaths fell off after that but some might argue that was the result of the deal Bush signed to withdraw all troops by 2010. The question is what did the surge actually buy the IRAQIS that justified so much sacrifice from the US? How is it that two years after the surge the situation in Anbar, triumphumantly held up as proof of the surge's effectiveness is now described as "precarious".

So I want to ask a version of the question posed the other day. Can we actually Score the Surge? By what numeric, social or political metric is it really a success. That less soldiers are getting killed after than during could be said for just about any battle, anywhere. Once the battle or war is won or lost relatively fewer people get killed, that is not in itself a metric of success.

I don't bring this up just to pick at a barely healed scab. In the new drumbeat for war it is held up that people who opposed the surge have been proven to be soft-headed idiots. Well can someone put that in quantifiable terms? We had an Iraqi election, and now we are going to have another one, and a lot depends of whether Maliki can pull this out. If not things might get a little messy as an Iranian friendly regime takes power. So, Got Numbers? A Hard Metric? Anything more than 'We told you so!'

Maybe the success is self-evident to everyone in the world radiating from the beltway outwards, maybe it just hasn't reached me here. But I don't see anything bought in 2006 and 2007 that we couldn't have got by having Bush sign that troop withdrawal deal two years earlier than he ultimately did.
Tyler Durden

Guest Post: The WSJ Blankfein Interview

Submitted by reader Deadhead

This weekend’s WSJ interview with Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs by Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. is worthy of commentary by both sides of the Goldman fence: those that subscribe to the theory that Goldman is the Matt Taibbi coined “..great vampire squid..” or those that have taken Mr. Blankfein’s recent public apology to heart and have accepted his words that “…Goldman wants to be a force for good…”.

The first impression of this writer after reading the piece is that perhaps Mr. Jenkins should have his own television show ala Chis Matthews named “Softball”.  Where in the world are the “sweat” questions or follow ups to the theme outlined by Mr. Jenkins himself about “The Bank Everyone Loves to Hate”?  The political and financial world is abuzz with overwhelmingly negative opinion about Goldman and its actions, yet Mr. Blankfein is barely nudged to address these matters nor does he or Mr. Jenkins offer examples of positive opinions or enthusiastic defenses of Goldman’s behavior.

The best we get on a macroscopic level is that Mr. Blankfein is “…more bemused than hurt by the slurs.”  Instead of dissecting and pressing for elucidation of Blankfein’s bewilderment, Jenkins simply concludes that Blankfein’s “…serenity may be helped by the fact that the events we’re discussing - Goldman’s brush with death - appear to be firmly in the past.”  Looks to me like Blankfein got a complete pass on the central theme of the article and the pervasive anti-Goldman zeitgeist.  Oh, and as for that “…brush of death….firmly in the past” thing, isn’t that what has been suggested previously by some about Bear Stearns, Lehman, or, for those with a sense of history that lasts longer than the speed of a HFT trade, some of the companies previously on the Goldman conviction buy list from the dot com bust era?

The next item covered is the role of former “Goldmanites” in top echelons of the government, which has lead to an explosion of press coverage and blog chatter about numerous suggestions (often labeled as “tin foil hat conspiracies”) as well as allegations of conflict of interest and influence peddling. Yep, it was addressed. That’s about it. Really. One paragraph. Read it yourself.  In the one paragraph, Jenkins indicates that Blankfein does not think Goldman is pulling strings.  Okay, it’s a nice autumn day, so “Let’s play Softball!”

As to the financial crisis recap, there are a few items that caught my attention that readers might find interesting and worthy of comment.

Blankfein admits that he was “scared” during the financial crisis and if the financial system had collapsed, that Goldman “…would have been in that snowball tumbling down the hill with everybody else.” Curiously, Blankfein immediately goes on to “insist”, according to Jenkins, that Goldman was not especially at risk.  To those Goldman critics who suggest that Goldman would have failed, Blankfein responds “I don’t think so. Our liquidity was huge.”  Does anybody see a bit of a  disconnect here?

Blankfein continues to insist that Goldman did not need TARP money, no surprise in that statement, as he and his peers have said this almost as frequently as Tim Geithner has vowed support for the US Dollar.  He also reiterates that he regrets that Goldman could not have kept a greater distance from bailout efforts. Yet, when it comes to the FDIC-guaranteed debt program (bailout? Subsidy?), Blankfein boasts about Goldman being “..overachievers..” and as such, being the first bank to dive right in to the government backstopped, lower interest rate borrowing honey pot.  Admitting that he did not foresee this government largesse as a “pejorative” (I think this means that taxpayers are getting really pissed off that banks like Goldman are making a fortune in the markets right now levered up with low cost money courtesy of the risk assumed by the American taxpayer), Blankfein expresses his joy at stopping at the 22 billion bucky mark.  Says Blankfein: “I wish we’d stopped at zero.” 

Lloyd, your wish can be granted!  On Monday morning, put out a press release that Goldman will go to the capital markets immediately (a vital “social” role as you describe it) and Goldman will borrow money at current market rates to pay off the FDIC backstopped bonds and relieve the American taxpayer of the risk that we are currently assuming.  Poof!! Your wish is granted. 

Blankfein continues along the timeline of the crisis and notes that Goldman has had a long standing application before the Fed to become a bank holding company, which would allow Goldman to disassociate itself from its primary regulator, the SEC. I find remarkable what follows and so there is no confusion, I will quote verbatim the passage as written by Jenkins summarizing Blankfein on this bank holding company application: “The SEC’s imprimatur, he says, had become worthless after the Bear Stearns and Lehman debacles.”

Blankfein continues, in a direct quote: “What it looked like at the time was, the Fed had regulated its institutions well, and its validation was a good imprimatur. And the SEC had failed in its supervision, and its validation wasn’t good”.

Wow……… “worthless”, “failed”, and “its validation wasn’t good”.  Hmmm, no comment here by this writer, I’ll wait for the forthcoming morsels from ZH and non ZH readers alike.  I wonder if we will hear from those currently or previously employed by the SEC?

I'm going to go back to this quote by Barney Frank of the US House, because it says everything those in state and local governments need to know:

Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, said in an interview that the defaults were, in essence, worth it.

“I don’t think it’s a bad thing that the bad loans occurred,” he said. “It was an effort to keep prices from falling too fast. That’s a policy.”

Got it?  It's a policy to screw the state and local governments.

Huh, you say?  It's simple, really: State and local governments rely on property tax revenues.  Yet defaulted mortgages don't pay property taxes.  Yes, there's a lien on the property but this doesn't help the municipal budget now.

And suffer they are:

Tax revenues used to pay teachers and fuel police cars continue to trail even the most pessimistic expectations, despite the cash from the economic stimulus plan pouring into state coffers.

"It's crazy. It's really just unbelievable," said Scott Pattison, executive director of the National Association of State Budget Officers, and called the states' revenue situations "close to unprecedented."

These shortfalls are a direct consequence of the intentional action of not only refusing to prosecute financial fraud and the making of unsound loans for years, but of continuing the game-playing even now as an official federal government policy.

This game goes back to the former Fannie accounting scandals, as a recently-discovered set of documents from a law firm that threatened a discrimination and whistleblower retaliation suit show:

"There is no explanation which I can see which justifies amortizing beyond 100% of an asset's value.  Having made those arguments with Janet and Dick and having lost, I have to hope their knowledge of the factor generation and cash flow modeling processes includes expertise which I do not have."  (Roger Barnes, internal email, October 2002.)

Well I don't understand a reason for justifying amortizing an asset beyond 100% of it's value either, but when we get down to 2 + 2 = and the answer is something other than "4".....

We have a regulatory environment where The Federal Government has intentionally left out of the Federal Legal code strictures on operating a bank while insolvent, when many states explicitly define such an act as a felony, thereby giving The Federal Government cover in allowing banks to operate long enough to generate 20, 30, 40 and even 50% losses as measured against their asset base before being closed.  To date nobody has been criminally charged in relationship to these events.

We have banks that are intentionally sitting on "NODs" (Notices of Default) and foreclosure actions, with many people in bubble areas not having made a payment in more than a year.  There are those who view this sort of thing as "good" for the economy (since those individuals continue to spend in the local economy instead of being evicted.)  Banks are doing this to avoid having to take the "mark" on the defaulted asset; by refusing to recognize the current value of those assets as the recovery value and instead holding the note at "par" or near to it, they effectively cook their books and appear healthier than they are.  Government is allowing this and claiming that it is "for the good of the economy" to keep these blown-up banks in business but along with the default on the mortgage comes a default on the impound account (if there is one) which means state and local governments are not receiving their property tax revenues.

We also have banks that have homes that have either "jingle mailed" or otherwise been left empty, and the banks are refusing to sell these properties off for the same reason - maintenance of these "assets" at unrealistic values on the books of these firms.  This also results in the property tax bills not being paid as there is nobody living in these homes and nobody making the payments to state and local governments.

It has become clear during the last two years that despite the royal screwing that is imposed on state and local governments as a direct consequence of these actions Federal regulators, lawmakers and administration officials will not step in and put a stop to it, as they are fully bought and paid for by the financial industry. 

As a direct consequence of this intentional blindness state and local governments are being forced to lay off school teachers, firefighters, police officers and severely curtail other normal activities for lack of funds.  The Federal Government in turn is plying the States with "stimulus" money but that amount is nowhere near the amount of the shortfalls being generated by these policy decisions.

Make no mistake: This is not about protecting "the broader economy."  It is about one and only one thing: covering up the bogus accounting and embedded losses these firms are carrying so they can pay their bonuses and indeed remain in business while the local, county and state governments are serially violated by the bankers and organs of the federal government.

States must stand and say "no more!" to these policies.  Fraud is fraud and papering it over doesn't make it less crooked.  The states are entitled to their funds irrespective of whether the federal government wants to protect big banking interests on Wall Street, and must not be used as a scapegoat in this latest game of "hide the truth."

State governments must rise and demand an end to the banking and balance sheet games.  Failing such an attempt they must pass 10th Amendment recognition laws with the full force of law behind them and then begin to bring criminal charges against those institutions that are improperly holding defaulted property off the market or allowing people who remain in homes who are not paying their mortgages - or taxes.  If The Federal Government will not investigate and bring charges then The States must indict under their own consumer protection and anti-fraud laws and issue 50-state Governor's Warrants as required.

I believe it is time for State Governments to openly question whether The Federal Government has violated the contractual limits and stipulations of the US Constitution on an ongoing basis for more than two decades, and whether The States should remain within a Union where one party violates the rights and privileges of the Other Parties with impunity and malice aforethought. 

Despite the calls of some who scream "racism!" and similar echoes of the 1860s this debate is not only proper now it is proper at any time; all parties to a contract are charged with continual assessment of whether the terms are being met, and it is never "over the line" to raise the question or hold an open debate on this account.

Many claim that The War Between The States was "only" over slavery.  But contemporary documents of the time make clear that this was not the case; to wit, Georgia:

The manufacturing interests entered into the same struggle early, and has clamored steadily for Government bounties and special favors. This interest was confined mainly to the Eastern and Middle non-slave-holding States. Wielding these great States it held great power and influence, and its demands were in full proportion to its power. The manufacturers and miners wisely based their demands upon special facts and reasons rather than upon general principles, and thereby mollified much of the opposition of the opposing interest. They pleaded in their favor the infancy of their business in this country, the scarcity of labor and capital, the hostile legislation of other countries toward them, the great necessity of their fabrics in the time of war, and the necessity of high duties to pay the debt incurred in our war for independence. These reasons prevailed, and they received for many years enormous bounties by the general acquiescence of the whole country.

Hmmm... perhaps slavery was an excuse rather than the actual cause?

The Constitution is in fact the contract under which each State entered the Union.  All contracts may be renegotiated, but none may be violated unilaterally.  By refusing to comport with equal protection under the laws of the land as demanded by same and by stepping into what are clearly intrastate matters with judicial and legal activism, as was done with Bush's interference with state predatory lending laws and other similar abuses, along with government refusing to stop bogus accounting that threatens state tax revenues and fiscal health The Federal Government is acting not as a party to The Constitution in concert with the States of this Union but rather as an insane monarch who has used The Constitution as toilet paper and then discarded it into the trash.

The States must demand that these violations be immediately cured and should the Federal Government refuse the States must both indict on their own initiative the bad actors in this economic mess and consider declaring themselves free of the bonds imposed by the Constitution, not by virtue of their desire to violate its' letter and intent but rather as a consequence of the other side's refusal to recognize that the original agreement still exists.

(And by the way, for those who can't read English very well, nowhere within this Ticker - or anywhere else - have or will I advocate violent overthrow or activity of any sort.  Not only is such an act unlawful but I am fully aware of the fact that it is highly likely that any such action will not lead to a "more free" nation, but rather a Hitler-style fascist dictatorship - simply based on the lessons of history.)

Below is the last part of Tavakoli's interview with Max Keiser.

 

And a note from Janet herself:

In Chapter 12 of Dear Mr. Buffett I predicted we would be suffering from stagflation by now. I believe this will eventually occur, but I was wrong about how quickly we would be at risk for inflation. We are still feeling the effects of a collapsing asset bubble resulting in demand deflation (except for food, energy and isolated pockets.) Instead of allowing necessary deflation (restructuring of AIG, investment banks and troubled banks), the Fed is trying to paper over the problem. We criticized Japan when it did this (and lost two decades), and now we are doing the same thing.


In the video, I mention I went to cash in 2007 (it sounds like 2000, so perhaps I misspoke). I also mention that “believing economists…” and the audio distortion makes it sound like “bleeding” economists.


In the earlier (posted on maxkeiser.com on October 2) first half of the interview, I misspoke. I meant to say that JPMorgan merged with WaMu (not Wachovia) and Bear Stearns. Shortly thereafter, I mentioned the Wells/Wachovia merger (Wachovia had already done the disastrous Golden West merger).

Even with a really strong recovery (which almost nobody expects), the Fed should keep rates on hold for at least two years.

Return on Investment
Total campaign contributions and lobbying by TARP recipients*

>

Company Campaign Contributions, 07-08 Cycle Lobbying Expenditures, 2008 TARP Payment Return on Investment
Bank of America Corp**
$5,752,630
$8,790,000
$45,000,000,000
309335%
Citigroup Inc.
$4,799,678
$7,660,000
$50,000,000,000
401194%
AIG
$929,774
$9,690,000
$40,000,000,000
376556%
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
$4,778,638
$5,390,000
$25,000,000,000
245754%
Wells Fargo & Company
$1,553,471
$1,200,740
$25,000,000,000
907601%
General Motors Corporation
$916,142
$14,071,000
$10,400,000,000
69293%
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
$5,690,351
$3,280,000
$10,000,000,000
111378%
Morgan Stanley
$3,689,027
$3,120,000
$10,000,000,000
146764%
The PNC Financial Services Group Inc.
$68,525
$0
$7,579,200,000
11060389%
U.S. Bancorp
$496,461
$570,000
$6,599,000,000
618676%
Chrysler Holding LLC and Cerberus Capital Management
$1,075,350
$7,927,782
$5,500,000,000
60990%
GMAC LLC
$72,207
$4,620,000
$5,000,000,000
106460%
SunTrust Banks, Inc.
$175,903
$0
$4,850,000,000
2757101%
Capital One Financial Corporation
$700,161
$1,132,000
$3,555,199,000
193944%
Regions Financial Corp.
$161,775
$180,000
$3,500,000,000
1023966%
Fifth Third Bancorp
$149,550
$80,000
$3,408,000,000
1484544%
American Express Company
$1,028,038
$3,790,000
$3,389,000,000
70240%
BB&T Corp.
$262,737
$0
$3,133,640,000
1192591%
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation
$886,701
$558,402
$3,000,000,000
207498%
KeyCorp
$159,280
$210,000
$2,500,000,000
676893%
CIT Group Inc.
$23,200
$90,000
$2,330,000,000
2058204%
Comerica Inc.
$210,538
$0
$2,250,000,000
1068591%
State Street Corporation
$152,627
$980,000
$2,000,000,000
176481%
Marshall & Ilsley Corporation
$57,400
$0
$1,715,000,000
2987705%
Northern Trust Corporation
$240,892
$0
$1,576,000,000
654135%
Zions Bancorporation
$117,159
$60,000
$1,400,000,000
790151%
Huntington Bancshares
$188,700
$232,971
$1,398,071,000
331455%
Synovus Financial Corp.
$10,150
$0
$967,870,000
9535565%
Popular, Inc.
$12,700
$390,000
$935,000,000
232083%
First Horizon National Corporation
$30,050
$0
$866,540,000
2883561%
M&T Bank Corporation
$3,500
$10,000
$600,000,000
4444344%
City National Corporation
$262,965
$0
$400,000,000
152011%
Webster Financial Corporation
$14,850
$0
$400,000,000
2693503%
First Bancorp
$4,900
$0
$400,000,000
8163165%
Fulton Financial Corporation
$5,700
$0
$376,500,000
6605163%
TCF Financial Corporation
$103,300
$0
$361,172,000
349534%
South Financial Group, Inc.
$29,100
$0
$347,000,000
1192340%
Wilmington Trust Corporation
$59,850
$0
$330,000,000
551278%
East West Bancorp
$4,800
$0
$306,546,000
6386275%
Sterling Financial Corporation
$5,750
$0
$303,000,000
5269465%
Whitney Holding Corporation
$27,950
$0
$300,000,000
1073245%
Susquehanna Bancshares, Inc
$6,850
$0
$300,000,000
4379462%
Valley National Bancorp
$950
$0
$300,000,000
31578847%
UCBH Holdings, Inc.
$42,750
$0
$298,737,000
698700%
New York Private Bank & Trust Corporation
$6,350
$0
$267,000,000
4204624%
Cathay General Bancorp
$2,500
$0
$258,000,000
10319900%
Wintrust Financial Corporation
$4,401
$0
$250,000,000
5680427%
SVB Financial Group
$18,300
$0
$235,000,000
1284053%
International Bancshares Corporation
$116,100
$0
$216,000,000
185947%
Trustmark Corporation
$6,500
$0
$215,000,000
3307592%
Umpqua Holdings Corp.
$650
$0
$214,181,000
32950823%
MB Financial Inc.
$15,150
$0
$196,000,000
1293629%
First Midwest Bancorp, Inc.
$1,750
$0
$193,000,000
11028471%
Pacific Capital Bancorp
$500
$480,000
$180,634,000
37493%
United Community Banks, Inc.
$12,250
$0
$180,000,000
1469288%
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc.
$6,400
$0
$154,000,000
2406150%
Independent Bank Corp.
$2,250
$0
$150,000,000
6666567%
National Penn Bancshares, Inc.
$1,500
$0
$150,000,000
9999900%
Dickinson Financial Corporation
$94,050
$0
$146,000,000
155137%
Central Pacific Financial Corp.
$19,750
$0
$135,000,000
683444%
Sterling Bancshares, Inc.
$9,150
$0
$125,198,000
1368184%
FirstMerit Corp.
$4,500
$0
$125,000,000
2777678%
Banner Corporation
$6,140
$0
$124,000,000
2019444%
Signature Bank
$7,875
$0
$120,000,000
1523710%
1st Source Corporation
$450
$0
$111,000,000
24666567%
S&T Bancorp
$3,200
$0
$109,000,000
3406150%
Park National Corporation
$10,500
$0
$100,000,000
952281%
Old National Bancorp
$8,250
$0
$100,000,000
1212021%
F.N.B. Corporation
$1,000
$0
$100,000,000
9999900%
Pinnacle Financial Partners, Inc.
$29,850
$0
$95,000,000
318158%
Iberiabank Corporation
$2,000
$0
$90,000,000
4499900%
Plains Capital Corporation
$59,650
$0
$87,631,000
146809%
Midwest Banc Holdings, Inc.
$2,800
$0
$84,784,000
3027900%
Sandy Spring Bancorp, Inc.
$250
$0
$83,094,000
33237500%
Columbia Banking System, Inc.
$2,500
$0
$76,898,000
3075820%
TowneBank
$4,750
$0
$76,458,000
1609542%
Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc.
$18,150
$0
$75,000,000
413123%
Bank of the Ozarks, Inc.
$11,150
$0
$75,000,000
672546%
Wesbanco Bank Inc.
$208
$0
$75,000,000
36057592%
Green Bankshares, Inc.
$1,200
$0
$72,278,000
6023067%
Virginia Commerce Bancorp
$8,850
$0
$71,000,000
802160%
Southwest Bancorp, Inc.
$50,650
$0
$70,000,000
138103%
Flushing Financial Corporation
$2,300
$0
$70,000,000
3043378%
Superior Bancorp Inc.
$250
$0
$69,000,000
27599900%
Nara Bancorp, Inc.
$2,000
$0
$67,000,000
3349900%
First Bancorp
$2,650
$0
$65,000,000
2452730%
SCBT Financial Corporation
$250
$0
$65,000,000
25999900%
CoBiz Financial Inc.
$1,000
$0
$64,450,000
6444900%
Union Bankshares Corporation
$1,000
$0
$59,000,000
5899900%
Liberty Bancshares, Inc.
$20,900
$0
$58,000,000
277412%
Great Southern Bancorp
$2,500
$0
$58,000,000
2319900%
WSFS Financial Corporation
$21,550
$0
$53,000,000
245840%
Ameris Bancorp
$1,000
$0
$52,000,000
5199900%
State Bankshares, Inc.
$4,800
$0
$50,000,000
1041567%
Home Bancshares, Inc.
$1,500
$0
$50,000,000
3333233%
Fidelity Southern Corporation
$300
$0
$48,200,000
16066567%
MetroCorp Bancshares, Inc.
$1,500
$0
$45,000,000
2999900%
Cadence Financial Corporation
$8,250
$0
$44,000,000
533233%
Exchange Bank
$2,750
$0
$43,000,000
1563536%
Sterling Bancorp
$1,300
$0
$42,000,000
3230669%
Eagle Bancorp, Inc.
$801
$0
$38,235,000
4773308%
Bridgeview Bancorp, Inc.
$6,600
$0
$38,000,000
575658%
OceanFirst Financial Corp.
$3,300
$0
$38,000,000
1151415%
First Defiance Financial Corp.
$2,000
$0
$37,000,000
1849900%
State Bancorp, Inc.
$6,850
$0
$36,842,000
537739%
Fidelity Financial Corporation
$1,657,052
$2,190,000
$36,282,000
843%
Yadkin Valley Financial Corporation
$1,250
$0
$36,000,000
2879900%
West Bancorporation, Inc.
$250
$0
$36,000,000
14399900%
Porter Bancorp
$5,000
$0
$35,000,000
699900%
Encore Bancshares Inc.
$4,300
$0
$34,000,000
790598%
First Security Group, Inc.
$3,350
$0
$33,000,000
984975%
Centrue Financial Corporation
$1,000
$0
$33,000,000
3299900%
Pulaski Financial Corp
$1,000
$0
$33,000,000
3299900%
Peapack-Gladstone Financial Corporation
$2,300
$0
$28,685,000
1247074%
Centerstate Banks of Florida Inc.
$500
$0
$27,875,000
5574900%
Citizens & Northern Corporation
$700
$0
$26,000,000
3714186%
Peoples Bancorp of North Carolina, Inc.
$2,125
$0
$25,054,000
1178912%
Shore Bancshares, Inc.
$3,800
$0
$25,000,000
657795%
Horizon Bancorp
$2,600
$0
$25,000,000
961438%
Intervest Bancshares Corporation
$2,300
$0
$25,000,000
1086857%
HF Financial Corp.
$250
$0
$25,000,000
9999900%
Heritage Financial Corporation
$1,250
$0
$24,000,000
1919900%
Wainwright Bank & Trust Company
$15,250
$0
$22,000,000
144162%
Citizens South Banking Corporation
$750
$0
$20,500,000
2733233%
First Financial Service Corporation
$7,325
$0
$20,000,000
272938%
BNCCORP, Inc.
$5,050
$0
$20,000,000
395940%
C&F Financial Corporation
$250
$0
$20,000,000
7999900%
Carver Bancorp, Inc
$5,300
$0
$19,000,000
358391%
Bar Harbor Bankshares/Bar Harbor Bank & Trust
$500
$0
$19,000,000
3799900%
Security Federal Corporation
$1,250
$0
$18,000,000
1439900%
ECB Bancorp, Inc./East Carolina Bank
$1,000
$0
$18,000,000
1799900%
Timberland Bancorp, Inc.
$430
$0
$16,641,000
3869900%
Carolina Bank Holdings, Inc.
$1,250
$0
$16,000,000
1279900%
BankFirst Capital Corporation
$500
$0
$16,000,000
3199900%
Monarch Financial Holdings, Inc.
$1,997
$0
$14,700,000
736004%
Magna Bank
$2,250
$0
$13,795,000
613011%
Morrill Bancshares, Inc.
$3,100
$0
$13,000,000
419255%
LCNB Corp.
$1,000
$0
$13,000,000
1299900%
OneUnited Bank
$3,550
$0
$12,063,000
339703%
First Manitowoc Bancorp, Inc.
$2,500
$0
$12,000,000
479900%
1st Constitution Bancorp
$2,000
$0
$12,000,000
599900%
Pacific Coast Bankers’ Bancshares
$250
$0
$11,600,000
4639900%
Mid Penn Bancorp, Inc.
$1,800
$0
$10,000,000
555456%
Uwharrie Capital Corp
$1,500
$0
$10,000,000
666567%
Midland States Bancorp
$500
$0
$10,000,000
1999900%
New Hampshire Thrift Bancshares, Inc.
$500
$0
$10,000,000
1999900%
Citizens First Corporation
$74,700
$0
$8,779,000
11652%
Syringa Bancorp
$750
$0
$8,000,000
1066567%
First Sound Bank
$2,716
$0
$7,400,000
272359%
Western Community Bancshares, Inc.
$5,600
$0
$7,290,000
130079%
Fidelity Bancorp, Inc.
$5,100
$0
$7,000,000
137155%
Somerset Hills Bancorp
$2,000
$0
$7,000,000
349900%
American State Bancshares, Inc.
$5,350
$0
$6,000,000
112050%
Patapsco Bancorp, Inc.
$1,050
$0
$6,000,000
571329%
Seaside National Bank & Trust
$400
$0
$6,000,000
1499900%
Northeast Bancorp
$1,000
$0
$4,227,000
422600%
Pacific Commerce Bank
$1,500
$0
$4,060,000
270567%
Capital Pacific Bancorp
$1,750
$0
$4,000,000
228471%
Bank of Commerce
$15,950
$0
$3,000,000
18709%
FPB Financial Corp.
$500
$0
$3,000,000
599900%
Treaty Oak Bancorp, Inc.
$250
$0
$3,000,000
1199900%
Grand Total
$37,477,300
$76,702,895
$305,212,309,000
267208%

*TARP recipient list accessed at Treasury.gov on Feb. 2, 2009. List includes only recipients that spent money on lobbying or were associated with campaign contributions. Campaign contributions include money from PACs and individuals but do not include post-election fundraising.

**Includes data for Merrill Lynch, which was acquired by Bank of America

You can also download this data here: TARP Recipients.xls

# # #

Even with this huge rally in stocks and corporate bonds, pension plans are in incredibly poor shape. The Washington Post lists Two Bad Choices Cut Benefits Or Take Greater Risks to Rebuild Assets.

Please consider Steep Losses Pose Crisis for Pensions.
The financial crisis has blown a hole in the rosy forecasts of pension funds that cover teachers, police officers and other government employees, casting into doubt as never before whether these public systems will be able to keep their promises to future generations of retirees.

Within 15 years, public systems on average will have less half the money they need to pay pension benefits, according to an analysis by Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Other analysts say funding levels could hit that low within a decade.

After losing about $1 trillion in the markets, state and local governments are facing a devil's choice: Either slash retirement benefits or pursue high-return investments that come with high risk.

"The amount that needs to be made up is enormous," said Peter Austin, executive director of BNY Mellon Pension Services. "Frankly, they are forced to continue their allocation in these high-return asset classes because that's their only hope."

In New Mexico, lawmakers passed legislation this year requiring public employees to contribute about 1.5 percent of their salary to cover retirement benefits. Labor unions representing 57,000 of the workers sued the state in response.
Mish: The correct response would be to kill all unnecessary services, fire all the government workers and privatize everything remaining.
In Philadelphia, officials delivered an ultimatum to state lawmakers: Allow the city to take a two-year break from contributing to its pension system or Philadelphia would lay off 3,000 workers and cut sanitation and public safety services. Last month, the lawmakers not only granted the request, but extended the funding holiday to thousands of cities and counties, despite severe pension deficits in many of these places.
Mish: The correct response would be to kill all unnecessary services, fire all the government workers and privatize everything remaining.
In Montgomery County, officials last year committed to setting up an investment fund to finance about $3 billion in retiree health-care benefits promised to employees. But when it came time to put the first round of seed money into the fund this year, county officials balked, citing budget constraints.
Mish: The correct response would be to kill all unnecessary services, fire all the government workers and privatize everything remaining. I think you get the idea.
Just a few years ago, it seemed far-fetched that Virginia's pension system would hit hard times. In 2003, the state's primary pension funds either had more money than they needed or, at a minimum, were nearly fully funded. And like their counterparts across the country, state officials assumed they would earn around 8 percent a year from investing in financial markets for years to come given the outstanding performance of stocks in the 1980s and 1990s.

Then the crisis hit. Virginia lost 21 percent of the value of its portfolio, or about $11.5 billion. Maryland and the District, meantime, suffered drops of 20 percent.

But Virginia officials now estimate the funding level of its major pension funds will sink to about 60 percent by 2013.

From there, the deficit will grow even wider, according to Kim Nicholl, the national director of PricewaterhouseCoopers public sector retirement practice. Even if public pension funds were to hit their 8 percent investment targets every year, Nicholl calculated they would have less than half of what they need by 2025. This is because a greater share of the population will be retired and those who are will live longer, thus collecting benefits longer, she said.
Mish: Expecting 8 percent returns when 30 year treasury bonds are yielding 4%, the dividend yield of the S&P 500 is 2%, and the S&P 500 trailing PE is 138.97, is amazingly foolish.

Even if one uses "operating earnings" a euphemism for "blatant lie" in which all "one-time losses" that recur like clockwork are ignored (along with everything else the companies want to ignore), the PE based clocks in at 29.64 as of the end of the third quarter according to S&P Earnings Data.

To see an earnings spreadsheet, click on one of the XLS links that will pop up when you click on the above link.
Like many states, Maryland had begun moving money from stocks into hedge funds and private equity before the financial crisis. The goal was not only to earn a higher return but to diversify the investment portfolio. Should stocks sink, the thinking went, less traditional investments might hold up.

The financial crisis offered a shocking retort. Nearly all investments, save for government bonds, tumbled at the same time.

Yet Maryland is now continuing its shift away from stocks and into nontraditional investments. Pension officials argue they have little choice.

"How do I act in the new environment? There aren't any ready answers for that," said Mansco Perry, chief investment officer for Maryland's pensions. "But I have difficulty throwing away 30 to 40 years worth of knowledge and practice and say that doesn't work anymore."
Mish: I have a clue for pension managers: Understanding the paradigm of the last 30-40 years is indeed worthless. It is a serious mistake to assume the next 30 years will be anything like the last 30 years.

For an excellent analysis of the ever-changing investment paradigm, please read Marc Faber's excellent book Tomorrow's Gold. It is number one on my reading list for a reason. It is not about "gold", it is about investment opportunities and how they change over time. Every pension manager in the country needs to read it.

When Treasury and corporate bond yields are high and falling as they were for 30 years, it is easy to get very high returns safely. Not only could one lock in high yields, one also was rewarded with capital gains as the yields compressed. Now with yields low and dividends low there is no magic formula that can possibly help.

Compounding the problem is the fact that all asset classes save government bonds, something no one wants, at least right now, have been correlated on the upside and downside. This should have been easy to spot. Yet somehow it wasn't.

Pension funds thought they were a genius in their diversification strategies between 2002-2007 when everything rose. They failed to appreciate what would happen when things went into reverse.
Some pension funds are also continuing to engage in other investment practices that got them in trouble during the crisis.

One such trading technique is called securities lending. In this transaction, a pension fund lends a stock it holds to a hedge fund and receives cash in return as collateral. The deal is meant to provide a twofold benefit: The pension fund can make money by investing the cash collateral and can continue to benefit from the stock through its dividends and any appreciation in its value.

Before the crisis, states committed billions of dollars to this practice. But when the credit markets seized up last year, pension funds got stuck. They could not access the investments they made with the cash collateral. Some had to sell off other investments at a loss to pay retiree benefits.

California's pension fund lost $634 million from securities lending as of March 31, but the total could reach $1 billion after a full accounting is done, according to a report from the system's consultant, Wilshire Associates. Still, the pension fund says it remains committed to the practice because it boosted returns in the two decades before the financial meltdown.
Mish: Notice the obvious problem? CalPERS, the California pension fund is assuming what worked before the crisis, will continue to work after the crisis.

Pray tell what good does it do to "boost returns" when you give it all back and more when the strategy blows up in your face. Moreover, note how progressively little they get for their lending. The yield on the S&P 500 is a mere 2%.

As for "appreciation in value", the hedge funds the pension plan lent the securities to shorted them, betting that they would drop in value. Meanwhile the pension plan locked in meager dividends. Who gained from that?

If a hedge fund wants to borrow your securities to short them, it's a reasonable bet they know more about what they are doing than you do.

In Ohio, for instance, the teachers pension system reported that it would take 41 years for its investments to catch up with the costs of meeting its obligations to retirees. That was before the worst of the financial crisis.

During the last fiscal year, Ohio's fund lost 31 percent. Its most recent annual report detailed how long it would now take for its investments to put the fund back on track. Officials simply said: "Infinity."

Unsolvable Problems

  • Expecting 8% returns in a 4% world. When 30 year treasury bonds are yielding 4%, the dividend yield of the S&P 500 is 2%, and the S&P 500 PE is 140 (26 if you use operating earnings), 8% returns are from Fantasyland.

  • Pension benefits start too early. People are living longer.

  • Private employees do not receive these kind of benefits. Public employees should not either, especially at taxpayer expense.

  • Indeed, continuing to chase high-yield in a low-yield world is a guarantee those plans will blow up again down the road.

  • Pension plans are so underfunded that it is virtually impossible to catch up, no matter what risks the plan managers undertake. When asked how long it would now take for its investments to put the fund back on track, Ohio officials simply said: "Infinity."

There is a solution of course, it's just not one that anyone wants to hear: The correct plan is to kill all unnecessary services, fire all the government workers and privatize everything remaining.

That is a choice the Washington Post failed to mention. Moreover, it's the only thing that reasonably works.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
Click Here To Scroll Thru My Recent Post List

A comprehensive analysis by Goldman Sachs of the long-term US economic forecast discloses some rather unexpected pessimistic observations.

Last week the US Treasury closed the books on fiscal year (FY) 2009, a year that will go down as a gamechanger in modern US budget history. According to estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Treasury will report next week that the FY 2009 deficit was just over $1.4 trillion (trn). This is more than triple the FY 2008 shortfall and, at 9.9% of GDP, by far the largest relative to the size of the economy since World War II. Both revenues and outlays reached extremes not seen in more than 50 years (15% and 25% of GDP, respectively).

As we have pointed out, big financial firms spinning the current situation positively is not surprising. Just compare the hilarious recent commentary by BofA/ML's David Bianco who needs no Nitric Oxide stimulation after observing the DJIA for a full day. Yet even Goldman, which is not only always spot on with their BLS prerelease data, but is as big a part of the system as any other TBTF institutions, had some disturbing observations this time around.

The good news is that prospects looked worse earlier in the year, when we and the government agencies expected large outlays for stabilization of the financial
system to push the deficit to nearly $1.9trn. Restating the budget figures to include the net present value of the subsidy rendered by the federal takeover of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to conform to CBO?s accounting treatment of these transactions, the FY 2009 deficit appears to be almost $1.6trn. (The Treasury counts only the cash outlays arising from these transactions.) This is right in line with the latest estimates provided in late August by both the CBO and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and it is much better than our late-July estimate of $1.725trn.


The bad news is that the underlying fiscal imbalance is apt to widen further as the economy struggles to recover from the deepest recession in more than 70 years. By our reckoning, the combination of virtual stagnation in federal revenue, ongoing growth in mandatory outlays, a step-up in spending under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and a modest dose of additional stimulus will keep th


deficit at about $1.6trn in FY 2010 despite a large drop in financial stabilization outlays. On the revenue side of the ledger, our expectation of almost no change in FY 2010 (+0.6%) contrasts sharply with the latest CBO and OMB estimates, which show increases of 7.6% and 9.2%, respectively, as of late August.

Yet the biggest red flags even to Goldman are, not surprisingly, on the far side of the projection period:

The Longer-Term Outlook Worsens…

Beyond the new fiscal year that has just begun, the budget outlook is unusually uncertain, but it appears on balance to be worse than we previously thought. The deficit should start to shrink in FY 2011, and we have penciled in a modest reduction, to $1.35trn, for that year. But the uncertainty is higher than normal at this relatively close range for two reasons. First, a lot hinges on big policy decisions yet to be made, notably on healthcare reform and on tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003, which are due to expire at the end of 2010. Although the aim on healthcare is budget neutrality, this will be scored over the ten-year planning period; in some versions, it reduces the deficit in the early years. On the tax cuts, the main question is what makes the list of extendable versus expendable provisions; we have assumed that the extensions will favor lower- and middle-income taxpayers, adding the ?Making Work Pay? tax credit to the ones likely to survive.


The second source of uncertainty is the pace of economic recovery. It may still be tentative if past experience with financial crises is indicative. If so, the deficit may remain stubbornly high as well.


Over the full ten-year period, we now see the deficit cumulating to $10½trn, up from $9trn previously. In part, this reflects the revenue weakness discussed above for FY 2010, which is somewhat worse than we previously thought; with the economy expected to recover only gradually, the path of revenue is lower over most of the period. We have also recalibrated our adjustments to the CBO baseline estimates for income support programs. And, of course, these changes trigger increases in net interest expense. As a result, our projections now show the deficit dipping to only about 4½% in FY 2015, after which it rises to 5½% by FY 2019, as shown in Exhibit 4, about 1 point higher than before.


The unsustainability of this situation is evident in our projections for the primary balance, which excludes net interest expense. If this balance is in deficit, then
debt service will tend to escalate relative to GDP (unless GDP growth exceeds the level of interest rates, in which case a small primary deficit is sustainable). On this metric, our budget projections continue to show an unsustainable situation, with the primary deficit still converging to 2% of GDP but more slowly than we previously thought, as shown in Exhibit 5.

And here is a stunning observation that may have multiple layers of additional meaning to it.

On a moment?s reflection, it should be evident that this long-term budget projection is untenable.

And McKelvey and Hatzius continue:

While the US political system is hardly conducive to the assertion or maintenance of fiscal discipline, it is not impervious to the implications of a large and sustained fiscal imbalance either. In 1990, for example, the prospect of a deficit persistently in the vicinity of 5% of GDP led the elder President Bush to renege on his famous ?read my lips, no new taxes? pledge; at the same time, the Congress installed the pay-as-you go (PAYGO) framework that was widely credited with getting the budget into surplus by the end of that decade. More recently, this year?s surge in the deficit, to twice the 1990 level relative to GDP, has spawned genuine resistance to additional fiscal stimulus despite economic weakness. Under these circumstances, the notion that a 5% deficit is now the best that can be hoped for would likely set corrective measures in motion, at least if lawmakers believe that this is the path on which the budget is headed.

Goldman is so confused by its model output that it has decided to basically ignore it as it literally makes no sense from an economic viability and sustainability perspective! The only way to deal with the insanity out of D.C. is to shove one's head deep in the sand.

In fact, for this reason we do not see our long-term budget projection as a realistic forecast of what will happen, especially in the out years. Instead, we regard it as an alternative baseline to the one presented by the CBO, based on an economic view and a set of policy assumptions that we think are more realistic. Particularly with respect to policy, the CBO baseline is constrained to assume that current laws remain as they are. We, on the other hand, have the flexibility to choose which pending proposals are apt to occur and which are not, leaning for the most part on the CBO?s calculations to construct an alternative profile of how these choices will influence the budget balance.

Many words to describe what essentially is an impossible to maintain status quo. Yet hoping for change against the "change you can believe in" may be a foolish approach, even for someone as embedded in the system as Goldman.

On the surface, it may seem that the long-term budget imbalance we project results from policy choices yet to be made. This is suggested by the fact that the primary balance in the CBO baseline reaches zero during the second half of the 10-year horizon, as also shown in Exhibit 5. However, the CBO?s primary balance also depends on economic assumptions that, in our view, are overly optimistic, especially when combined with the policy assumptions. For example, it is quite unlikely that real GDP would grow 3.5% in 2011 and 5% in 2012, as the agency now assumes, in the wake of a decision to allow all of the 2001/2003tax cuts to expire, which the agency also must assume.


Therein lies the rub for today?s policymakers. The current imperative is to promote economic recovery, which requires measures (e.g., tax cut extensions) that will endanger the longer-term balance the CBO now projects. Yet without the tax cut extensions, or some other stimulus, the economy and the budget will suffer some damage anyway. At the same time, the prospect of a persistent primary deficit, whether it is due to a weak economy or to efforts to combat the weakness, underscores the need for policymakers to shift their focus nimbly to deficit reduction ?aka fiscal restraint ?whenever the economy strengthens to the point that it can tolerate the restraint.

Also for those curious how Goldman models its economic recovery process, here are their 6 core verticals, which lead the firm to conclude that an imminent decline in GDP is more than warranted shortly after the stimulus benefits evaporate sometime this quarter.

  1. We expect real GDP to rise at a 3% annual rate during the second half of 2009. The strength comes from three factors: (a) a swing in the inventory cycle toward significantly less liquidation, (b) federal fiscal stimulus, which should have its largest effects on quarterly growth rates during this period, and (c) a near-term rebound in home building from extremely depressed levels.
  2. However, recovery in 2010 is apt to be more anemic. The growth contributions from inventories and federal stimulus, currently about 4 percentage points at an annual rate in combination, will peter out by the second half of 2010. Meanwhile, the US economy faces several structural headwinds. Among them: (a) efforts by households to boost saving out of current income, aggravated by (b) weakness in labor income, reflecting the impact of high unemployment on wages and employers? reluctance to rehire aggressively, (c) fiscal drag from the state and local sector, (d) large overhangs of vacant homes and unused industrial capacity, which limit the potential for major improvements in private-sector investment, and (e) limited credit availability from a financial sector that is still on the mend. As a result, we expect growth to slow to an annual rate of 2% in the first half of 2010 and 1½% in the second half.
  3. The unemployment rate should continue to drift up, to about 10½% by year-end 2010. We think the ?jobless recovery? pattern of the 1991-1992 and 2001-2003 economic recoveries provides a better template for corporate hiring decisions over the next year or
    two than the more robust payroll rebounds of earlier cycles. If this judgment is right, then net hiring will not absorb all of the influx into the labor force that is apt to occur during this period, in which case the cyclical peak in unemployment will again lag far
    behind the bottom in real GDP.
  4. Inflation is not a significant threat, at least for the next few years. Although highly expansionary fiscal and monetary policies have caused many market participants to worry about inflation, these concerns miss the point that the policies have been undertaken
    to combat a large and growing gap between actual and potential output. Under any reasonable economic scenario, the aggregate US output gap will be huge? currently about 8% of GDP and potentially as large as 10% ?and thus require years of above-trend growth to eliminate. Given this prospect, we expect year-to-year inflation in the core index of consumer prices?now at 1½%?to approach zero in late 2010.
  5. Monetary tightening is highly unlikely before the end of 2010. The outlook for Fed policy hinges on how strong the incipient recovery will be, and what the strength of that recovery means for inflation. We think most members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will be reluctant to raise the funds rate target?even from its near-zero current setting?until they have some confidence that the unemployment rate has reached its cyclical peak or will do so shortly. This is especially true if our outlook for further disinflation is right. Accordingly, we see the FOMC?s strong commitment to low interest rates as expressed in its most recent policy statement as consistent with our outlook for stability in the funds rate through year-end 2010.
  6. Treasury yields should come down further. The Treasury yield curve has moved a long way towards our forecast, although in our view it still builds in too much Fed tightening next year. We expect 10-year note yields to continue their slide towards 3% over the next few months as final demand remains sluggish and disinflation continues. We also remain convinced that the increase in Treasury supply is less important for bond yields than many investors believe, for two reasons. First, increased saving by households and businesses creates a potential demand for Treasury securities as well as less competition for lenders? funds; flow of funds data and bank balance sheet reports confirm that the domestic private sector is increasing its allocation to Treasury securities. Second, the Treasury?s auction schedule for coupon securities is now more than adequate to meet funding needs over the next few years; as this becomes evident, concerns about further increases in auction sizes should abate.

While definitely squeezing some optimism out of the data, the schizophrenic undertone is definitely present: even Goldman, while seeing contained disinflation, as expected in keeping with the Fed script (or is that disdeflation?), has problems reconciling what is an untenable economic forecast based on conservative assumptions. How hope and reality will reconcile, nobody at this point is willing to discuss. And yet, at some point over the next decade, the worlds of imaginary optimism and pragmatic realism, will not only collide, but when one throws in the singularity that is the Social Security funding conundrum, and it is easy to see how the entire American model unravels in the not too distant future, even as we currently ride on the wave of transient hope brought to your courtesy of yet another TV appearance of the current administration.

By Paul Krugman

Peter Temin corrects my history

What really happened in Germany, 1931.
George Washington

Guest Post: The OTHER Economic Crisis?

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

You know all about the subprime, alt-a, option arm, and commercial real estate crises.

You’re well-aware of the house of cards built with credit default swaps, securitized assets and other exotic investments.

You’ve heard about the massive debt overhang threatening individuals, companies and the country as a whole, and the massive de-leveraging which is still to occur.

You’re aware of the soaring unemployment rate, the tapped out consumer, and many other economic problems.

But do you know about the demographic crisis?

What Demographic Crisis?

Franco Modigliani won the Nobel Prize in Economics 1985, partly for his “life cycle hypothesis“, which states that spending and savings patterns are predictable and largely a function of age demographics. In other words, Modigliani’s hypothesis is basically that age demographics largely determine the health and robustness of an economy.

Harry Dent and other financial advisors who have examined American demographics say that we’re in big trouble.

Specifically, they say that the basic health of any country’s economy is largely driven by the number of its citizens who are in their peak spending years.

For example, the peak Japanese spending range has been estimated to be comprised of 39-43 year olds. The more 39-43 year olds Japan has at any given time, the more consumer spending there will be, as these are the folks who are the big spenders in Japan. Dent argues that the Japanese economy will tend to grow when the number of 39-43 year olds grows, and to shrink when it shrinks.

Dent says that this principle applies to all countries, although the peak spending years might vary slightly from country to country.

In the U.S., Dent says, 46-50 year olds are the biggest spenders, because that is when – on average – they are paying for their kids’ college, paying mortgage on the biggest house they will own during their life, and making other big-ticket purchases.

Claus Vogt agrees, saying that – all other things being equal – the country with the youngest population will experience the biggest growth in the future, as it will have the highest percentage of productive people in the days ahead (Modigliani’s age categories are somewhat different from Dent’s and Vogt’s, but – in general – people are having children later than they were in 1985).

Whether or not you believe Modigliani , Dent and Vogt, it should be obvious that countries with a large percentage of elderly people and a small proportion of productive workers will have less productive output and a larger demand for social services than those with a higher percentage of workers. It should also be obvious that this will tend to drag down the economy.

Which Countries Have the Most Favorable Demographics?

Which countries have the best demographics?

Let’s start by looking at the “age pyramid” for the United States. The following 2 charts from the National Institutes of Health shows that the population is aging:

This graphic (courtesy of Ed Stephan) shows the U.S. age pyramid from from 1950 through 2050:

male female
Population of the United States, by Age and Sex,
1950-2050 (millions)
information source: International Data Base, U.S. Census Bureau;
supplied pyramids were modified using Canvas, GraphicConverter and GIFBuilder.

[If you can't see the dates at the bottom of the pyramid, click here].

As NIH notes:

The first of the postwar baby boom cohort, born 1946–1964, will turn 55 years in 2001. In just three decades, an extraordinary change in the age structure of the United States is anticipated. By 2030, one in five persons (20% of the U.S. population) will be aged 65 or older, increasing from the present ratio of one in nine persons (12.8%). The number of persons in the 65 and older age group will more than double, increasing from the current 34 million persons to 70 million persons. Moreover, within the older segment of the population, because of longer life expectancy and additional persons reaching older ages, there will be age shifts resulting in the 85 and older population more than doubling in size from 4.3 million persons to approximately 8.9 million persons.

An aging U.S. population means less productive workers, less big-spending consumers, and more dependent elders.

Here’s China:

http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/images/anim/ch_all2.gif

As Reuters points out, China will have an aging population in the future, but not for some time:

China’s working-age population will peak in 2015 and plunge by 23 percent by 2050.

Brazil has a much younger age demographic.

And India’s is even younger than Brazil’s.

The following chart shows that Japan has the worst demographics of all, with a staggering percentage of elderly who need to be taken care of by the young:

Chart 2: Old Age Dependency Ratios for Selected Countries

clip_image002[5]

Source: http://data.un.org/

And this chart shows that – as a whole – emerging markets have a higher percentage of working age population:

Chart 3: Working-Age Population as % of Total Population

clip_image002[7]

Source: http://data.un.org/

You can find some interesting charts showing age pyramids for multi-country regions here. You can search for other countries or regions, as well.

What Does It Mean?

What does all this mean?

Well, initially, it means that – in addition to everything else they have going for them – 2 of the BRIC countries (Brazil and India) have much more favorable demographics than the United States. So they are at a competitive advantage to America for demographic reasons in addition to the other reasons that people write about.

Indeed, as Richard Jackson told the White House Conference on Aging in 2005:

If demography is destiny, global leadership may pass to the “Third” world…

Countries with slowly growing workforces may have slowly growing economies…

We live in an era defined by many challenges, from global warming to global terrorism.

None is as certain as global aging.

And none is likely to have such a large and enduring effect on the shape of national economies and the world order.

Moreover, Dent and another of the main writers focusing on the economic effect of age demographers – Daniel Arnold – say that America’s aging demographics point to a major depression.

As Arnold writes:

2008 was the victim of a self inflicted sub-prime financial crisis. This has nothing to do with the demographics based massive depression that is yet to come, as described in the book. The sub-prime consequences are however very similar though mild so far compared to what is coming our way. The book clearly spelled out that along the way unpredictable short-term (1 to 3 years) disruptive events could happen. The sub-prime crisis is just that. It should be regarded as the “warmer upper” or “hors d’oeuvre” for the big one that is now rapidly closing in on us all.

I hope that he’s wrong.

See also this and this.

Note: Of course, different levels of development and technology also substantially affect the economy.

CalculatedRisk

Ivy Zelman on Housing

Edward Robinson wrote a recent article for Bloomberg on the rise of independent research: ‘Sell’ for Research Renegades Becomes Business Off Wall Street (ht Eyal)

One of the analysts featured in the article is Ivy Zelman, formerly at Credit Suisse, and now at Zelman & Associates. Ms. Zelman became an internet favorite when she asked Toll Brothers CEO Bob Toll "Which Kool-aid are you drinking?" on the Q4 2006 Toll Brothers conference call.

On Zelman's current view:
Many of her clients are clamoring to know whether the market has hit bottom. In terms of prices, she says probably not: One out of three owners has a mortgage worth more than the value of the home, and mounting foreclosures and distressed properties are slated to account for 53 percent of home sales in 2010 compared with 40 percent in 2008, according to Moody’s.

“When that inventory hits the market, it’s going to undermine prices,” she says.
Although I think prices might have bottomed in some low end bubble areas at the end of 2008, or early 2009 - because of the flood of foreclosures at that time - some of these areas have seen prices increase 10% to 15% since then (according to local reports). This is because of a combination of a buying frenzy associated with the first time home buyer tax credit, and the lack of inventory because of foreclosure delays associated with the trial modifications. It is not unusual for homes in these areas to receive 20, 30 or 50 bids.

Even if the first time home buyer tax credit is extended, I think the interest will wane. Meanwhile the banks are preparing to start foreclosing again. The WSJ recently quoted a Bank of America Corp. spokeswoman: "We are going to see a spike from now to the end of the year in foreclosures as we take people out of the running" [for a loan modification].

So I expect prices in the low end areas to decline again (even if the bottom is in). I also expect further price declines in the mid-to-high end bubble areas. Note: this isn't like in 2005 when I thought large price declines were inevitable. House prices are much closer to the bottom now, and the U.S. government is trying to support house prices, or at least slow the rate of price declines.
by Rebecca

There is no shortage of speeches by US central bankers these days. The following is an excerpt from a NY Times article that highlights the debate among key Fed officials about the speed and method of stimulus withdrawal once the decision to exit has been made:
Mr. Bernanke and other officials want to see evidence that the economic recovery is self-sustaining, strong enough to generate jobs without the crutch of extremely low interest rates.

But Mr. Warsh, as a Fed governor, has begun arguing that the central bank cannot afford to wait for irrefutable evidence of a solid expansion. Mr. Warsh recently argued that the Fed should take at least some of its cue from stock prices and other financial indicators, which turn around earlier and more quickly than the underlying economy.
...
Mr. Warsh and some other Fed officials also argue that when the time does come to change gears, the central bank may have to raise rates almost as fast as it slashed them when the crisis began.
We are far from seeing "irrefutable evidence of a solid expansion". This debate is likely confusing the public more than anything else, or as my title puts it: the Fed is attempting to assuage inflation fears that don't need assuaging. There is simply no measured inflation concern at this time, not even over the next ten years.

The chart illustrates the 30-day moving average of expected inflation for the next 5, 7, 10, and 20 years. Expected inflation, roughly speaking, is the nominal Treasury Security rate minus the associated Treasury Inflation-Protected Security (TIPS) rate, the real rate of return or the break-even rate. Technically this break-even rate is not a perfect measure of inflation expectations; but it's close and measured daily (see this SF Fed article for more on TIPS).

The "inflation problem" is way overstated in the media. Roughly speaking, markets have priced in just 1.3% annual inflation each year over the next five years, 2% over the next ten years.

By giving speech after speech (Bernanke's latest), the Fed is attempting to keep inflation expectations in check. However, the Fed is walking a fine line between alleviating concerns about long-term inflation prospects and overemphasizing the short-term disinflation (deflation) risks.

Rebecca Wilder
Karl Denninger

Where’s My Economic Recovery?

We were promised one, you know.

Dennis Kneale, Larry Kudlow, hell, name a "mouthpiece" on ToutTV or in the sell-side of Fraud Street and you'll find someone claiming that "the recession is over."

But if it is, how can this be true?

Lockyer’s spoke before Controller John Chiang said state general fund revenue fell $1.1 billion below estimates during the first three months of the fiscal year that began July 1.

Let's boil this down a bit: Sales tax revenues came in at $99.8 million, or 4.5% lower than expected.

Income tax revenues were also off big, but remember that income taxes are (usually) progressive, so a loss in income translates into a larger drop in tax revenues (as an aside this, my friends, is why "tax the rich" only works when the rich are getting richer - when they start to get poorer as a consequence of your redistribution schemes and move down the tax ladder, your income tax receipts collapse!) while sales taxes are a straight percentage of sales, often with the only exception that would skew on an income basis being food.

This strongly implies that California saw gross consumer sales off about 4.5% from where they expected; this, of course, raises the question "what was expected?"

What we do know is that for the three months ending in June they had expected a 14.4% drop - and got an 18.75% one.

It's not just California either:

"It's crazy. It's really just unbelievable," said Scott Pattison, executive director of the National Association of State Budget Officers, and called the states' revenue situations "close to unprecedented."

Most states had been pessimistic in forecasting their tax revenues for the 2010 fiscal year, Pattison said. So far, collections have fallen below even those low targets.

The bubble economics games have severely damaged everyone for the benefit of only a very few, whether you participated in the purchase of a home during the boom or not.  States were led to project budget numbers that were totally fraudulent and everyone who moved into (or within) a bubble area during those years was forced to participate by either having to rent or buy at artificially-high prices. 

This wasn't limited to real estate either.  Medical care, insurance, college costs - all were inflated dramatically by the obscene "bubblenomics" for the benefit of those "securitizing" that debt and selling it off to rubes - so-called "investors" who were defrauded on a grand scale by "models" that promised the mathematically impossible. 

All of this was not only cheered on by Washington but deliberately enabled through perversions such as Barney Frank, who was caught admitting that having the FHA make bad loans on purpose was "a policy."

The markets generally cheered a "better than expected" initial unemployment and continuing claim number last week, but those numbers don't necessarily provide a good signal in an economic environment like this.  For one, they completely ignore anyone who isn't eligible for unemployment compensation - which includes the self-employed.  They also don't measure how hard it is to find a replacement job, which of course is the key metric if you find yourself unemployed.  The employment report provided less-than-encouraging news in this regard, particularly the household survey which strongly suggests that we've lost a hell of a lot of jobs and are not, at present anyway, turning that corner:

Note that this indicator turned upward right near the end of the last "official" recession - and it also led the "official recession" beginning calls by about 12 months.  There's no indication of recovery in this number - yet.  Indeed, the flattening of this curve for a couple of months is probably a big part of what led a whole bunch of people to make those "bottom" calls, yet that is increasingly looking not like dawn approaching but rather an incoming meteor.

Then there's consumer credit, which contracted at a rate of about $10 billion last month.  Most of it was in revolving (credit card) debt, which is no big surprise.  Nor is it a surprise that September had a moderation of the decline in non-revolving (mostly car loan) debt outstanding.  But "cash for clunkers" is now known to have massively pulled-forward demand and left a vacuum behind, as the most-recently posted auto sales were disastrously bad.  This of course portends a resumption of credit contraction next month, never mind what may come from those who bought "clunker deals" but can't afford them.  If you're looking for a new(er) car the best time to buy may well be in the late winter and spring of next year, when the lates have turned into repossessions and the lots are rather likely to be full of six-month-old cars with a few thousand miles on them clogging up dealer lots, destroying not only the poor fools who took on debt they can't afford but adding further punishment to new car sales (after all, why buy new when you can buy a six-month old vehicle at 30% - or more - off!)  We won't get another Fed Z1 report until December 10th, but I strongly suspect that when we do it will show further deterioration, confirming credit contraction that is being reported by banks themselves (28% annualized contraction rate to businesses, 19% annualized across all segments of the economy.)

At the same time The Dollar is under attack - not from external causes as many would love to lay the blame upon (there are a lot of people who hate George Soros) but rather due to our own government and Fed policies.  After all, printing over a trillion to buy likely-worthless securities in legally-questionable (at best) transactions to prop up two bankrupt companies (Fannie and Freddie) along with the administration's penchant to spend nearly double what it takes in via taxes has a habit of being currency negative.  How negative?  You judge:

Of particular problem here is that descending wedge.  It should have broken upward according to the expectations of basic technical analysis.  It didn't; instead it broke in a downward direction on extremely high volume, bounced back inside and then took a second stab at collapse.

Let me be quite clear: We are literally hanging by a thread.  There is one final support level down around 72, but I don't think it is particularly meaningful.  The "powers that be" clearly recognized the danger, as the jawbones came out in earnest overnight into Friday morning, along with some intervention in Asia.

While the Chinese might tolerate a slow deterioration of the dollar even though it screws with their export economy tremendously (never mind the Arabs and their oil) a collapse is another matter.  Lest someone think this move has been "slow", let me point out that from March to today the index has fallen some 15%.  This, of course, is about a 30% annualized rate.  To put this in perspective the dollar is suffering a pace of decline this year about equal in the degree that the stock market did last year. 

This move has been broadly supportive of stocks; indeed, stock prices are almost lock-step responsive to dollar moves intraday.  Not only do prices look "cheaper" to foreigners but exports are helped by a falling currency. 

There are only two rather large dragonflies in this ointment; not only are imports hurt (and we're a major importing nation) but worse, foreign capital suffers a direct loss when it repatriates.  History says that weakening the currency never works as a means of getting out of a credit problem or covering insolvencies because capital flees faster than you can devalue and as a consequence you lose even if you're a net exporting economy (as was Japan); for a net-importing economy such as ours the ultimate outcome is disastrous.

Of course the incessant claim of support for a "strong dollar" has echoed from TurboTimmy the last couple of weeks, and of course The Fed has (as usual) disclaimed any interest in where the dollar stands.  Both claims are flat lies.

For Treasury's part spending more than you make weakens your currency.  Why? Because you must borrow that extra money, which weakens your nation's balance sheet.  Since your currency is backed by that balance sheet, weakening it leads your currency to decline.  It's that simple.

The Fed's words are even more outrageous; there is no more certain way to cause the price of something to decline than to produce more of it without commensurate demand.  Yet that's what The Fed has done by effectively monetizing both Fannie and Freddie along with Treasury debt.  These programs have amounted to "printing money", which increases supply into what is clearly slack demand for credit origination.  Basic economic theory tells you that when you increase the supply of something while demand is falling price collapses.

Many are concerned about potential "inflation" and this has in turn driven gold to new highs in the last week.  In my opinion this concern, to the extent it is for inflation, is misplaced.  Rather, I'm quite concerned about the impoverishment of millions of Americans - those of middle class means and below, as the destruction of the currency's purchasing power is not able to be reflected back into wages due to offshoring of damn near everything.  The consequence will be that standards of living fall, but not due to hyperinflation where nominal GDP rises.  Rather the curse we've seen over the last two years looks to be poised to accelerate dramatically, with spending shifting hard into mandatory items (food, fuel, shelter) and away from virtually everything else.  This in turn will place increasing pressure on GDP and the government's attempt to support output. 

But how?  For now government can borrow all the money it wants at near-zero cost, especially on the short end of the interest rate curve, and they have taken advantage of this, shifting down the curve in a dramatic fashion over the last two years.  But there is grave danger herein; while last fiscal year's interest expense for the government was $383 billion (versus $451 billion in FY08) the deficit and outstanding debt exploded higher, with $1.743 trillion added in the last fiscal year.

The effective interest rate on the debt in FY08 was 7.7%.  This last year it was 5.1%. 

To put this in perspective the previous fiscal year saw $750 billion (or less than half as much) added and the year prior $206 billion. 

See a pattern here?

What happens if our interest expense goes back to where it was in Fiscal Year 2008?

The interest cost would be $581 billion.

Can this game continue indefinitely?  No, it cannot.

In Fiscal Year 2009 the government took in $2.1 trillion dollars (preliminary numbers from the CBO)  This is a current coverage ratio of 18% (income to cover interest), which sounds reasonable.  But should the cost of debt rise to FY 2008's level coverage would deteriorate to 28% - that is, from about one in six dollars going to interest to a bit more than one in four.

The Government did manage to add roughly four points and change to GDP last quarter, and it will also be adding positively this time around with Cash For Clunkers and similar "free money" schemes, but the broad question really is whether such "GDP additions" should count at all.  There are valid arguments on both sides of this debate, with one side claiming that if you go to the bank and borrow $20,000 you haven't really added to output at all (since all you've done is pulled forward spending you'd otherwise do later) while others say that the "now" counts (but so does the hangover later.) 

The latter is more mathematically defensible but the question becomes when the "hangover" will be realized, rather than drowned with yet another keg of whiskey.  That prescription seems to work just fine for a while if you're a drunk, but eventually your liver shuts down and you die.

Such may be our fate if we do not stop to take our medicine soon, as a dollar collapse that really gets some legs under it could trigger all sorts of unfortunate consequences - including a war.  I'm quite certain that neither Japan or China is going to sit by silently and watch us destroy nearly $3 trillion of their wealth, say much less what Saudi Arabia holds.  Despite the view that we have them by the short hairs in truth we both are pointing pistols at each other's heads - the question becomes whether one of us develops a tick in our trigger finger.

Americans appear oblivious to this as they cheer the stock market but let's take a look at whether you should be cheering at all.  Mathematics is a bitch and she's not being particularly kind to people in retirement accounts or, for that matter, anyone who doesn't trade actively - and guess right.  Let's take the S&P 500 which topped at 1576 in October of 2007.  It fell to 666 in March of 2009, a 58% loss.  That's horrible.

It has since risen to 1071, a 61% gain.  Great, right?

Uh, notice something folks? 

32% of your money is still gone.

The Dow is in similar dire straits.  It went from 14,000 to 6,469, a 54% loss.  It has since recovered to 9,864, a 52% gain.  Where's the rest of your money?  Almost 30% of it is still missing!

Were you better in tech stocks?  Let's look.  The NDX (Nasdaq 100) went from 2,239 to 1,018, a loss of 55%.  It has since recovered to 1,727, a monstrous 70% gain!  You're in the money, right?  Uh, wrong; 23% of your original money is still missing.

Then there are individual stocks.  Yes, there are some crazy winners, including Alcoa which has nearly tripled.  Or is it a winner?  Alcoa lost 90% of its value from July of 2007, when it sold for $48.77.  Today it sells for $14.24, an insane loss of 71%.  Yes, buying it at $5 was a screaming deal - if they didn't go to zero (and still don't.) 

The usual rubric is that "it's a stockpicker's market and you need professional advice."  Oh really?  How many of those so-called "pros" told you to get out in 2007?  "What is none, Alex?"

Now I want you to consider the following - The DOW today, at 9,864, is back where it was in March of 1999.  You've spent ten years and made nothing.  That's bad.

What's worse is what has happened to the price of eggs, milk, cars, medical care, college tuition and more during those years.  Most have doubled and some have tripled.  Yet your stock portfolio is exactly where it was then. 

In terms of purchasing power it has lost half or more over that decade, and the same story is told in the S&P 500.

Renewed economic growth?  Where?  Baby Boomers have had their retirements destroyed by the Fraud Street crowd.  The 401k is, for most people, a scam and what's even worse is the concept of "saving" in a world where we have a government hellbent on destroying every saved dollar.  We the Sheeple think this is great as our so-called "per-capita income" goes up, but has it really increased?  Has our wealth really increased in terms of spending power?  I'd argue no; we have instead been lied to about the future and about our nation and its economy, and have as a consequence been goaded into spending money we do not have and have no hope of being able to earn. 

We have now discovered that we're in a huge hole, well over our heads, and Bernanke and Obama have shovels and are trying to make the damn thing deeper, all in the name of "trying to help."

In a crisis you need to make a choice. You can choose to solve the problem and protect the innocent from the results of the firestorm. Or you can try to teach them a lesson. You can't solve the problem by teaching people a lesson. That's not a strategy for solving the crisis. It's a strategy for inflicting a lot of damage.

That's a very nice thought from TurboTimmy, but it intentionally misses the point.  Fraud Street and Washington have been running around with gasoline cans spraying gas everywhere in the financial system for more than 20 years.  Someone threw away a lit cigarette and the firestorm erupted.

Timmy and the rest of Fraud Street and K Street then showed up with fire trucks and "put the fire out" - but they did so by smothering it with more gasoline!  "Heh, if we can just get enough gas in here there won't be any oxygen and the fire will go out!"  "Great idea, let's do it!"

Now the fire's out, but instead of a bit of gasoline on the floor we're now up to our chests in it and the oxygen is coming back into the room.  Not only has nobody drained any of the gas off they're still adding more and while there are "no smoking" signs up everywhere eventually someone is going to create a spark, and this time it won't start a fire - there will be an explosion.

The fraudsters must be thrown out and prosecuted.  Lying to people about your balance sheet and the structure of deals is a crime, not a mistake.  Intentionally omitting people's incomes and plugging in "guesses" on liar loans into models is a crime, not a mistake.  Intentionally holding short-term market rates negative in real terms through various liquidity schemes for the purpose of goading people into borrowing and lending irresponsibly isn't a mistake, it's an intentional act.  Modeling indefinite 6, 7, 10% home price increases isn't a "reasonable estimate", it's an act of fraud, as a 7% increase annually (touted by many during the boom years) would mean that in a decade the price of all homes, added together, would be greater than that paid for every home cumulatively from the inception of America 230 years ago to the day that 10 year period began. 

Jimmy Carter lost his job for saying this on national television for those of you who remember.  He was referring to electricity use, which was at the time increasing by 7% a year.  He was right - whether you wanted to hear it or not.  He over-estimated the average American's intelligence; this, after all, is (really) sixth grade math.  The next Presidential Election made clear that at least 51% of Americans failed that class.

We have deadly-serious issues facing our nation.  They require serious solutions.  The nation must stop promising that which it cannot deliver.  We must stop allowing liars in our government, at The Fed and on Fraud Street in New York to run amok with impunity.  That which cannot happen over long periods of time but is sold to investors as a "long term trend" must be prosecuted as the fraud that it is.  Those who intentionally make loans they know have no reasonable expectation of being paid back must be prosecuted.  Those banks that are intentionally holding assets at above-market values when those "values" were achieved via mathematically-unsustainable practices must be forced to write down those "assets" to their market price.  If this causes them to fail, so be it.

We the people must stand up instead of sitting in front of our boob tube and watching American Idol.  If you're unemployed and pissed off about it, or if you live in a house that is worth half of what your mortgage balance is, be aware that it was not an accident.  You lost your job and your house's "value" spiked and then collapsed because of three decades of formal American policy promulgated by bankers and government officials resulting in production being offshored and the border left wide open for illegal immigrants, squeezing you on both ends. At the same time Greenspan, Bernanke and Congress all actively conspired to prop up asset values through intentionally-derelict fiscal and monetary policy decisions.  This was the only way to make the books balance and keep justifying the debt issuance that was otherwise impossible to cover. 

But now all the workers that can be offshored have been, and what's left are people making coffee at Starbucks, McJobs flipping burgers, unskilled labor cleaning rooms in hotels and of course Fraud Street "magicians" who claim to have found $105 in a $100 lending transaction through a computer model that takes the world's largest supercomputers a full day to run.  That would be great if it was real but it isn't, any more than is cold fusion, turning lead into gold by alchemy, or as was discovered just a few years ago, the "complex adjustments" that Fannie Mae applied to their deals to "manage" their earnings (and which later blew up in their face, as it was bogus from the start.)  If you're interested in exactly how ugly that was, complete with the emails documenting it, read that link - then consider that some of those referenced as allegedly "guilty" in those emails are STILL employed by the GSEs, FHFA and others in the securities and lending industry!) 

Instead what we truly have left is a mountain of impossible-to-service debt and in a mad dash to avoid recognition of the facts we are now turning to outright scams with the full sanction of the government behind them - refusing to sell properties at auction, not initiating foreclosures for a year or more after the homeowner goes into default, "re-marketing" mortgages under government "approval" to people that the government knows can't pay and pretending that commercial loans are all going to be "money good" when there is no possible way for them to cash flow.  The nearly-100 banks that have failed thus far in this crisis have proved this to be the rule rather than the exception - uncovered losses should simply never happen under our body of law, yet we continually see 20, 30, 40 even 50% losses against entire asset bases.

The game of "kick the can" has been played with a reasonable degree of success for the last 30 years, but the can is now full of cement.  We cannot choose whether to take our medicine any longer - we can only choose whether to decide to do it now and have the outcome be bad, or try to put it off one more time and have the outcome be catastrophic.

Choose wisely America.

Future Nobel Laurelate Robert Shiller has an interesting article in today’s NYT about a recent shift in the psychology of home buyers.

He and Wellesley prof Karl Case conduct an annual survey of what home buyers are thinking:

“On average over the next 10 years, how much do you expect the value of your property to change each year?”

The average answer among 311 respondents in 2009 was an increase of 11.2%. The median response — with half above, half below — was 5 percent, also high. That sounds rather like bubble thinking.”

Its worth noting a few things about surveys in general, and this survey in particular:

Forecasting Failures: Humans are especially bad at forecasting the future. Not only do they lack the skill set to rationally think about the factors impacting prices, they tend to engage in all manner of error-laden, faulty thinking;

Zero Objectivity: Asking new homeowners about home prices is a kin to asking a new car buyer about the future reliability of their vehicles as they drive from the dealer. They sure hope its reliable, just as buyers hope prices don’t go down.

Past Failures: Trying to discern future price movements based on surveys of recent buyers is a fatally flawed endeavor. The 2008 Case-Shiller survey had an average expected yearly increase in home values of 9.5% a year — at a time when prices were falling 20% per year. (Median was also 5%)

The bottom line is that surveys often reveal more about the questioners and questionees than they do about the subject matter at hand.

>

Source:
A Bounce? Indeed. A Boom? Not Yet.
ROBERT J. SHILLER
NYT, October 10, 2009
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/business/economy/11view.html

Tyler Durden

Weekend Reading

  • Russia economy to shrink 7.5% in 2009 according to President Medvedev (BBC)
  • Medvedev: Slump deeper than forecast (WSJ)
  • Andy Xie: Why one bubble burst deserves another (Caijing)
  • Paranoid theories can't take the shine off gold (FT)
  • US States face "unbelievable" revenue shortages (Reuters)
  • October surprise from bank earnings? (MarketWatch)
  • Employers have fewer jobs to offer (WSJ)
  • Central banking: a blight on humanity (FSU)
  • JPMorgan, others to pay $100 million settlement (AP, h/t deadhead)
  • Citigroup hires Mr. Inside (NYT)
  • Steep losses pose crisis for pensions (WaPo)
  • An American fail: the Eastman Kodak tragedy (The Reformed Broker)
  • The speculative bubble in equities and the case for deflation, staglation and implosion (Jesse)
  • Momentum strength emboldens the bulls (Pragmatic Capitalist)
  • The "Democratization of Credit is over" - now it's payback time (WSJ)
  • Currency depreciation and global imbalances (Michael Pettis)
  • Mourning rally (Cassandra Does Tokyo)
Tim Knight

Options Strategies from Fujisan

Fujisan here.

First of all, I would like to express my greatest appreciation to Tim, who decided to take me in as a contributor to his site.  I know that he has such a high profile with thousands of followers, and yet he has so much courage to take in someone like me, who just showed up 6 months ago in another blog site started posting some charts and options strategies.  

I'm so thrilled with this opportunity and happy to be a part of his blog site.  I am a big fan of Tim, and his insights are always eye-opening, to say the least.  I will do my best to meet his expectation and I hope your visit to my posting would be worthwhile and help you make money.

OPX (Options Expiration) is here once again!

As many of you may know, OPX is one of my favorite week to trade and, when it's coupled with the earnings season, that would make it even more special.

One of my favorite stocks to trade in OPX is GOOG (yeah, I'm so original).  For many reasons, GOOG is very easy to set up a target for OPX.

I have discussed this before, but if you look at the OPX price for GOOG, they tend to fall in the 50 increments (i.e., 450, 500, 550, etc.).  With GOOG currently trading at 516, it's not too hard to guess the possibility of hitting 550 level by the end of OPX Friday.


1011-one
 

To back up my price projection, I did a quick analysis of GOOG on a daily chart. (Click on any of these images to see a larger version)

1011-two

As you can see, GOOG is in the final wave of "Three Drives Pattern" and there is a smaller "three drives pattern" within the final wave, both of which are indicating the price projection of right around 550.  When I see two same patterns indicating the same price projection, I call it  a "perfect symmetry" and gives me an extra confidence that the price will make it to the projection.

Now, to back up my assumption further, let's check the option open interests and see how the market participants are viewing GOOG's price action.

1011-three

As you can see, the 550 strike price has the most open interests in Oct options.  Just like the chartists use MACD and stochastic as a part of their analysis, I use the option open interests as a part of my price analysis.  This is not an absolute measure and failed my expectation sometimes, but it served me well most of the time.  It's more like a "sanity" check.

Now that I feel pretty comfortable about the 550 price target for OPX Friday, how should I approach to the earnings play?

This is all up to the individual taste and the risk tolerance, but I hate surprises and I don't want to lose a lot of money over earnings, so here are some suggestions for GOOG OPX play.


Nov Bull Call Spread (Beginner to Intermediate level)

Here is 500/550 Nov bull call spread.  This is the combination of long 500 call option and short 550 call option which looks like this:


1011-four


When you are dealing with the earnings, it would be wise not to deal with the front month options for many reasons.  I'm hoping that I could go over the details of the volatility pump and dump over the earnings someday, but for now, please just remember this:

DO NOT GO LONG the front month options right before the earnings!

Based on my observation for the past couple of GOOG earnings, it seems to me that GOOG tends to run up to right before the earnings, and then expire right around the same price before the earnings (i.e., the "good news" is already priced in so the stock price does not change much after the earnings).  If you have already gone long or planning to go long on Monday, make sure that you exit your trade before the earnings.  I don't think you would gain that much by holding on to your position through the earnings.  If you are expecting a blow off surprise earnings, there are better way to make money, but not with this bull call spread.

If you are new to the options and not comfortable with trading spread and yet like to participate this upside move, you can go with Dec 500 strike option, but make sure to get out of the trade before the earnings.


ATM/OTM Calendar Spread (Intermediate to Advance level)


This is one of my favorite earnings play by far.  You won't make a killing with this strategy but you won't lose much either even if you are wrong.  Here is the result of the ATM calendar spread in Q1 and Q2.


1011-five

You can put this on right before the earnings right at the money (or out of the money - based on your bias) and take it out after the earnings.  This is the example of Nov/Oct 550 calendar spread.  You go long Nov 550 call options and short Oct 550 call options to make a calendar spread.  My guess is that GOOG  will run up to 550 toward Thursday closing and probably close right around 550 on Friday. 


1011-six

Iron Condor (Intermediate to Advanced level)

Iron condor is a combination of two credit spreads - bear call spread and bull put spread.  Here is one of the example of 530/540/560/570 iron condor - a combination of 540/530 bull put spread and 560/570 bear call spread.  As you can see, you risk only $293 to make $707 and the risk/reward is so sweet.  This is called "pin play", i.e., to place your short strike close to your expected expiration price to maximize the profits.  Some people place a butterfly instead of an iron condor. 


1011-seven

Depending upon your risk tolerance, you can increase the length of the short strike to incease the probabilities (of course the higher the probabilities, the less the reward), but some people like to take more conservative approach to secure the profits.

OK, some of you may be totally confused, or no clue as to what I'm talking about.... but that's OK.  This could be a good start to get to know with the options, and if you are new to the option, please do yourself a favor and DO NOT trade through the earnings. 

I was planning to cover GS earnings play with a target price of $205, but I think this should be good for now. 

I hope you enjoy my posting today.  Have a good weekend, everyone.   

Fujisan


"The worst the economy is, the more money they will print."

Marc Faber is an international investor known for his uncanny predictions of the stock market and futures markets around the world. Dr. Doom also trades currencies and commodity futures like Gold and Oil.
CalculatedRisk

A Policy: Supporting House Prices

“I don’t think it’s a bad thing that the bad loans occurred. It was an effort to keep prices from falling too fast. That’s a policy.”
Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee on recent FHA lending, quoted Oct 9th, 2009 in the NY Times.

"I believe the intent of the FTHB [first time home buyer] credit (and any extensions) is to raise the floor on home prices to delay (and sometimes prevent) defaults, reducing the shock to the financial system."
reader picosec in email, Oct 2nd, 2009

And a couple more quotes from an article by Alan Heavens in Philadelphia Inquirer: Skeptics question housing recovery :

"Government intervention to date has been extremely helpful in preventing an even more dramatic decline in home prices."
John Burns, real estate industry consultant

The housing market "is showing improvement only because it is on government life support."
Mark Zandi, Economy.com

As Representative Frank notes, the policy of the U.S. appears to be to support asset prices at almost any cost. This includes:

  • The FHA insuring "bad loans" for buyers with a high probability of default.

  • The first-time home buyer tax credit (the FTHB makes no sense from any other economic perspective).

  • Delaying foreclosures, first with moratoriums and then with "trial modifications".

    We could probably include the Fed buying GSE MBS to lower mortgage rates, and other policies like increasing the "conforming loan" limit to $729,750 in high cost states.

    Intentionally encouraging loans with high default rates (insured at taxpayer expense), and the FTHB tax credit (especially allowing buyers to use the credit as a down payment) have stimulated demand. And delaying foreclosures has restricted supply.

    This has had the desired effect of pushing up asset prices, especially at the low end.

    It is "a policy", but is it a good policy?
  • Gold prices, which just reached a new record high above 1,060 dollars an ounce Thursday, will top 2,000 in a decade, according to Jim Rogers. Jim Rogers, speaking Thursday at the sidelines in a conference held by ETF Securities in New York, said gold prices will keep rising as a protection against a weaker U.S. dollar:

    "The dollar is a terribly flawed currency. Foreign debts are increasing rapidly every year, and I don't think Washington seems to care."

    Rogers, chairman of Rogers Holdings, said prices of other commodities, such as oil, copper, and sugar, will continue to rise in the long term as the world will face more demand but shrinking supplies:

    "There was very, very few new production capacity brought on line in the past 30 years for commodities. We have shortages developing throughout the world."

    Demand, meanwhile, is on the rise, especially from Asia, he said.

    "Thirty years ago, the last time we had a bull market in commodities, Asia was not in the game." "And now they are all trying to live like we do."
    Barry Ritholtz

    2010 Nissan 370Z Roadster

    The 2010 Nissan 370Z lineup gains a new convertible body style. The 370Z Roadster joins the coupe, which was redesigned for the 2009 model year.

    The 370Z convertible has a power soft top and heated-glass rear window. Like the coupe, the convertible comes in Base and Touring trim levels. Like the Base and Touring coupes, convertibles have a 332-hp 3.7-liter V6 engine that teams with a 6-speed manual or 7-speed automatic transmission.

    370z_roadster_quarter_w800

    370z_roadster_building_w800

    370z_roadster_cockpit_w800

    370z_roadster_shadow_w800

    370z_roadster_tilt_w800

    370z_roadster_top_w800

    052020091603263503

    052020091603264683

    >

    One question: WHEN THE HELL IS THIS CAR GOING TO BE AVAILABLE?

    >

    Sources:
    Nissan USA
    http://www.nissanusa.com/zroadster/?dcn=1

    Z IS THE LAST LETTER IN THE ALPHABET BUT FIRST FOR DEFINING SPORTS CARS
    Marty Bernstein
    The Auto Channel
    http://www.theautochannel.com/news/2009/06/30/467735.html

    InsideLineVideo
    Nissan Press Release
    http://www.nissan370zny.com/documents/2010370ZRoadsteOverview4-09.pdf

    First Look: 2010 Nissan 370Z Roadster
    Scott Evans
    Motor Trend, April 01, 2009
    http://www.motortrend.com/roadtests/convertibles/112_0904_2010_nissan_370z_roadster/index.html

    Brett Steenbarger, Ph.D.

    Weekend Reading: Markets and More – Volume Two

    * FDIC facing growing failures among small banks;

    * Three reasons for not pursuing trading as a living;

    * Does restricting calories improve health?

    * Sobering view on the pension crisis;

    * Credit contraction and other topics for important reading;

    * But for leverage, Amaranth's strategy was a winner;

    * Size matters: ETFs can change markets;

    * Thanks to a sharp reader for this link to an article on cocaine addiction in the financial industry;

    * Behind the economic collapse was fraud;

    * Getting beyond quackery in the coverage of economic data and markets;

    * Diversifying beyond the U.S. dollar;

    * Thoughts on political power and the financial system.
    .
    Barry Ritholtz

    Kaptur & Johnson on Bill Moyers

    Just over a year after economic calamity brought promises of reform from Washington, has Wall Street really changed? Former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon Johnson and US Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) report on the state of the economy.

    >

    click for video
    moyers

    In Michael Moore’s new film Capitalism: A Love Story, Congresswoman Kaptur says there has been a financial coup d’etat, and that Wall Street – rather than Congress – is in charge.

    Hat tip Washington’s blog

    October 9, 2009

    BILL MOYERS: Welcome to the JOURNAL.

    I sat in a theater packed with passionate moviegoers, every one of them seemingly aghast at the Wall Street skullduggery exposed by Michael Moore in his latest film. It’s called ‘Capitalism: A Love Story.’ Here’s an excerpt:

    MICHAEL MOORE: We’re here to get the money back for the American People. Do you think it’s too harsh to call what has happened here a coup d’état? A financial coup d’état?

    MARCY KAPTUR: That’s, no. Because I think that’s what’s happened. Um, a financial coup d’état?

    MICHAEL MOORE: Yeah.

    MARCY KAPTUR: I could agree with that. I could agree with that. Because the people here really aren’t in charge. Wall Street is in charge.

    BILL MOYERS: That’s the progressive Representative from Ohio, Marcy Kaptur, she’s with me now. She has a Masters from the University of Michigan, did graduate study at M.I.T. and still lives in the same house in the Toledo working class neighborhood where she grew up.

    She’s in her 14th term in Congress, the longest-serving Democratic woman in the history of the House, and she’s an outspoken financial watchdog on three important Committees: Appropriations, Budget and Oversight and Government Reform.

    Also with me is a familiar face to viewers of this broadcast. Simon Johnson is the former Chief Economist at the International Monetary Fund. He now teaches Global Economics and Management at M.I.T.’s Sloan School of Management. He’s one of the founders of the website Baselinescenario.com. I check it out daily for Simon’s take on the economic and financial crisis.

    It’s been a year since the great collapse and both my guests are well equipped to assess what’s happened since then. Welcome to you both.

    MARCY KAPTUR: Thank you.

    BILL MOYERS: Let’s look at this story that I just read from the Associated Press this week about how Treasury Secretary Geithner is on the phone several times a day with a select group of very powerful Wall Street bankers, especially Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs. He will talk to them when Members of Congress have to leave a message on the answering machine. And these are the bankers who helped bring on this calamity and who are now benefiting from it. What does that say to you?

    MARCY KAPTUR: That says to me that Wall Street and Washington is a circuit. And because Mr.Geithner headed the New York Fed that that historic relationship, unfortunately, continues. And it gives them special access and special power to influence policy.

    SIMON JOHNSON: Well, I think it really tells you how the system works. The system is based on access and is based on what on Wall Street shaping Washington’s view of what’s important.

    It’s the people who are very close to Mr. Geithner before when he was the head of the New York Fed. Before he became Treasury Secretary. These people have unparalleled access. And in a crisis, when everything is up for grabs, you don’t know what’s going on, the people who will take your phone calls, right, in government and people who are going to be standing in the oval office, making the key decisions. That’s the heart of the system. That’s the heart of how you get your agenda through, by changing their worldview.

    MARCY KAPTUR: And they also move people. In other words, Mr. Geithner came from the New York Fed, he came from Wall Street, and he becomes Secretary of the Treasury. His predecessor, Mr. Paulson, came from Goldman Sachs, and he becomes Secretary of Treasury. You can go back decades, and you will see that there’s this revolving door between Wall Street and Washington. And I recently asked Chairman Bernanke of the Federal Reserve, ‘Let me ask you a question. Would you be willing to consider a reform where the Cleveland Fed would have equal power to the New York Fed, in terms of how the Fed is run?’ And his answer was, ‘No.’

    BILL MOYERS: And why did you ask that question?

    MARCY KAPTUR: Because I think we need to democratize the Fed. I think that my region of the country, which is suffering so heavily from these decisions that were made by Wall Street and Washington, we need to have voice. And our bankers, who didn’t do the bad things, our community bankers, who are having to pay higher fees shouldn’t be treated this way. Why should the people who did it right be penalized for those that did it wrong?

    SIMON JOHNSON: Remember Wall Street convinced us that trading derivatives without any regulation, that all these kind of crazy housing loans, which are very dangerous for consumers. That all of this was sensible. All of this was a good way to sustain growth. That was wrong. That wasn’t it. That wasn’t that’s not the end of the story. In the crisis, when things got bad, they also convinced the key people in Washington that they, the bankers, the big bankers, the Wall Street bankers, who are really responsible for all of these problems, they should be saved. Not just their banks, but they individually and should be saved. Their jobs, their pensions, all their perks. It’s an extraordinary moment.

    BILL MOYERS: You asked on your blog, just this week, a question I want to put to you now, and to both of you. You asked, ‘Does this crisis reflect something about the disproportionate influence of a few incompetent investment bankers or a deeper breakdown of capitalism?” What’s your answer to your own question?

    SIMON JOHNSON: Well, definitely, this disproportionate influence of some fairly incompetent bankers, that’s for sure. That’s what we’re seeing today. That’s what we’ve seen over the past few months. I think on the issue on the issue of capitalism, we have to take this very seriously. To me, at least, the financial part of our capitalism is very seriously broken.

    SIMON JOHNSON: They persuaded us to allow them to take incredible risks. And then they pushed all the downside, all those losses onto us, the taxpayer, at the same time as really hammering hard all the people who were duped, essentially, into taking out loans. People lost their houses. It’s an absolute tragedy. This combination cannot go on. And yet, the opportunity for real reform has already passed. And there is not going to be not only is there not going to be change, but I’ll go further. I’ll say it’s going to be worse, what comes out of this, in terms of the financial system, its power, and what it can get away with.

    BILL MOYERS: Why?

    SIMON JOHNSON: That’s the.

    BILL MOYERS: Why is it going to how is it going to be worse?

    SIMON JOHNSON: Well, there’s four we used to have a dozen or so substantial big banks, now we’re down to four. Now we’re down to four big banks that have a lot more market power and a lot more political power. They make the campaign contributions. They shape agendas in ways that are that are really quite scary. If you look, for example, at derivatives. And the debate on whether or not derivatives should be regulated in a sensible manner. And at this point, actually, the Obama Administration has is leaning in a better direction. But the big financial players are absolutely against any kind of sensible regulation. And I think they’re going to win.

    MARCY KAPTUR: Let me give you a reality from ground zero in Toledo, Ohio. Our foreclosures have gone up 94 percent. A few months ago, I met with our realtors. And I said, ‘What should I know?’ They said, ‘Well, first of all, you should know the worst companies that are doing this to us.’

    MARCY KAPTUR: I said, ‘Well, give me the top one.’ They said, ‘J.P. Morgan Chase.’ I went back to Washington that night. And one of my colleagues said, ‘You want to come to dinner?’ I said, ‘Well, what is it?’ He said, ‘Well, it’s a meeting with Jamie Dimon, the head of J.P. Morgan Chase.’ I said, ‘Wow, yes. I really do.’ So, I go to this meeting in a fancy hotel, fancy dinner, and everyone is complimenting him. I mean, it was just like a love fest.

    MARCY KAPTUR: They finally got to me, and my point to ask a question. I said, ‘Well, I don’t want to speak out of turn here, Mr. Dimon.’ I said, ‘But your company is the largest forecloser in my district. And our Realtors just said to me this morning that your people don’t return phone calls.’ I said, ‘We can’t do work outs.’ And he looked at me, he said, ‘Do you know that I talk to your Governor all the time?’ He said, ‘Our company employs 10,000 people in Ohio.’

    MARCY KAPTUR: And I’m thinking, ‘What is that? A threat?’ And he said, ‘I speak to the Mayor of Columbus.’ I said, ‘Why don’t you come further north?’ I said, ‘Toledo, Cleveland, where the foreclosures are just skyrocketing.’ He said, ‘Well, we’ll have someone call you.’ And he gave me a card. And they never did. For two weeks, we tried to reach them. And finally, I was on a national news show. And I told this story. They called within ten minutes. And they said, ‘Oh, we’ll work with you. We’ll try to do some workouts in your area.’

    We planned the first one after working with them for weeks and weeks and weeks. Their people never showed up. And it was a Friday. Our people had taken off work. They’d driven from all these locations to come. We kept calling J.P. Morgan Chase saying, ‘Where’s your person? Where’s your person?’ And they finally sent somebody down from Detroit by 3:00 in the afternoon. But out people had been waiting all morning and a lot of people that’s how they treat our people.

    BILL MOYERS: You did a remarkable thing on the floor of the House recently. And I want to show my audience a clip of a speech in which you urge people to break the law.

    MARCY KAPTUR: So why should any American citizen be kicked out of their homes in this cold weather? In Ohio it is going to be 10 or 20 below zero. Don’t leave your home. Because you know what? When those companies say they have your mortgage, unless you have a lawyer that can put his or her finger on that mortgage, you don’t have that mortgage, and you are going to find they can’t find the paper up there on Wall Street. So I say to the American people, you be squatters in your own homes. Don’t you leave. In Ohio and Michigan and Indiana and Illinois and all these other places our people are being treated like chattel, and this Congress is stymied.

    BILL MOYERS: Wow. You are urging them to resist the law when the Sheriff shows up to throw them out of their home.

    MARCY KAPTUR: I’m saying that they deserve justice, too. And that the scales of justice in front of the Supreme Court are supposed to be balanced, and they’re not. And that possession is 90 percent of the law. And that you have legal rights, as a home owner. You have a right to legal representation. You have a right before the judge to have the mortgage note produced by whomever in the system has it. Judge Boyko of Cleveland threw out six cases, because when the foreclosures came up, the financial institutions couldn’t produce the note. Our people deserve their day in court.

    BILL MOYERS: What’s your explanation as an economist. And a student of this financial system as to why the banks are taking so long to help the homeowners when Congress has allocated funds for that purpose?

    SIMON JOHNSON: I’m afraid that it’s pretty obvious and it’s very tragic. That they have no interest in helping the homeowners. They make money with what they’re doing. Bill, they’ll expected a lot of these mortgages they made to default, okay? It was in their models. A high default rate. Now, they didn’t expect house prices to come down so much. That’s where they got their losses. But they absolutely made these loans expecting they would have to foreclose on people. And figuring they would make money on that.

    SIMON JOHNSON: These are very smart, very profit-oriented people. I can assure you, if there was money in it for them. They would be negotiating you know, very various kinds of re-schedulings of these loans. They don’t want to do it. They it’s not in their interest. It’s not where the money is. Follow the money. The money is where Jamie Dimon says it is. Jamie Dimon says, ‘You ain’t seen nothing yet,’ in terms of his lobby in Washington. He’s on the record as saying, he’s this is his big initiative right now.

    BILL MOYERS: To?

    SIMON JOHNSON: To spend more time in Washington, more time cultivating all those relationships on Capital Hill and in the executive branch. And you know what else Jamie Dimon said to his shareholders? To his shareholders meeting this year, he said, with regard to 2008, the year of what we regard as the greatest financial crisis, an absolute human tragedy. He said, Jamie Dimon said to his shareholders, ‘This was perhaps our best year ever.’

    MARCY KAPTUR: Think about what these banks have done. They have taken very imprudent behavior, irresponsible. They have really gambled, all right? And in many cases, been involved in fraudulent activity. And then when they lost, they shifted their losses to the taxpayer. So, if you look at an instrumentality like the F.H.A., the Federal Housing Administration. They used to insure one of every 50 mortgages in the country. Now it’s one out of four.

    MARCY KAPTUR: Because what they’re doing is they’re taking their mistakes and they’re dumping them on the taxpayer. So, you and I, and the long term debt of our country and our children and grandchildren. It’s all at risk because of their behavior. We aren’t reigning them in. The laws of Congress passed last year in terms of housing, were hollow. Were hollow.

    MARCY KAPTUR: Foreclosures in my area have gone up 94 percent. And we know the basic rules of economics. Housing leads us to recovery. Housing was the precipitating factor in this economic downturn. Unless you dealing with the housing sector, you aren’t going to have growth in this economy

    BILL MOYERS: You’re both saying the financial world, the banks in particular, are putting their interests above anybody else’s interest. And they’ve got the power in the executive branch, and the Congress to back up their demands, right?

    SIMON JOHNSON: This is capitalism, Bill. That’s what they’re supposed to do. They represent their shareholders, they’re appointed by the board of directors to make money for their shareholders. And the way they think that they can best make money is to shape the regulatory rules around housing around derivatives, around all everything we used to have that kept the financial sector under control. Has all been, you know, washed away, one way or another, by their efforts, right? They make money in the boom, that way. And when and when bad things happen, they shove all the downside onto the taxpayer. That’s what they’re doing their job.

    MARCY KAPTUR: It’s socialism for the big banks. Because they’ve basically taken their mistakes and they’ve put it on the taxpayer. That’s the government. That’s socialism. That isn’t capitalism.

    SIMON JOHNSON: Well people some people call that lemon socialism. So, when it turns out to be a lemon, it’s you it’s yours, the taxpayer. When it turns out to be good, it’s mine, I’m Wall Street.

    BILL MOYERS: Why have we not had the reform that we all knew was being was needed and being demanded a year ago?

    SIMON JOHNSON: I think the opportunity the short term opportunity was missed. There was an opportunity that the Obama Administration had. President Obama campaigned on a message of change. I voted for him. I supported him. And I believed in this message. And I thought that the time for change, for the financial sector, was absolutely upon us. This was abundantly apparent by the inauguration in January of this year.

    SIMON JOHNSON: And Rahm Emanuel, the President’s Chief of Staff has a saying. He’s widely known for saying, ‘Never let a good crisis go to waste’. Well, the crisis is over, Bill. The crisis in the financial sector, not for people who own homes, but the crisis for the big banks is substantially over. And it was completely wasted. The Administration refused to break the power of the big banks, when they had the opportunity, earlier this year. And the regulatory reforms they are now pursuing will turn out to be, in my opinion, and I do follow this day to day, you know. These reforms will turn out to be essentially meaningless.

    MARCY KAPTUR: When Lincoln ran into trouble, during the Civil War, he got new generals. He brought in Grant. I hope that President Obama will bring in some new generals on the financial front.

    BILL MOYERS: Should Geithner be fired? And Summers be fired?

    MARCY KAPTUR: I don’t think that any individuals who had their hands on creating this mess should be in charge of cleaning it up. I honestly don’t think they’re capable of it.

    BILL MOYERS: Let me show you an excerpt from the speech President Obama made on Wall Street last month, September. Here is the challenge he laid down to the bankers.

    PRESIDENT OBAMA: We will not go back to the days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess at the heart of this crisis, where too many were motivated only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses. Those on Wall Street cannot resume taking risks without regard for consequences, and expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there to break their fall.

    BILL MOYERS: A reality check. Not one CEO of a Wall Street bank was there to hear the President. What do you make of that?

    SIMON JOHNSON: Arrogance. Because they have no fear for the government anymore. They have no respect for the President, which I find absolutely extraordinary and shocking. All right? And I think they have no not an ounce of gratitude to the American people, who saved them, their jobs, and the way they run the world.

    BILL MOYERS: In the scheme of things, it is the Congress, and the government that’s supposed to stand up to the powerful, organized interests, for the people in Toledo, who can’t come to Washington. Who are working or trying to keep their homes or trying to pay their health bills. What’s happened to our government?

    MARCY KAPTUR: Congress has really shut down. I’m disappointed in both chambers, because wouldn’t you think, with the largest financial crisis in American history, in the largest transfer of wealth from the American people to the biggest banks in this country, that every committee of Congress would be involved in hearings, that this would be on the news, that people would be engaged in this. What we’re seeing is– tangential hearings on very arcane aspects of financial reform. For example, now we’re going to have a consumer protection agency to help the poor consumer, who doesn’t understand all of this, rather than hearings on the fundamental new architecture of reforming the American financial system, so that we have prudent lending, capital accumulation at the local level again; that we encourage savings and limit debt by the American people. Our country needs this. Those aren’t the hearings that are happening.

    If you want a marker at the Federal level of how serious we are to get justice out of this financial crisis, look at the F.B.I. Look at the number of people who are really prosecuting and investigation mortgage fraud and securities fraud. It is so small

    I’ve been one of the Members of Congress trying to increase by ten times the agents to get at the justice issues for the American people. For companies that have been hurt. For shareholders that have been hurt. Our government isn’t doing it. That it’s very easy to look at the budget of the F.B.I. in mortgage fraud and securities fraud and say, ‘How serious is the government?’ And until those numbers increase, we will not begin to get justice.

    BILL MOYERS: If we can’t get reform out of this calamity, when can we get it then, given the realities you have both described?

    SIMON JOHNSON: That’s the worry, Bill, right? And I’m very serious. I’m very serious about this. Which is, you know, does it take- we have elements of the Great Depression now, in terms of the impact on people, okay? I mean, people losing their jobs, their homes, their health insurance.

    BILL MOYERS: Even though Wall Street says, ‘Well, we’re past the crisis now. Profits at the banks are up. And Wall Street- and the stock market is stirring.’

    SIMON JOHNSON: We’re out of the financial part of the crisis, we’re not out of the human part of the crisis.

    MARCY KAPTUR: And we’re not out of the housing crisis. The President ought to take these empty units and require his Administration to broker rental agreements with families, so they’re not kicked out. Property values are dropping, all over the country, sometimes by as much as 25 percent. You can do a 30 year mortgage, even a 40 year mortgage, where people have a job or even unemployment benefits, if they’re going to get them for another year. Well, my goodness, you can keep them in their home. Empty units do no one any good.

    Let me tell you what happened in- where I live in Toledo, Ohio. The house next to me was foreclosed. And so, I called, the other day, a little plaque appeared on the door of this house. And it said, ‘$500 down, $300 a month rent.’ I said, ‘What is that, a land contract deal? What’s going on there?’ So I called the number. I get a repossession dealer in South Carolina. I said, ‘Hello sir, what’s your name?’ ‘Johnny,’ or something. I said, ‘And what’s your address?’ He gave me a P.O. Box number. I said, ‘Now listen,’ I said, ‘Your property is bringing down the value of our property because you’re on our heels.’ ‘Lady, I get these things from the bank.’ And he said, ‘You know, we try to unload ‘em. What are you going to offer me?’ This is what he’s saying to me over the telephone. I don’t think a single one of my neighbors knows that that home is now in possession of a group in South Carolina that could care less about it.

    SIMON JOHNSON: Just to reinforce this point. Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac are now government agencies. Okay? They not only hold a lot of mortgages that are in default or close to default. They’re also responsible for enormous amount of the new loans- that are being originated anywhere in the country, actually. They work for the President. The kinds of proposals that Congresswoman Kaptur’s put in forth are entirely reasonable. And can be implemented by the executive branch, hopefully with Congress on board, certainly at the urging of certain members of Congress, obviously. But they can do it.

    BILL MOYERS: So Simon, go ahead- you were saying- what is it that scares you? You’re worried?

    SIMON JOHNSON: Another Great Depression. Right? If you don’t fix the financial system, Bill. If you allow them to have the same attitude. If you- if you actually allow them to increase their economic power, their ability to take risk, and their belief that they can shove the losses onto the government. And that’s why they didn’t show up to President Obama’s speech on Wall Street.

    BILL MOYERS: Why don’t they respect him?

    SIMON JOHNSON: Because they think that the next time they won’t even have to ask. They’ll just be given the bailout that they want.

    MARCY KAPTUR: Right. That’s been their history. Their bed is feathered. When they messed up during the 1980s, they put their bill through the savings and loans crisis on the American people. $140 billion.

    BILL MOYERS: And we’re still paying that off, by the way. I think the last payment will be made in 2013.

    MARCY KAPTUR: Very good. Most people don’t even know that.

    BILL MOYERS: Well, I covered that.

    MARCY KAPTUR: But that, you know, it opened the flood gates. They go, ‘Oh, we can get away with $140 billion?’ This time how many trillions have they gotten away with? Plus all the deregulatory actions that were taken during the 1990s. I remember when they came to the Congress, when Newt Gingrich became Speaker of the House. And they came down to the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee, and they took the name off the door. And they changed it to Financial Services. And people began to see that they had money in the bank, and they charged them a fee to cash their own check on their own money. And then fees went up for everything. And the ordinary consumer found, ‘Hey, it’s not so smart to have a savings account, because it costs me more money if I have under $10,000 in the bank, they charge me all this money on my own money.’ They got exactly what they wanted. And so, then all the abuses and the irresponsible and imprudent behavior of the 1990s that led to this, nobody did anything. They just kept opening more floodgates to them. And then with the removal of Glass-Steagall in 1999, which I-

    BILL MOYERS: That was the rule that kept the investment banks from being owned by banks, right?

    MARCY KAPTUR: It’s about separating banking and commerce.

    BILL MOYERS: Right.

    MARCY KAPTUR: They said as a country, you know, banks have extraordinary power. They have the power to create money. And decide how much that is worth. They have extraordinary power. And we used to have capital ratios. We need to get back to them. Ten to one. For every dollar in your bank, you can lend ten. You know what J.P. Morgan did? A hundred to one. And then with derivatives, who knows how much? Glass-Steagall separated banking from commerce, so that we didn’t have these institutions getting too big, getting into too many things. And we just gave them total abandon. And they took it.

    SIMON JOHNSON: Well, the final end of the last vestige of Glass-Steagall came in just now in August. Unnoted, but I think very significant. Goldman Sachs, you remember, was an investment bank, a securities company. Not allowed to be a commercial bank; didn’t have access to the Federal Reserve and this ability to tap into the money supply of the country. Until September of last year, when the crisis broke, they were allowed a very short notice to convert to being a bank holding company. This was what saved Goldman Sachs in my opinion. Also Morgan Stanley. Which meant they could stay in the securities business. And they could also have access to the Federal Reserve. In August, just now, they converted to what’s called a financial holding company. That may seem like a technical detail to you, but this means they can borrow from the Fed, at essentially zero interest rate now.

    They can invest in, I mean, as far as we can see, from the outside, looking at their portfolio, anything they want, including, you’re going to love this one, they just bought some stock, big chunk of stock in a Chinese automotive company. Okay? So, that’s your money, that’s your Federal Reserve, financing a highly speculative investment. And if it goes well, they get the upside. And if it goes badly, that’s another one for us.

    BILL MOYERS: Well, and this is what we were talking about earlier, the system. I mean, President Clinton’s Secretary of Treasury, Robert Rubin helps eliminate Glass-Steagall. And then leaves the government and goes to work for? Citicorp?

    SIMON JOHNSON: Well Rubin’s a fascinating character. He ran Goldman Sachs, he went into the Clinton White House, then he became Secretary of the Treasury, and it was on his watch that, first of all, Glass-Steagall began to really seriously crumble, and then it was completely swept away- replaced, abolished, really. And then, of course, Rubin goes on after he leaves Treasury, to be the senior guru type figure at Citigroup. And Citigroup is absolutely epicenter of everything that’s gone wrong with our financial system.

    BILL MOYERS: And wasn’t it Robert Rubin the mentor, the guru to both Tim Geithner and Larry Summers?

    SIMON JOHNSON: Absolutely. Both Geithner and Summers advanced to senior positions in the Treasury under Rubin was instrumental in bringing Larry Summers to be President of Harvard, after the Clinton Administration. And according to published new report, he was absolutely key person in making sure that Tim Geithner first went to a senior job at the IMF, and then became President of the New York Fed. And there are unconfirmed reports that Robert Rubin was an essential advisor to then candidate Obama in fall of last year, with regard to who he should bring on board as the leadership team on the economic side.

    MARCY KAPTUR: And you know, looking at it from the heartland, when I look at Wall Street and all their connections into Washington, and I’ve been at it a while now, it’s very disheartening to me, because I know they don’t care about us out there. We’re flyover country for them. And they’re just out to make money.

    And I have seen people that I worked with in the Carter White House, who were associated what the bond industry of Wall Street, use their access and create for themselves a money path that today has led them to head organizations like Black Rock, and get private contracts with the Federal Reserve. The over $2 trillion, we don’t know how much that the Federal Reserve has extended at this point.

    BILL MOYERS: And Black Rock is?

    MARCY KAPTUR: Black Rock is an institution that has gotten the major contract of the Federal Reserve to do the mortgage workouts. And my question is, the very people involved in Black Rock, who’ve gotten these confidential contracts with the Federal Reserve, they were involved on Wall Street in creating the instruments in the first place. So how do we know that they are not covering up their own crime?

    BILL MOYERS: So, Simon, what happens now? If we’re going to avert a depression and the next calamity, what needs to be done?

    SIMON JOHNSON: Well, I think you have to keep at it, Bill. I mean, that’s the lesson from previous generations of Americans, who have really confronted entrenched power like this. You have to keep at it. And you mustn’t be satisfied. When the Administration says, ‘Okay, we fixed it. Don’t worry. We did some technical tweaking on capital requirements, for example, in the banks.’ You have to say, ‘No, that’s not true. Let’s look at what’s happening, let’s follow it through.’

    The muckrakers of today are absolutely essential, I think, to really pushing these banks. And revealing what they’re doing. And by the way, Bill, it’s going to I think it’s going to be a long haul. I think that the economy will start to recover. We’ll get some jobs back. It’s going to be very painful for a lot of people. But other people’s attention is going to drift. It’s a three, five, seven, maybe twelve year cycle. But when it comes back, it will come back with a vengeance. And it will be even, I think, even more devastating, in all likelihood, than what we just saw.

    BILL MOYERS: How do we get Congress back? How do we get Congress to do what it’s supposed to do? Oversight. Real reform. Challenge the powers that be.

    MARCY KAPTUR: We have to take the money out. We have to get rid of the constant fundraising that happens inside the Congress. Before political parties used to raise money; now individual members are raising money through the DCCC and the RCCC. It is absolutely corrupt. It’s good people.

    BILL MOYERS: Those are the fundraising groups both parties-

    MARCY KAPTUR: Parties.

    BILL MOYERS: In the Congress.

    MARCY KAPTUR: And then people wonder, ‘Well, why doesn’t Congress get along?’ Because they are made into arch enemies by the type of fundraising system that is embedded in the very guts of the institution. So, you’ve got to clean that out. But meanwhile, we need to get hired over at the justice department, 1,000 agents, in mortgage fraud and in securities fraud. Then, I pray, that the leadership of both chambers will do the kind of robust hearings that the nation deserves to rout out those who did wrong and to change the fundamental financial architecture of this country. And then the President needs to get his top housing advisors in the room with him. And they need to meet all weekend. And they need to get their arms around this housing market, in order to stem the rising foreclosures. We haven’t stopped the bleeding out there.

    BILL MOYERS: Does President Obama get it?

    MARCY KAPTUR: I don’t think President Obama has the right people around him. The poor man inherited a total mess, globally and domestically. I think some of the people that he trusted haven’t delivered. I urge him to get new generals. It’s time.

    SIMON JOHNSON: Louis the Fourteenth of France, a very powerful monarch, was famous for having many bad things, you know, happen under his rule. And people would always say, ‘If only Louis the Fourteenth knew. I’m sure he doesn’t know. If we could just tell him, he’d sort it out.’ You know. I’m skeptical.

    BILL MOYERS: Simon Johnson, Congresswoman Kaptur, thank you both very much for this interesting discussion.

    MARCY KAPTUR: Thank you.

    SIMON JOHNSON: Thank you.

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