Archiv für das Tag 'bonds'

Molecool

Junk Still Going Strong

I finally had some time to update my BAA-TYX spread chart this afternoon and, like many of my other indicators, the results are not very inspiring for any remaining bears:

As you can see we had a promising upswing during the drop but since the ramp up any loss of appetite for corporate junk bonds has quickly faded. Risk is still in and bearish sentiment is out.

For the noobs: Bonds are generally classified into two groups - “investment grade” bonds and “junk” bonds. Investment grade bonds include those assigned to the top four quality categories by either Standard & Poor’s (AAA, AA, A, BBB) or Moody’s (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa).

The term “junk” is reserved for all bonds with Standard & Poor’s ratings below BBB and/or Moody’s ratings below Baa. Investment grade bonds are generally legal for purchase by banks; junk bonds are not.

The specific definitions assigned to junk bond ratings by the services help define the magnitude of the risk associated with them. Because Standard & Poor’s definitions are somewhat more comprehensive, they are quoted here:

BB, B, CCC, CC, C: Debt rated BB, B, CCC, CC, and C is regarded, on balance, as predominantly speculative with respect to capacity to pay interest and repay principal in accordance with the terms of the obligation. BB indicates the lowest degree of speculation and C the highest degree of speculation. While such debt will likely have some quality and protective characteristics, these are outweighed by large uncertainties or major risk exposures to adverse conditions.

BB: Debt rated BB has less near-term vulnerability to default than other speculative issues. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions which could lead to inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and principal payments.

B: Debt rated B has a greater vulnerability to default but currently has the capacity to meet interest payments and principal repayments. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair capacity or willingness to pay interest and repay principal.

Because a B rating is the single most common rating found in a junk bond portfolio, Moody’s definition of its B rating follows:

Bonds which are rated B generally lack characteristics of the desirable investment. Assurance of interest and principal payments or of maintenance of other terms of the contract over any long period of time may be small.

To resume with Standard & Poor’s:

CCC: Debt rated CCC has a currently identifiable vulnerability to default, and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions to meet timely payment of interest and repayment of principal. In the event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, it is not likely to have the capacity to pay interest and repay principal.

D: Debt rated D is in payment default.

I guess I should explain how this affects us equities/options traders.The BAA-TYX chart measures the yield spread between bonds rated one step above junk versus the yield of the supposedly most reliable and safe bond there is, the U.S. 30-year treasury bond. In the past it has been observed that a narrowing of the spread often precedes a rise in equities and inversely that a widening of the spread may be a sign of trouble ahead. Is a big drop in equities always preceded by a widening of the BAA-TYX spread? Well - sometimes it is - but if you parse through this chart you’ll also notice that it doesn’t always pan out this way and that it sometimes lags behind a little. Still, it’s something we want to be on the lookout for in case it does occur.

What does it all mean? What it means is that QE sponsored bullishness continued unmitigated and in full blast. Bond traders are usually a lot smarter than equity traders (let’s face it - most of us are small timers without much of a clue) and I do not see any indication that this trend is about to change any time soon. The BAA-TYX spread keeps narrowing further and further and it’s a visual representation of how quantitative easing is attempting to re-inflate our credit bubble just one last time.

Let’s have one for the road, shall we? Tomorrow we all dine in hell.

Cheers,

Mole


Guy M. Lerner

It’s All The Same Trade!

One of the frustrating aspects about this market environment is that all assets look like the same trade. Betting on equities is a bet against bonds or vice a versa, betting on bonds is a bet against equities. It is that simple. Consequently, using a tactical asset allocation strategy makes it hard to diversify away my risk as I end up being all in on essentially what has become the same trade.

From my perspective, one of the best places to park my money would be in Treasury bonds as the reward to risk is greatest. This can be seen in figure 1 a weekly chart of the i-shares Lehman 20 + Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: TLT). The key pivot point at 89.38 is support, and a weekly close below this level would be lights out for TLT - expect much lower Treasury bond prices or higher yields. In addition to being close to support levels, the "smart money" or commercial traders from the Commitment of Traders data is bullish on bonds, and the "dumb money" or Market Vane Bullish Consensus is extremely bearish. It is within this context - low (and quantifiable) risk and betting with the "smart money" and against the "dumb money" - that I see this as the "better" trade. Despite the resistance overhead, I believe that TLT could make it to $98.

Figure 1. TLT/ weekly

The flip side to Treasury bond trade has become the equity trade. As we have chronicled over the past couple of weeks, this is the crowded trade. There are too many bulls. In addition, there are headwinds in the form of strong trends in 10 year Treasury yields, gold, and crude oil. In essence, to bet with the equity bulls, you have to ignore risks and jump into the market while holding your nose. You are buying high to sell higher. In my opinion, the best case scenario for the bulls would be a persistence of the trading range that we have been in for the past 5 months.

Only time will tell as the story unfolds, but from this perspective, the safer and better reward to risk trade is with Treasury bonds. We should have our answer soon enough.
Guy M. Lerner

Like Minds…I Hope!

There are several commentators on the web that I read consistently, and John Hussman of Hussman Funds is one of them. I always take great comfort when my analysis rhymes with his because like myself I know he does his homework too.

My weekly report on sentiment was about not straying too far from the data because of short term price moves. For example, this past week's pop to almost highs in the major indices has the "this stuff doesn't work" readers emailing in. As stated a couple of weeks ago, we are in "Bounce Mode". In the end, I see no reason to stray from the price cycle as defined by greed and fear that has worked over and over again.

This week, Hussman has similar thoughts on his mind. On abandoning the data because of short term market movements, he states:

"Many investment professionals have developed a habit of forming expectations based on nothing more than extrapolation of short-term trends in the data, even when those extrapolations are inconsistent with market history or well-established economic relationships. This was a key element in creating the housing bubble - no price was too high and no bubble was recognized, because all that mattered was that prices were rising. The focus of analysts on the short-term ups and downs of economic and earnings reports has become such a mainstay of financial news that it's not at all clear to me that investors even recognize how devoid the current financial discourse is of real analysis."

He goes on to state and because I find truth and humor in the following:

"Instead, the only question today is whether earnings and economic reports are delivering 'surprises' versus what 'the Street' estimated the day before the data was released....But to watch a half hour of CNBC today is like watching an old episode of Gomer Pyle ('Well, surprise, surprise, surprise!')."

Hussman also touched on another theme that I have written on recently. In my article, "Danger, Danger Will Robinson", I state that the combination of overly bullish sentiment and strong trends in our indicator that measures trends in gold, crude oil, and yields on the 10 year Treasury bond had a high likelihood of leading to a market top. Hussman uses similar data to reach similar conclusions. He characterizes this market environment as overbullish, over valued, overbought, and rising yield pressures, and using more extensive data, he provides the following context to these observations:

Last week, we observed a subtle shift in yield pressures, which has historically been associated with fairly abrupt "air pockets" in which stocks have typically lost 10% or more within the span of about 6 weeks.

Consider the following conditions: 1) market valuations above their historical norm by any amount at all - for example, a dividend yield on the S&P 500 anything less than 3.7%, and; 2) The 10-year Treasury bond yield and the year-over-year CPI inflation rate higher than their levels of 6 months earlier (regardless of whether their absolute levels have been high or low).

If you look at market history since 1940, this condition has been in effect nearly 20% of the time. Yet this set of factors alone has made an enormous difference in the returns achieved by the market. When the above conditions have been in effect at the same time, the S&P 500 has actually lost ground on a price basis, and has delivered an annualized return of just 0.28%. In contrast, when those conditions have not been in effect, the market has advanced at an average annualized rate of 14.94%. Of course, these averages mask a lot of volatility, but it is clear that even the most basic combination of low stock yields and rising yield pressures is hostile to total returns.

To the above conditions, if Treasury bill yields are also higher than 6 months earlier (again, regardless of the absolute level of yields), the annualized return drops to -0.83%. Add a discount rate higher than 6 months earlier, and the annualized return drops to -2.22%.

Now add overbought conditions (say, a 12-month advance in the S&P 500 of greater than 30%), and the annualized return turns sharply negative, to -39.17%. Overvalued, overbought, conditions with rising yield pressures are trouble. Given those conditions, excessive bullishness only worsens the situation. Now, this combination of conditions has never persisted for an entire year, so the actual loss sustained by the market is not so extreme, but suffice it to say that the typical loss has been in excess of 10%. Based on the current overbought status of the market, there are only three similar periods that we can identify in post-war data: August-October 1999 (which was followed by an abrupt air pocket of greater than 10%), September-October 1987 (no comment required), and September-December 1955 (which was followed by a 10% correction, a brief recovery, and a secondary decline to re-test the initial low).

In the final analysis, I like to read Hussman because I believe he is diligent and disciplined in his analysis. The fact that I come to similar conclusions often is comforting although that doesn't mean we are always correct. Nonetheless, the consistency of the process or approach is over half the battle in this game, and that is what I strive for, and that is why I think Hussman is successful too.


Karl Denninger

Kaaaaaaaa…… BOOM! (Fannie/Freddie)

Now this is interesting...

March 5 (Bloomberg) -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bondholders shouldn’t assume the government will make them whole on their investments as Congress retools the companies, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank said.

Heh, who's the biggest individual bondholder?

Mr. Bernanke, the bond market is on line #1!

Frank continues:

A “whole range” of options is being considered for investors in the two government-seized companies, “from paying nothing to a haircut to whatever,” said Frank, whose committee oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Nothing?  You mean zero, zilch, bupkis? 

That would be rich.  After Bernanke stepped in and bought some $200 billion of their debt, to have it "marked to zero" would be the ultimate slap in The Fed's face for buying that which I have argued is impermissible under the law.

What an elegant solution to a difficult problem - "oops - tear 'em up jackass - you should have known better than to buy something that you weren't allowed to and was patently worthless!"

The irony of that outcome would be delicious.  Yes, I know I'm dreaming here - or am I?

“Please don’t think this is federally guaranteed, I don’t think it is, I don’t think it should be, I don’t feel any obligation to bail you out,” Frank said. Congress will “certainly not” extend any new protections to bond and mortgage-security investors beyond what exists, Frank said.

Oh.  You mean that the face of those prospectuses mean what they say?  You mean this is real?

Uh, the market is kinda ignoring that right now, isn't it? 

Yes, I think it is.

How about this for a clear statement?

We’re not remaking Fannie and Freddie,” Frank said. “We’re going to start from scratch and do housing finance.

Go ahead folks, keep buying.  This is spelled "opportunity", thank you very much.  Now please excuse me while I go put a few chips on "red."

PS: Why are these stocks still listed again?

Guy M. Lerner

“Danger, Danger Will Robinson”

I feel like the robot in the television show, "Lost In Space". Investor sentiment remains bullish and trends in gold, crude oil, and yields on the 10 year Treasury bond are collectively becoming extreme as well. This combination has me thinking: "Danger, Danger Will Robinson".

Yesterday, I presented our combination sentiment indicator and our indicator that measures the trends in gold, crude oil, and yields on 10 year Treasury bonds. As stand alone indicators, each of these would suggest caution on equities. Together they work synergistically. For example, with regards to our combination indicator constructed from the trends in gold, crude oil, and 10 year Treasury yields, the data was reasonably compelling to suggest that when these trends are strong (as they are now) that it is a headwind for equities. The data is more compelling when we consider both sentiment and trends in gold, crude oil, and yields on 10 year Treasury bonds.

Figure 1 is a weekly chart of the S&P500. The red dots over the price bars are those times when both sentiment was bullish and our combination indicator was in the extreme zone suggesting strong trends in gold, crude oil, and yields on the 10 year Treasury bonds. The chart goes back to 2004, which is the time our sentiment indicator starts.

Figure 1. S&P500/ weekly

This data is more suggestive of a market top than a lift off to a new bull run. The only thing that would change my mind regarding this is if some of the shorter term measures of sentiment (i.e., like the Rydex asset data) were persistently bearish (i.e., a bullish signal). As a representative sample of market participants, these short term traders were betting against the market mid-July, 2009 to mid - August, 2009 when the market went on a moonshot and the "this time is different" scenario unfolded. No doubt short covering had something to do with this.

Lastly, I believe the market is setting up for a reversal. The other day I made "The Bearish Case For Equities", and I used the Ultra Short S&P500 ProShares (symbol: SDS) as an example. I explained how a weekly close below the key pivot at 33.57 would be a good sign of a continuation move for equities. In other words, if SDS closes below 33.57 on a weekly, then expect higher equity prices. This is a true statement as key pivots act as support and resistance and we are below support here on SDS. The key pivot at 33.57 is now resistance.

However, this is also the time where there are reversals or "fake outs", and with sentiment modestly bullish and with trends in crude oil, gold, and yields on the 10 year Treasury strong, I believe there is a reasonable chance that the market is setting itself up for such a scenario. We cannot have a reversal without a close below the key pivot. So today's action is the first step in the process. If equity prices do continue higher, then it is my expectation that it will be at the grinding pace we have seen over the past 4 months.

I know this is somewhat controversial, but it is consistent with the data and the price action. The price action is good despite the lack of volume; all the other data suggests headwinds. Putting it together, there is a higher than likely chance of reversal.

Lastly, to keep it light, I have included a picture of the robot from "Lost In Space". Did you know that his name was B-9? See figure 2.

Figure 2. Robot

Our composite indicator that assesses the strength in the trends of gold, 10 year Treasury yields, and crude oil is likely to be back in the extreme zone by the end of the week. This represents a headwind for equities.

Figure 1 is a weekly chart of the S&P500 and the indicator is shown in the lower panel. This week's value isn't reflected in the indicator until Friday's close, but if the markets closed right now the indicator would be at the extreme zone. If you had been so smart to only "buy" the S&P500 during those times when the indicator was extreme, then you would get those trades seen in figure 1. Winning trades are in green; the losing trades are noted by the red trend line. Since the March, 2009 low, the indicator has been at or in the extreme zone 6 times. If you bet long on the S&P500 when the indicator was extreme, these 6 trades resulted in 3 losses (-4.99%, -2.24%, -0.78%) and 3 wins (1.06%, 0.35%, 0.04%). The winning trades essentially were multi-week trading ranges for the S&P500. During the past 12 months when the indicator was in the extreme zone, the S&P500 either went down or side ways.

Figure 1. S&P500/ weekly

For a more comprehensive look at this indicator and how stocks under perform when the indicator is extreme, I refer you to the following articles:

Over the past many months, I have spent much time on this blog writing about US Treasury bonds. Treasury bonds have become a tale of two diverse stories, and both stories have the potential to be secular or generational in nature.

The case for higher yields or lower Treasury bonds goes something like this: 1) higher yields are expected as the recession ends and the economy picks up steam; 2) higher yields are expected as the Federal Reserve maintains a loose monetary policy beyond all reasonable expectations; 3) higher yields are expected to attract buyers of America's massive debt issuance; 4) higher yields are expected as American debt competes for buyers with other issuers of sovereign debt; 5) Treasury bonds have been in a 20 plus year bull market - isn't it time for this "bubble" to end?

The case for lower yields or higher Treasury bonds goes something like this: 1) the recession and credit contraction is all about deflation - not inflation; 2) Treasury bonds are a safe haven especially with the economy still teetering and the stock market essentially flat since November; 3) for investors, the secular winds of capital preservation are beginning to take hold - the mantra is a return of my principal as opposed to a return on my principal; 4) for American households Treasury bonds are an under represented asset class, but after two stock market crashes and as they near retirement age, investors are pouring money into bond funds at an unprecedented pace and in effect ignoring equities.

As mentioned above, the story of Treasury bonds has become the story of two very plausible outcomes and each outcome could be generational in nature. It should be apparent that many market heavyweights are aligned on both sides of the fence. Marc Faber and Nassim Taleb are calling for higher yields - it's the no brainer trade of the century. David Rosenberg and Hugh Hendry are for higher Treasury bond prices. The WealthTrack video presented the other day made this apparent.

Now we have an excellent article "Explaining the Secular Shift Towards Treasury Bonds". This is courtesy of Babak over at the Traders Narrative blog. The article essentially makes the case that it is the demand side of the equation that has become important in the Treasury market, and as Babak points out, "fund flows into fixed incomes have been positive at a rate that is almost beyond belief". The American household is deleveraging, and fiscal prudence is back in style. This is the secular shift towards income preservation.

As always, the question is how to play this? As explained recently, I have spent a lot of time writing about Treasury bonds and I have very little to show for my efforts. Treasury bonds have done nothing and in fact, I have taken my money off the table as I was long the the i-Share Lehman 7-10 Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: IEF), but with a close this past week below key support at 89.79, I moved to the sidelines. But despite this modest setback, I still believe the correct play is to be long Treasury bonds. To understand why, let me present a weekly chart of the i-Shares Lehman 20+ Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: TLT). See figure 1.

Figure 1. TLT/ weekly

The black and pink pivot points are our key pivot points and their values are labeled. These tend to be areas of buying and selling or support and resistance. Now if this was a chart of the equity market I would be buying hand over fist. Why? Look at the last key pivot point to the right of the chart (inside the gray oval). That level is support and price has yet to close below that level on a weekly closing basis. This pivot is 89.38.

But how do I know if that pivot will be the ultimate low? How do I know that it won't end up being like the key pivot point at 93.94 (down red arrows)? I don't know, but I do know that the most immediate key pivot point at 89.38 is support albeit it is support within a down trend. But this is a test of that support (i.e., double bottom), and there is a high likelihood of a reversal. Or to put it another way, the continuation of the down trend will only be confirmed on a weekly close below the key pivot point at 89.38.

But there is more. See figure 2 a weekly chart of the TLT. I have added two indicators to our chart in figure 1. In the middle panel is the Bullish Consensus from MarketVane. This looks at the number of advisers who are bullish on bonds, and as we can see from the indicator, advisers are very bearish on bonds and they are so to an extreme degree. The indicator in the lower panel is from the commitment of traders data and it represents the commercial or smart money or deep pocket trader. These folks are very bullish on bonds.

Figure 2. TLT/ weekly

So you say, "This is a no brainer. The "smart money" is bullish and the "dumb money" is bearish. I am betting with the "smart money"." Most of the time that is the correct thing to do, but there are always instances (across all asset classes) where we can point to the "smart money" or "dumb money" being wrong. The question is knowing when these investors are wrong. For example, think about the equity rally over the past year. We would have to say the "dumb money" was right and the "smart money" was wrong, and within that context we had our "moonshot" in equities starting sometime in July, 2009.

So the question becomes: when will we know that the "smart money" will be wrong and the "dumb money" will be right? The answer: a weekly close below the most immediate key pivot point at 89.38.

Let me summarize. Treasury bonds are in a downtrend. The key pivot point at 89.38 should serve as support, and one should be buying at this level despite the downtrend. One should be betting with the "smart money" and against the "dumb money". This is the correct way to play Treasury bonds. Go with the "smart money", not the "dumb money" and buy at support. If we are wrong, that's ok. We know when that will be, and then we can say that "this time is different". Of note, a weekly close over the 92.15 level would confirm a new uptrend.

For completeness sake, I have included a weekly chart of IEF. The important pivot point is at 88.67.

Figure 3. IEF/ weekly
Karl Denninger

Bondzilla Eats The Church

Well, maybe not yet, but....

Today, Members of Congress have an opportunity to set out on the road to recovery by agreeing to co-sponsor the Accurate Accounting of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Act. Authored by Representative Scott Garrett (R., N.J.), the bill would require that taxpayers receive an honest accounting of their exposure to the failed housing behemoths.

The Obama Administration has refused to provide such an accounting in its official budget, which is indefensible under traditional rules for government-sponsored entities. As the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) pointed out last month, since the government placed Fan and Fred in conservatorship and Treasury took controlling ownership stakes in 2008, "those actions make Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac part of the government and imply that their operations should be reflected in the federal budget."

Of course it's indefensible.

But heh, this is nothing new.  The biggest problem with these "factories" of housing BS games is that their balance sheets are about as transparent as a piece of plywood, they have a documented history of cooking their financial reports and they're raw political tools of people like Bwarney Frank.

I called for this when the government first provided "support" to these "institutions."  Frankly, they need to be shut down and put into run-off - it's the only thing that makes sense.  Those who argue that we "won't have a housing industry without them" are simply wrong - we will have a housing industry - a sound one, based on sound credit fundamentals, instead of a serial bubble machine that our government attempts to keep inflated even though it has already popped!

But short of that we must have transparency and accountability, and the only way to accomplish that is for the GSEs to be formally placed "on sheet" where we can all see exactly how ugly things really are.

Whether this provokes Bondzilla into waking up is an option question - frankly, I'm stunned that he hasn't already stepped on a few buildings.  Nevertheless no institution, including our government, deserves to get away with raw misdirection and outright accounting fraud.

Karl Denninger

This Is Some Odd Stuff (Bonds)

The 4-week bill auction had a jaw-dropper in it:

Note the indirect bidder and low yield amount.

Someone wanted to park $6 billion and was willing to take zero to do it.  $6 billion isn't that much money, all in, given that this category typically includes foreign central banks and such.

Is this particularly of note?  Well, given the bad confidence numbers, perhaps not.  But then look at the 13-week bill in the IRX...

Uh, what's that about?

The median for the 4-week bill was 0.04%, but the 13-week is trading at 0.12% or three times higher, and has spiked 40% today?

What?

The rest of the curve is getting smacked a good bit as well, but that should not surprise given the equity market action today.

Which way this resolves should be interesting.  Also interesting should be The Fed's reaction if the IRX keeps climbing...

Guy M. Lerner

Another Technical Update: TLT and IEF

One month ago, I looked at US Treasury bonds, and I was a bit more constructive than I had been in the prior 12 months. Technically, it had appeared that TLT and IEF had made reversals. So what has happened?


Absolutely nothing! Bonds have yet to get off their back and move higher. On the other hand, they have not moved lower. Do I get any points for that?

The analysis remains sound, and the key pivot points that I identified appear to be providing support as buying seems to surface when TLT or IEF get down to those levels.

For example, figure 1 is a weekly chart of the i-Shares Lehman 20+ Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: TLT). The key pivot point at 89.91 remains the line in the sand or key support level, where buying has surfaced. Conversely, a close back below 89.91 is bearish. I would become very constructive on TLT on a weekly close above 92.15, which is the next key pivot point or level of resistance.

Figure 1. TLT/ weekly

Figure 2 is the the i-Share Lehman 7-10 Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: IEF). 89.79 remains the key area of support here; therefore, a weekly close below this level is bearish. A weekly close above the key pivot at 91.25 suggests a run to $94 to $96.

Figure 2. IEF/ weekly

Ok, I know bonds aren't the most exciting, but in this "risk on/ risk off" market environment, I find them to be a good diversifier. But realistically, this position has yet to take off as expected, so in reality it has been dead money. On the other hand, I do find IEF and TLT to be in a good reward to risk position. I like the fact that most investors are betting on higher yields, so this is the opposite of that trade. Furthermore, buying against support is an "ideal" place to buy, and that's what we are doing here.

But maybe what I stated last month still applies as Treasury bonds are not going to attract much interest:

"How am I squaring the long term secular story for higher Treasury yields with the current and more intermediate term rise in Treasury bonds? We have been down this road several times in the past 12 months, and you have had to be very nimble to capture profits when betting on higher bond prices. Maybe this time will be different. Maybe the current reversal will result in a more tradeable rally for Treasury bonds. Regardless, we have our sign posts (i.e., key pivot levels) marked and we will interpret the price action as we go."
Karl Denninger

30 Year Auction: A Solid “F”

There's no other way to describe this:

Bad.  Actually, let's go worse than bad and call it what it is - by any definition this is just one step off from "Failed."

Yield was way over where it was trading at the time, as you can see here:

The more-worrying factor here is that we've got this "mystery" direct buyers out here again taking nearly 25% of the offered amount (who is bidding for that undisclosed?) and another 11% taken down by The Fed for the SOMA account.

Yet even with this Treasury had to pay up to get it to go and the bid-to-cover was anemic at best.

Given the Primary Dealer system we have in this country, any BTC under 2.0 is an effective fail.  To get an auction that behaves in this sort of fashion, complete with mystery direct bidders and heavy SOMA (Fed) participation, yet Treasury has to pay up in the form of a significantly higher coupon is not a good sign at all.

Remember folks, this sort of issuance isn't a local event.  It will continue through the year, as we are on track to run record budget deficits, so the premise that "it will all be ok and this won't start a ratchet up of rates on the long end" is perhaps more than a bit fanciful.

Rick Santelli gave the auction an "F" and I agree - there's simply no possible way to read this as anything positive at all, and that the equity market is ignoring it (other than a quick, small spike downward on the release) likely has more to do with how tightly equities have become coupled to the dollar in the last couple of weeks than anything else.

Over the past year, I have most often discussed the composite indicator constructed from the trends in gold, crude oil, and yields on the 10 year Treasury in the context of high readings. Collectively, when these trends are strong and rising, stocks tend to under perform. This has been the case over the past 25 years and over the past 10 months during this epic bull run. But what happens to equities when this indicator registers a low reading - as in the trends in gold, crude oil, and yields on the 10 year Treasury are weak and falling?

Figure 1 is a weakly chart of the S&P500 with the composite indicator in the lower panel. With the recent sell off in gold, crude oil and yields on the 10 year Treasury (i.e., higher bond prices), the composite indicator is registering an extreme, low reading, and this may be a good sign for equities.

Figure 1. S&P500/ weekly

How good? Let's develop a strategy and run some numbers.

In this strategy, I will "buy" the S&P500 when the indicator is less than or equal to the green line on the chart in figure 1. I will "sell" the S&P500 when the indicator rises above this green line. The study will go back to 1984, and it will be frictionless as slippage and trading costs are not considered.

Since 1984 such a strategy generated 50 trades yielding 238 S&P500 points. Buy and hold netted 900 S&P500 points. 68% of your trades were winners, and the time spent in the market was only 10%. In other words, your strategy made 1/4 of buy and hold with only one-tenth of the time in the market. This is actually quite good because when you are in the market with this strategy, you are seeing your money grow at an accelerated rate.

The equity curve for this strategy is shown in figure 2. For the most part, the curve is appealing especially because of the nice 45 degree rise between 1984 and 1998. From 1998 to 2001, the curve is a bit choppy and then the curve peaks in 2006. After that, significant draw downs were seen especially during the market crash of September and October, 2008 when all assets became highly correlated.

Figure 2. Equity Curve

Now let's look at this strategy a little bit more closely, and to do this, we will look at the strategy's maximum adverse excursion (MAE) graph. See figure 3. MAE assesses each trade from the strategy and determines how much a trade had to lose in percentage terms before being closed out for a winner or loser. You put on a trade and if you are like most traders, the position will move against you. MAE measures how much you have to angst and squirm while you are in that position. Because once you close the position out for a loss or a win, you are done worrying about it. As an example, look at the caret in figure 3 with the blue box around it. This one trade lost 6% (x-axis) before being closed out for a 3% loser (y-axis). We know this was a losing trade because it is a red caret.

Figure 3. MAE Graph

The first thing we notice about this strategy is that over 85% of the trades had MAE's less than 4%. This is to the left of the blue line. That's extraordinary. You put on a trade and 85% of the time you don't even lose more than 4%. How sweet is that?

But let's look to the right of the blue line where we see that 5 out of the 50 trades had excessive (>10%) MAE's. I have labeled these trades and as you can see, 3 are from late 2008, and 2 are from other notable periods in market history. Of the 5 trades with an excessive MAE, one recovered to be a winner; 3 recovered slightly but still lost money; and there was one trade -look to figure 3 in the upper right corner - that lost 18% after a 24% draw down or MAE. Ouch!

So what conclusions can we draw so far?

One, from 1984 to 1998, when the trends in gold, crude oil and yields on the 10 year Treasury were weak and falling, this was a buying opportunity for equities. Inflationary headwinds -real or perceived - were non-existent and stocks continued on their bull market ways. This seems to be most pronounced from 1984 to 1998 or during a secular bull market.

Two, during times of market stress, like 1998, 2001 and 2008, it appears that all assets are vulnerable. Weakness is seen in stocks as well as gold, crude oil and yields on the 10 year Treasury bond (i.e., bonds go higher).

So that begs the question: is this indicator now flashing bullish or bearish? Based upon this data (as opposed to the recent sentiment data), I don't have an answer. It appears to be one of those situations where we won't know until we know. If this was a bull market, then I would state that "this is a buying opportunity"; I am bullish on the S&P500 for 2010, but it is more of a recognition that I cannot get too bearish on equities as the first major pullback where sentiment turns bearish (i.e., bull signal) will be bought. I would prefer to wait until that happens or at the very least, I could see taking a cautious or graded approach at this juncture - you don't need to go all in.

Lastly, let me just mention the other reason for concern here. Stocks and commodities remain highly correlated as all risk assets seem to move in lock step these days. Maybe the beating seen in commodities is only harbinger of what is to come for equities.

In any case referring back to figure 3, we note that any trade that loss over 5% (i.e., MAE>5%) had a high likelihood of not recovering. Failed trades lead to significant losses for the markets. And maybe that is the lesson here. If the S&P500 loses over 5% from Friday's close that should be a caution flag. On the other hand, lower prices will bring out the bears (i.e., bull signal) and it will be time to get long. Failure at that juncture - when sentiment is bearish - will be a more ominous sign for the markets.
Guy M. Lerner

To Risk Or Not To Risk

In many respects the current market environment can be broken down into a very simple construct: to risk or not to risk. To start this week, the risk trade is back on. Risk assets, such as stocks and commodities, are moving higher; safe haven assets, such as bonds and the Dollar, are moving lower. Last week, the risk trade was off. Safe haven assets outperformed as the risky assets went into a swoon.

From this perspective, the markets have yet to "figure out" if risk taking is warranted or not. Yes, equities have pulled back a bit and are now in bounce mode, but Treasury bonds are trading in a range, and the resolution of this trading range is likely to hold the key to the equity markets. Higher bond prices means that the risk trade is off; lower bond prices means that the risk trade is back on.

Let's look at a graphic example of what I am talking about. Figure 1 is a weekly chart of the i-Shares Lehman 20+ Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: TLT). Key pivot points are designated by the black dots within the yellow dots. What are key pivot points? Key pivot points are special pivot points as they are a pivot point low occurring at a time when investor sentiment towards an asset is bearish. Typically, these price levels are areas of buying or selling that result in either support or resistance.

Figure 1. TLT/ weekly

In a very basic sense, a weekly close above 93.94 is very bullish for Treasury bonds, and one should expect risk assets to be under pressure. A weekly close below 89.91 is bearish for bonds (i.e.,higher yields), and the risk trade is back on again.

From this perspective, the price action is constructive for higher bond prices. Those bullish technical tidbits include: 1) a double bottom; 2) a break of the black down sloping trend line (red down arrows) as formed by two pivot highs. A weekly close above 92.15 would be constructive for TLT, and a weekly close above 93.94 would be very bullish.

On the bearish side of the ledger, I would not get too worked up about lower bond prices until there is a break below 89.91. If this were to occur, it would likely result in much lower bond prices, and I would expect risk taking to be back in vogue.

Figure 2 is the the i-Share Lehman 7-10 Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: IEF). This bond ETF remains stuck within its range. Bullish technical tidbits include: 1) double bottom; 2) remains above key support at 89.79. A breakout and weekly close above the black down trend line and the 91.25 would be very bullish for IEF. A weekly close below 89.79 would suggest caution and weekly close below the double bottom at 88.62 would likely lead to much lower bond prices suggesting that the risk trade is back on.

Figure 2. IEF/ weekly

In summary, long term Treasury bonds remain range bound. A break of this trading range will provide clues as to the risk appetite seen in the markets.

Obama finds that the tides don’t listen to his beautiful speaking voice.  Foreclosures are being forecast to reach 3 mm in 2010 vs 282 mm in 2009 - remembering that banks are doing whatever they can NOT to foreclose and have to mark to market.  .Gov assistance programs are ending.  Debt loads remain high, and unemployment continues to take a toll. Delinquencies are rising sharply. Meanwhile, Moody’s says that the economy will die if .gov measures are withdrawn too quickly (read “at all” into that). I’m getting awfully tired of all these apocryptic warnings. Can’t “they” see the economic wasteland that is already all around us?

Meanwhile, the AIG hearings are showing that apparently no one was in charge even though Financial Armageddon was the expected outcome. Further, the mysterious NY FED was the source of an email lamenting that they would be unable to keep things secret from Congress due to the sheer number of fingers in the pie. TIck. Tock. Tick. Tock.

EQUITY

Asia was red. Europe is GREEN *(except for Switzerland - how’s that CHF doing? Looks stronger. We have a correlation!) .  The DAX is putting in a floor with apparent overhead resistance at 5600.  All sectors are green except Telecom. This suggests an up day initially for the SPX. The green is between 1% and 2%, so not too shabby.

This is the last trading day of the month, but portfolio window-dressing is already done. Today could be a low volume tug-of-war, it seems. Volumes on the ES have been accelerating since the start of the year and are up around 3.0 mm per day (24 hour less lock up).  SPX volumes remain subdued.

Yesterday, the SPX put a pin down through the 1086 floor - and closed blow it.  TD Pressure says that today should be an up day as it crosses back above the oversold signal line. I’m more interested in the 5 DMA and how it has pushed SPX down. IMO, for an up day to hold and mean something, SPX would need to close above the 5 DMA - which right now is at 1092.55. The “Since AUg 17″ trend line is overhead at 1104ish, and the 50 DMA is still tracking flat at around 1114 - 1114.50 (our upper resistance level from eye-balling the chart).

ES gentle wound its way down until around 1 AM and has since, gently, retraced its way back up to the highs of the session. It looks like a “normal” overnight market with sellers dominating earlier, and buyers coming back in later - but no reindeer games. In this type of market, cyclic TA seems to work well, and we have a bullish cross on the 9 and 34 pMA on the 5 min ES chart. TD pressure has indicated a low risk buy at these levels, with pre-cautionary stop around 1079. I notice that this is just below the 34 pMA and a TD support level at 1080ish. If 1079 is penetrated decisively, then price exhaustion would become active down to 1074.50.  Given the bullish cross, and TD pressure - that is a big IF. Pivots:

  • R2: 1115 = would put SPX above the 1114 ceiling. Not impossible, but not likely, IMO.
  • R1: 1097 = Certainly would put SPX above the 5 DMA. Looks like it’s in the area of a lot of “peaking” activity over the last 5 trading days.
  • Neutral: 1085.75 = Put a stop to the rally into the close yesterday. Looks like ES wants to make it a base camp for an assault on R1. Not there yet though - and there is good resistance at this level. This is also above a lower trend line on the 4hr ES chart, beginning Aug 18 (With a touch Nov 2nd and 3rd, a near touch Oct 2nd, Sep 2nd).  So far that trend line is holding, unlike the one on the daily chart.
  • S1: 1068 = Site of the turnaround of the dip from late Nomember. Was also resistance back in the second half of September.
  • S2: 1056.50 = The gates to the abyss?

FX

Not much to say here. DXY is moving up, CAD is neutral, JPY, EUR, GBP are mildly weaker. Financial leaders in Europe are still telling us that a strong USD is in the best interests of everyone (who wants toilet paper in their wallet), and that Greece is not an issue. That’s twice they’ve denied it. Third time, and……. I’d worry more about California’s debt.

NEWS

  1. Bernanke hearing gets past cloture. Does the icy pain of betrayal by one’s elected officials ever grow numb?
  2. The PBOC is worried about inflation - now that they have let it out of the cage, it refuse to behave and they are finding it difficult to “manage the economy”. Who knew?
  3. Bankers are bitter at the absence of their annual wine-tasting in Davos and plot long sober hours on how to bring .gov back to heel.
  4. US GDP is expected to be driven by factory output, even as commodities are expected to fall.
  5. Greek bond yields come back in showing an improvement in confidence that there will be no bailout.
  6. The Gates-es do some more good and pledge $10 bb for vaccines for the poorest nations. Future consumers have to come from somewhere, he said cynically.

DATA

Here is the European data from this AM:

http://www.forexfactory.com/

Today is GDP and all the attendant sub-data at 8:30AM EST. 4.7% is expected vs 2.2% prior. Do you know why the saying is ” Buy the rumour, Sell the news”? It’s because traders /gamblers take a position based on their expectations of what the data point will show. When the data comes out, they close their position for a gain or loss. There is a built-in bias to the upside on the saying as well.

Note that Personal consumption is expected to be down to 1.8% from 2.8% prior (and yet GDP is supposed to double? - sure looks like a lot of inventory building is expected).

We also have these two little sleeper items:

  • 08:15 FRB Vice Chair Kohn on bank interest rate exposure
  • 10:30 Fed agency purchase (Oct 18, 2016 to Jul 15, 2032)

I got an email from the FED saying that they bought $12 bb of MBS in the last week, $12.5 bb gross - which suggests pre-payments of about $0.5 bb in the week. Not yet at the levels expected by the zero hedge article - but something nonetheless. I have seen about $2 bb difference between net and gross in previous months.

On the trading side, I see ES is leveling off its move upward. The 9 pMA is turning down - and is close enough to the 34 pMA to cross over in a bearish cross. However, it looks like flat slow waves into the data. Nothing left now but the white knuckles and grinding teeth of those betting on the numbers. The TA shows more downside support than overhead resistance, all in all, on the 5 min ES chart. It sure looks like a consolidation before a move up. Swim with the current if you’re gambling.  Watch out for the volatility in this news. I’m sitting on my hands until afterwards.

HERE IS A LINK TO MOLE’s POST FROM LAST NIGHT:

http://evilspeculator.com/?p=14397


In times of crisis, leaders often look for an enemy to distract the great unwashed from the growing problems. The President of the US has decided that it should be the Legislature. Bernanke, it seems, has been lobbying senators to keep his job.  The great contradiction yesterday was Geithner saying he had nothing to do with the AIG decision, and a later witness (I forget the name) saying that he signed off on all the AIG transactions.

In the meantime, it’s official: The FED has declared that we are in a recovery. It must be. Ford was profitable in accounting-world. More importantly, this means that lquidity backstops and MBS purchases shoud be on the way out. In my opinion, the risk market has only risen due to that “rising tide”.

China tells the world that there is NO inflation in its country. Clearly, their Central Bank is cloned from Greenspan and the FED who cannot see a bubble when it’s coming out their noses. It seems in Greece that on top of death and taxes, the only other certainty is bribes. Businesses are making decisions to avoid or minimize the amount of payoffs they need to make to do business there. Irony of irones, a judge in Ireland tells a debtor, “But you will appreciate that when parties enter a legal arrangement, if someone loans you money, you have to pay it back.”  German unemployment increase was less than expected. Consumer confidence remains at its previous levels (low, if there are any doubts).

It’s just another day watching the hands of time tell lies. Welcome to the broken clock.

EQUITY

The world is green. Only Canada and Latam are showing red on the Wheel of Fortune. Even the PIIGS are getting a bid this AM. Obama may not be much - but he sure can give a speech! The DAX gapped up at the open, but has been selling off since and almost closed the gap. It looks like a bearish flag being put in.  The current level, around 5660 looks to have been support all th way back to September. It must be the DAX equivalent of SPX = 1086. Industrials, Health Care, and Utilities are the only RED. Materials and Financials are leading.

SPX put a pin through 1086 yesterday, which seems to have lit a fire under the buttocks. It went on a tear upward, to be stopped at the 5 DMA. So far it is looking like a small gap up at the open, but the lying Durable goods number comes out this AM, along with jobless claims. You can be sure that there are a number of gamblers with money on one side or the other - and the low volumes make the swings particularly dangerous.

Today, the “Since Aug 17″ trend line is overhead at around SPX = 1103. The 50 DMA is overhead at the visual resistance point of SPX = 1114. SPX = 1086 has held again (For the 6th time, more or less, since going above on November 9th).

If you look back to SPX daily in 2003 - 2004, you will see that after the ramp off of the bottom, there was a period of sideways range-bound activity from around January 2004 until October 2004, with the TA indicating on each down leg that it migh head lower. My expectation is for similar action for the next few months until liqididty begins to be taken out of the market. One of the reasons is that I believe that the big money has to do distribution - and what better way than to bring in the SHORTS and sell to their panic covering?

One final note on the big picture: On a weekly basis, the trend lines have been clearly broken. TD has a technical support line at 1069.30. If the trend line is to be re-tested (and they don’t have to be before a drop), then SPX = 1121 could be a possibility.

ES rose overnight on Obama’s eloquence, and began a slow sell-off when the silver spoon turned back at midnight. TD has a technical support level (and it was the base for the overnight rise) at ES = 1096. The resistance level is at ES = 1102 (SPX = 1106ish, I believe).  Looks like range-bound trading until 8:30AM EST, to me.

  • R2: 1107.50 = Also the potential target for any momentum, since TD has a price exhaustion level there on the 5 min chart.
  • R1: 1101 = Moving above this and retesting from above would activate the 1107.50 price exhaustion level and make it an active target.
  • Neutral: 1089.75 = Site of some noise into the close yesterday. Looks like it was resistance and support both over the last week or so.
  • S1: 1083.25 = ES analog to SPX = 1086, more or less. Definitely not the Maginot line.
  • S2: 1072 = Looks like this was the area for a lonely pin at the end of November. It was also resistance on the way up in the second half of September. If SPX = 1086 is breached at some point in the future, I believe that this would be where the bulls would come in to force short covering. (remember Jan - Oct 2004!).

FX

Looks like DXY is going to get a bit of a rest after avoiding the double top.  The 50 DMA at 76.82 looks like a solid longer-term support level, and TD technical support is there as well. The EUR is resisting falling below 1.40 - money is on there being some option bets around that level.  On the 30 min chart, DXY found some support at the pivot at 78.63 - but it hasn’t been able to hold above the last high at 78.814. Lower support is at the pivot at DXY = 78.41.

CAD and GBP are stronger. EUR is flat (more or less), JPY is weaker. Yet the DXY is up. Is it the mightly CHF?  It is weakening. Are those the BIS footprints at the crime scene?

NEWS

Economic recovery is underway in the USA. There is no inflation in China. Russia says that it doesn’t expect country issues in Europe to have an effect on the Euro. Japan says that it won’t suffer a double dip in the first calendar quarter. I can hold my breath for an hour.

Sales of floating-rate corporate bonds are falling off, suggesting that there is less of a worry by investors about inflation. The market seems to believe that rates are going to stay low for a while. Don’t they understand that the FED has been buying Treasuries and that when liquidity is withdrawn, rates will ramp?

Brace for more useless spending as Obama is making jobs his top priority (what was it before?). Nokia shares surge 16% - let’s party like it’s 1999.

DATA

8:30AM EST = Durable goods (remember the fudging last time) at 20% expected versus the adjustment to -0.7% prior.  If I were going to fudge, I would make a statistical adjustment because not many would notice the downward movement that would make the next period positive. Watch out for low-flying reindeer games.

Also, Jobless claims and continuing claims - which has become a bit of a snore-er. 450K expected vs 482K previous. Expect a thrilling appearance by the Birth /Deaths model that attempts to simulate small business activity.

ES is coming up to the top of its overnight range. I like the idea of swing trading between 1102 and 1096.  I would put a stop just above ES = 1103, and look to come back in short around 1107.50;

If we get down to 1096, depending on TA at the time, a trade going long with a stop below 1095 looks like a decent risk /reward trade - with upside around 1101. BTW, the 9 pMA has crossed the 34 pMA on the 5 min chart indicating a bullish cross - even as ES bumps against the pivot at 1101 with TD technical resistance just above at 1102.


“Investors who rushed into government-guaranteed debts in 2008-2009 in the belief that AAA-rated governments would always pay the interest on their debts and repay the creditor in full upon maturity could be in for a rude awakening sometime in the next 5 to 10 years.”

in Digital Journal

Marc Faber is an international investor known for his uncanny predictions of the stock market and futures markets around the world. Dr. Doom also trades currencies and commodity futures like Gold and Oil.
“The following crisis is likely to be in sovereign debt, because interest payments on government debts could reach between 35% and 50% of government revenue in 10 years. In my opinion it’s beyond repair. If the US were a corporation and had proper accounting, they would be "Triple C", nobody would buy their bonds.

Having said that, in the near term I think the dollar could rally because the others are no better, the others are worse. I think that the dollar will rally now against the euro and against the pound sterling and probably against the yen.”

Marc Faber is an international investor known for his uncanny predictions of the stock market and futures markets around the world. Dr. Doom also trades currencies and commodity futures like Gold and Oil.
Guy M. Lerner

Some Interesting Reading

Here are several articles that I have read over the last two days that I thought were noteworthy.

The first is an editorial from the Wall Street Journal by John Bogle, who is the founder and former chief executive of the Vanguard Group. Mr. Bogle is an investor (as opposed to a trader) and a big idea kind of person who has the interest of investors on Main Street. I believe Mr. Bogle is sincere when he talks about "Restoring Faith in Financial Markets".

The second article comes from Gary Shilling via SafeHaven: "2010 Investment Strategies: Six Areas To Buy, 11 Areas To Sell". Mr. Shilling gives the case for investing in Treasury Bonds and for a higher Dollar. These are two assets that I have recently focused on as well.

I am not into overload with useless data, but I thought these commentaries were worthy of your attention!
Guy M. Lerner

Technical Update On IEF And TLT

When we last looked at longer term Treasury yields, I stated that longer term Treasury yields were likely to undergo a secular trend change from down to up, but I had reservations because significant resistance was overhead, sentiment was too bullish for higher yields, and Treasury yields were greatly overbought. Honestly, last week I was not sure which way the bond market was going to go but I did offer up a game plan. This article will review the game plan that now has me more constructive on bonds or bearish on Treasury yields.

Figure 1 is a weekly chart of the i-Shares Lehman 20+ Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: TLT). Key pivot points are designated by the black dots within the yellow dots. What are key pivot points? Key pivot points are special pivot points as they are a pivot point low occurring at a time when investor sentiment towards an asset is bearish. Typically, these price levels are areas of buying or selling that result in either support or resistance.

Figure 1. TLT/ weekly

Despite the bearish implications of price closing below 3 key pivot points, I did state that I would be more constructive on long term Treasury bonds if TLT closed above the key pivot low point at 89.91 on a weekly basis. This is likely to happen at the close of trading today. This level, which was resistance, now becomes support, and it should be noted that a weekly close back below 89.91 is bearish. I would become very constructive on TLT on a weekly close above 92.15, which is the next key pivot point or level of resistance.

Figure 2 is the the i-Share Lehman 7-10 Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: IEF). Three weeks ago IEF closed the week at 88.60, which was 2 cents below the key pivot low point. Last week, this level was recaptured and suggesting that this is a significant level of support. This is constructive suggesting a reversal was in the works, and this week's close above the key pivot point at 89.79 is bullish. 80.79 is now support, and a weekly close below this level is suspect. A weekly close above the key pivot at 91.25 suggests a run to $94 to $96.

Figure 2. IEF/ weekly

How am I squaring the long term secular story for higher Treasury yields with the current and more intermediate term rise in Treasury bonds? We have been down this road several times in the past 12 months, and you have had to be very nimble to capture profits when betting on higher bond prices. Maybe this time will be different. Maybe the current reversal will result in a more tradeable rally for Treasury bonds. Regardless, we have our sign posts (i.e., key pivot levels) marked and we will interpret the price action as we go.

I thought that the effectively-zero bill rate auctions were all about window dressing for the banks on their year-end "balancing"?

Then what's this about?

13 week bill at FOUR basis points, and the 26 week bill at THIRTEEN, with bid-to-covers over 4.0 - that is, for every dollar of offered 13 or 26 week debt there were FOUR bidders, essentially all of it "primary dealers" (big banks)?

Ok, 'splain this: Why are the "too big to exists" parking money with Treasury - and a hell of a lot of it too - at effectively zero interest?

We're talking about $28 billion here - this is not small potatoes.

Is this simply "we have nothing productive to do with the money and we're frightened of higher interest rates" or do these bankers smell smoke?

Guy M. Lerner

Inflation Pressures Heating Up, Again!

The composite indicator that measures the trends in gold, crude oil, and yields on the 10 year Treasury will end the week in the extreme zone, and this should be a headwind for equities. Inflation pressures, whether real or perceived, are heating up. See figure 1 a weekly chart of the S&P500 with the indicator in the lower panel.

Figure 1. S&P 500/ weekly

The rally that began in March, 2009 has stalled every time this indicator has hit the extreme zone. These are shown by the trade signals in figure 1. During this rally and over the past 25 years, strong trends in gold, crude oil, and yields on the 10 year Treasury have been a headwind for equities. I recently reviewed the use of this indicator as a filter for a simple moving average strategy in our series on developing a trading strategy. I would also recommend reviewing the article "The Faber Model and Inflation Pressures". Once again, this filter improves the efficiency of this simple trend following model.

Lastly, let me make a comment to those readers who are looking for an indicator that calls every market turn all the time and it does so with the utmost of precision - the proverbial holy grail. If you are one such person, then this indicator is not for you. But in the imperfect world of the market or in a world where we try to apply order or structure to randomness, this indicator is pretty good in my opinion - and it makes sense. Hopefully and this is a word I don't like to use in my investing, these precuations will prevent us from losing dollars and cents over the next couple of weeks.
Guy M. Lerner

What Could Be The Catalyst?

As the prior post implied, Treasury bonds are at one of those "critical" junctures. If they continue lower (i.e., yields head higher), it would seem to suggest improvement in the economy. If bonds find a bottom and reverse higher, which is entirely possible as well, then the economic outlook still remains a bit murky. Nonetheless, the old adage that the "technicals break with the news" may apply here.

According to this article over at ZeroHedge there is a good possibility of stronger than expected economic news with Friday's job report, and this could be the catalyst that finally catapults yields higher. It is well worth reading. I don't have an opinion either way but I did present my plan in the prior article.

How equities react is another matter entirely as they appear to be pricing in all sorts of good news. Good economic news may see yields increase but stocks decrease as market participants worry about the withdrawal of Fed stimulus and higher interest rates.


Guy M. Lerner

Treasury Bonds In The Balance

As I have been chronicling for better than a year now, longer term Treasury yields have a high likelihood of undergoing a secular trend change from down to up. See figure 1 a monthly chart of the yield on the 10 year Treasury (symbol: $TNX.X), which has served as our proxy for the long bond.

Figure 1. $TNX.X/ monthly

The indicator in the lower panel is the "next big thing", and this suggests that yields have those technical characteristics of an asset that are typically seen at the bottom of a prolonged downtrend just prior to a secular trend change. If we go back about 9 months, we have the break of the down sloping trend line; this is at point 1 on the chart. This is bullish especially within the context of the "next big thing" indicator being in a position where trend changes occur. A month later at point 2, prices closed above the prior pivot low point at a yield of 3.432%. This also is bullish. Prices did not hold beyond a month, and yields fell back below our pivot point of 3.432%. This inflection point was resistance for 5 months until yields closed the year back above the 3.432% mark and above the down sloping orange trend line; this is point 3. Once again, this is bullish price action.

However, turning to the weekly chart, I must give some pause. See figure 2. The indicator in the lower panel looks at the 52 week rate of change of the yield on the 10 year Treasury bond, and that value is then wrapped in dynamic trading bands. These trading bands use a 104 week look back period, and readings outside of the bands are 2 standard deviations outside the norm. The current indicator value is not only outside the bands, but it is the highest value in almost 50 years! That is extreme.

Figure 2. $TNX.X/ weekly

Now here is the trick and this is key: if you have been around the markets for awhile, extremes can mean revert or they can indicate a break out and the start of a new trend. So at this juncture all I have is an issue that has moved very far and very fast over the past 52 weeks. I am very mindful of the bigger picture on the monthly chart and the significance of trend line breaks when the "next big thing" is in its current position. Furthermore, let me remind you that not all price moves end up being tradeable. Refer back to figure 1 where I labeled the 2004 to 2007 up trend in Treasury yields; despite the persistence to go higher, this was a choppy trend. So my first concern is the extreme overbought reading, but as stated, overbought can be good too.

My second concern is seen in figure 3 another weekly chart of the 10 year yield. The pink labeled price bars represent negative divergence bars between price and an oscillator that measures price. The indicator in the lower panel measures the number of negative divergence bars occurring over a certain time period. When the indicator is red it is identifying a cluster of negative divergence bars, which typically indicates slowing upside momentum and the possibility of a market top. In fact, this was pretty much the case for yields on the 10 year Treasury from the 1980's to the current time, and as you can see, the last occurrence of this cluster was in August, 2008 prior to yields unraveling.

Figure 3. $TNX.X/ weekly

Three things are important about this cluster of negative divergences: 1) the current yield is right at the highs of this cluster of negative divergences; yields haven't rolled over but they have not broken above this resistance area either; 2) in the 1970's, which was the last bear market in bonds (or when yields went appreciably higher) these clusters did not end the trend but only slowed it down; in a previous article, I remarked that we would know that the trend for higher Treasury yields is for real if this resistance zone was easily taken out; 3) breaks over resistance areas formed by negative divergences can lead to accelerated price moves; we have seen this over and over again in the equity markets for the better part of the past 6 months.

My third concern is bond market sentiment, and this can be seen in figure 4 a weekly chart of the yield on the 10 year Treasury bond. The indicator in the lower panel looks for extremes in the Market Vane Bullish Consensus data for Treasury Bonds. When the value is low and below the lower trading band, it generally signifies a top in Treasury yields. That is how it is suppose to work unless it is 1994 to 1995 or 1999 to 2000 when yields rose in spite of the very bearish sentiment for bonds. The current value is below the lower trading band, and this means investors are too bearish on bonds or too bullish on yields.

Figure 4. $TNX.X/ weekly

But as stated above and as we know from this year's stock market, extremes in sentiment don't always lead to turning points, and in fact, the increase in yields during the 1994 to 1995 and from 1999 to 2000 saw lots of bullishness for yields. Yet, yields still went higher!

So let's stop and summarize the technical picture. Yields on the 10 year Treasury have moved an extreme degree and are currently hitting a "key" resistance area formed by multiple negative divergences. Sentiment, which works "most" of the time, is too bullish on yields. None of this suggests an imminent reversal, but it is the current state of affairs. The longer term monthly picture is more bullish, but in light of the weekly picture, I wonder if we are going to get a picture similar to 2004 - 2007 that was characterized by spiking yields followed by months of downward yield pressure.

On a fundamental basis, higher yields appear to be implying an improving economy although most would agree that higher yields are bound to choke off any recovery. Higher yields could also remain persistent as long as Dollar devaluation and inflation remain a concern, but the downtrend in the Dollar appears to have played itself out for now, and in an economy still under the weight of a credit contraction and deleveraging, most would agree that inflation is far off in the future. So may be higher yields are signaling an improving economy.

So the question in my mind is this: how do we resolve these issues?

For this I need to introduce what I call the "key" pivot point. Key pivot points are special pivot points as they are a pivot point low occurring at a time when investor sentiment is bearish (i.e, bull signal). Why are these key areas? Well think about it for a second. Sentiment gets extremes and prices should bounce higher and a pivot low point is formed on the chart. Typically, such price action will represent the low. However, failures do occur despite the extremes in sentiment, and prices can trade back below these key pivot points. It is these failures at the lows that lead to a reversal in the trend catching traders and investors off guard.

Let's look at a weekly chart (figure 5) of the i-Shares Lehman 20+ Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: TLT). The indicator in the lower panel looks at the Market Vane Bullish Consensus data for bonds, and the current reading is below the lower trading band suggesting bearishness towards longer term Treasury bonds. That is, investors are betting on higher yields. The black dots are pivot low points and the black dots within the yellow dots are our special, key pivot points.

Figure 5. TLT/ weekly

The key pivot point at point 1 was the bottom for bonds back in 2003, and this was retested at point 2 in 2004. In fact, prices at point 2 closed below the key pivot point from point 1 (prior support) suggesting lower yields, but this level was quickly re-captured and bonds moved much higher over the next year. Point 3 is a pair of key pivot points that are higher than key pivot point 2 suggesting a higher low and an intact bull market for bonds. Point 4 was a retest leading to the final blow off in TLT in early 2009.

Now we come to the 3 key pivots on the right side of the price chart. The close below the key pivot point at point 5 is bearish, but history would have us believe that caution is in order. The close below the key pivot point at point 6 is even more bearish for bonds, and the same can be said for the close below the key pivot point at point 7. In fact, a close below 3 key pivot points is a good sign of a secular trend change! (See this article on the Dollar Index.)

The picture is not looking good for bonds. Expect TLT to continue on a downward trend.

What would get me to change my tune on TLT? A weekly close above the key pivot point at point 7 at $89.91. Expect prices to flirt with this level. A weekly close above the key pivot point at point 6 ($92.15) would be a reason to become very bullish on TLT again.

Lastly, let's look at the i-Share Lehman 7-10 Year Treasury Bond Fund (symbol: IEF). See figure 6. The key pivot point at point 2 traded below the point 1 key pivot point, but once this level was recaptured, IEF moved higher. The same could be said for the point 3 key pivot point. The key pivot point at point 4 did not close below point 3, and this proved to be bullish. Once again, focus on the right side of the chart and we note closes below the prior two key pivot points, and this is bearish. Price has yet to close below the bottom most key pivot point at 88.62. A close below this level suggests a bearish picture for bonds (or higher yields) and IEF. If this level holds (or is recaptured later following a break below), then I would become very bullish on IEF on a close above the middle pivot point at $89.79.

Figure 6. IEF/ weekly


How am I playing it? I am still long IEF with a cost basis of $89.85; the position represents about 44% of my portfolio. I have recently added to this position at $88.62 recognizing that I will be gone from this trade on a weekly close below $88.62. It would have been nice to get out 5 weeks ago when prices closed below the most recent key pivot point, but things didn't work out that way. I am prepared to exit the trade on a close below $88.62. If prices close back above this level in the following week, I will likely re-initiate my long position. It may be a pain moving in and out of a position in this manner, but I look at it as good insurance.

From this perspective, Treasury bonds are at risk for a significant down trend. To put it another way, Treasury yields could finally be going significantly higher. The price action around these key pivot points needs to be followed closely as we are in an area where new trends develop.
Karl Denninger

Uhhhhh… Ok, Keep Buying Fools

Following up on the earlier ticker....

Yeah, it's a great idea.

Yeah, ok, there's nothing going on here.... no problem with corporate credit, whether high yield or otherwise.  Seriously, trust us.

There's no need to worry or rush the door - that's not smoke you smell, it's the guy over there by the punch bowl with a bong.  Really, come on over, buy some more stocks and enjoy the party!  First hit is free so long as you buy 1,000 shares of SPY along with a bunch of GS, BAC and JPM!

Karl Denninger

Carnage Continues: PHK (Who Smells Smoke?)

The "rumor on the street" at the time of the dump in PHK a few days ago was claimed to be a "fat-fingered" trade.

Uh huh.

Let me guess.  We've had three fat-fingered days in a row, right?  The first one which was an honest mistake, and now two days of follow-up which were also honest fat-finger mistakes?

Pretty impressive to lose all of the gains since October - in three days.

Of course this isn't being discussed on CNBS, nor the real reason for it, nor is anyone calling out those who disseminated the "claim" that this was a "fat-finger" mistake originally.

Yeah.

This is high-yield debt by the way.  A PIMCO fund on top of it.  Closed end, and yes, it does trade at a rather insane premium to NAV, but closed-end funds have a habit of doing that.

But gee, here we are in the New Year, the selling continues at ridiculous volumes compared to the historical average, and in a market where the DOW is up 160 points this issue is down another 5% today.

Who's whistling past the grave here?  If there's a problem with the constituents in this fund then one has to ask if this is an "isolated incident" or whether it implies some really ugly things around the corner in the credit markets.

If you remember we had "little signals" like this back in 2007 - just before everything went totally to hell.  Anyone remember this?

That's from 2007.  There were a few "signals" in this fund during that year.... and of course we all know what came next.

If this is fund-specific then why is it showing up in DPO too - erasing all the gains back to JULY?

Uh huh.  A 25% decline in less than 5 days eh?

I'll go out on a limb here a bit: The "fat finger" claim IS A LIE and there's something nasty brewing here that, as is the usual practice, has been leaked to certain "privileged" players in the market.

You're welcome to believe this won't infest and reflect into the broader marketplace.  I believe, as has been the pattern over the last several years, one ignores signals like this at considerable peril.

You, the ordinary trader and investor, will never be "cut in" on the deal and given the opportunity to get out before the curtains are on fire and people start succumbing to the smoke, and those who both leaked whatever inside information there is and who traded on it will not go to prison for doing so.

Nor will the "mainstream media" investigate this and report on it.  Not on CNBC, not on Bloomberg, not in the Wall Street Journal, NOWHERE.

Your only defense is to look for signals like this and get damn defensive when you see them - right or wrong - because someone who has more information than you do certain as the sun rising in the eastern sky is doing exactly that.

Guy M. Lerner

The Next Big Thing

Let's talk shop.

The "next big thing" indicator was developed to help identify those assets that are most likely to undergo a secular trend change from bear to bull. The indicator looks at those technical characteristics that are mostly frequently found at market bottoms prior to the change in trend. The indicator is unique in that it just doesn't rely upon the "oversoldness" of an issue (i.e., the y axis) but it also tries to assess how long (i.e., the x axis) the current down trend has gone on. The indicator also incorporates such things as counting the number of positive divergence bars over the prior year as positive divergences between oscillators (i.e., stochastics, MACD) that measure price and price itself tend to show up as markets bottom. The indicator also makes an assessment of how many consecutive years that an asset makes a negative return. This is a mean reverting feature as most assets rarely make more than two years of negative returns. In essence, the indicator tries to assess not only the extent to which prices are off their prior bull market highs, but also how beaten down investors have become as the downtrend (prior to a bottom and trend change) has gone on for such a long time.

A lot has gone into this indicator, and on a historical basis the indicator has a very good track record of calling major turns in not only equities but also in every major asset class out there. However, like any good indicator it is not perfect. There are false positives (i.e., bad signals) and the occasional missed signal. In addition, price confirmation is always important as the indicator only tells you that there is the potential for a secular trend change.

The major drawback to the indicator is that it is only applicable on monthly charts. This proved somewhat problematic at the March lows. For the S&P500, the indicator didn't actually get into position until the end on June when the the S&P500 closed at 919.32. It was the nature of the sell off and subsequent bounce that proved to be the problem. The sell off was steep enough (i.e., y axis) but it didn't prove to be long enough (i.e., x axis) in time. Furthermore, the absence of positive divergence bars owing to the "V" shaped bounce caused the indicator to lag.

But all wasn't bad for the "next big thing" indicator. Back on March 20, 2009, I wrote "Semiconductor Sector: Potential For Secular Run" and this was based upon the "next big thing" indicator. On April 16, 2009, I highlighted the retail, airline and housing sectors using the my "next big thing" indicator as the basis for my analysis. Since March 20, 2009, the semiconductor sector is up about 65%. Since April 16, 2009, the airline sector is up 83%; housing is up 23% and retail is up 52%.

So where am I going with this commentary? I believe that the "next big thing" indicator remains a useful tool. The indicator has limitations, but its usefulness appears to be in identifying those assets that have the potential for a market bottom and trend change from down to up. As you think where you want to put your money over the next 12 months, this information may help you formulate that plan. Once again, I would always use price confirmation (i.e., moving average crossover) to determine that the trend has truly changed.

With this in mind, I will present some charts of assets that I follow; the "next big thing" indicator is in the lower panel. I have put comments on the price charts.

Figure 1. $TNX.X/ monthly

Figure 2. $DXY/ monthly

Figure 3. Crude Oil/ monthly

Figure 4. Natural Gas/ monthly

Figure 5. S$P500/ monthly


Figure 6. Gold/ monthly

Tyler Durden

Frontrunning: December 30

  • Here comes Spain: Spanish banks start to unload property portfolios (WSJ) Some brilliant insight: "Accumulating properties also stopped a sharp drop in prices, avoiding the painful write-downs banks are required to book when the value of their assets falls." The FHA will not be reading this article
  • How uou like your strong euro now Europe? After two years of crashing banking systems and economic recession, the euro zone enters 2010 with a full-blown debt crisis (WSJ)
  • Treasuries set for worst year since 1978 as U.S. steps up sales (Bloomberg)
  • First Brazil now Russia: Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin says Russian stocks "too expensive", nobody cares (Bloomberg). In the meantime Templeton's Mark Mobius, who after a 104% rise is still down relative to 2007 (56% decline in 2008) says "If you compare Russian valuations now with other major countries, it’s not overpriced. There are still opportunities there" One wonders who is pitching their book
  • E-mails inside AIG reveal executives struggling with growing crisis (WaPo)
  • Just in case you thought the "recovery" was for real, GMAC to demand $3-$4 billion more from the Obama endless bailout fund (Bloomberg)
  • More debt supply on deck: $130 billion in Build America Bonds to be sold quickly as congress is set to change subsidy rules (Bloomberg)
  • Geely bid for Volvo makes Goldman-backed boss disregard Toyota (Bloomberg)
  • Paris plus Texas equals an American dream of striking oil in France (TimesOnline)
  • Fidelity and Vanguard lead list of worst performing mutual funds of the decade (Bloomberg)
  • Keeping the Yemen story on the front page: look for [WMDs/nukes/the great Kindle channel stuffer] to be found there soon to quite soon (Bloomberg, WaPo, NYT)

 

 

Marla Singer

Breaking the Glass Ceiling

Well, you sort of knew it was coming in some form or another.  That form happened to be the Banking Integrity Act of 2009.  Think of it as "Glass-Steagall II."

For the unwashed, and among other things, the original act created the FDIC and separated the practice of "investment banking" and "commercial banking."  The concept was intended to avoid the conflicts of interest that purportedly arose when the same Wall Street shark was responsible for both the growth of your long-term savings and the sale of securities (underwritten by self-same shark's bank, most likely).  It's effect was, as might be imagined, debatable.

Bloomberg reports today that the concept is, once again, making the rounds and points us to a document on Thomas:

Banking Integrity Act of 2009 (Introduced in Senate)

S 2886 IS

111th CONGRESS

1st Session

S. 2886

To prohibit certain affiliations (between commercial banking and investment banking companies), and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

December 16, 2009

Ms. CANTWELL (for herself, Mr. MCCAIN, and Mr. FEINGOLD) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

A BILL

To prohibit certain affiliations (between commercial banking and investment banking companies), and for other purposes.

      Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

      This Act may be cited as the `Banking Integrity Act of 2009'.

SEC. 2. RESTORING LIMITATIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AFFILIATIONS.

      (a) Limitation on Affiliation- The Banking Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. 221a et seq.) is amended by inserting before section 21 the following:

      `Sec. 20. Beginning 1 year after the date of enactment of the Banking Integrity Act of 2009 , no member bank may be affiliated, in any manner described in section 2(b), with any corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization that is engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation stocks, bonds, debenture, notes, or other securities, except that nothing in this section shall apply to any such organization which shall have been placed in formal liquidation and which shall transact no business, except such as may be incidental to the liquidation of its affairs.'.

      (b) Limitation on Compensation- The Banking Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. 221 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 31 the following:

      `Sec. 32. Beginning 1 year after the date of enactment of the Banking Integrity Act of 2009, no officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association, no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve simultaneously as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank, except in limited classes of cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may allow such service by general regulations when, in the judgment of the Board of Governors, it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member bank or the advice given to customers by the member bank regarding investments.'.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITING DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS FROM ENGAGING IN INSURANCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES.

      (a) In General- Beginning 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, in no case may a depository institution engage in the business of insurance or any insurance-related activity.

      (b) Definition- As used in this section, the term `business of insurance' means the writing of insurance or the reinsuring of risks by an insurer, including all acts necessary to such writing or reinsuring and the activities relating to the writing of insurance or the reinsuring of risks conducted by persons who act as, or are, officers, directors, agents, or employees of insurers or who are other persons authorized to act on behalf of such persons.

Welcome back to 1933.

The administration sure is learning how to take advantage of the Ritalin addicted, holiday sales overbonanza'ed (1% increase over last year's gruesome December performance surely must be terrific news) public. Not only did Obama hope the whole Fannie/Freddie BS would slip by unnoticed even as he paid the failed public servants over at the nationalized-in-perpetuity GSEs an insane amount of money, but this week the Cottonelle experts over at 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue tried to sneak a $118 billion in coupons and another $57 billion in bills, a total of $175 billion pieces worth of one-ply bidet replacements, for the last weekly auctions of the "noughties" (yes, apparently that is the name to this most recent lost decade, set to end in a few days. But don't worry Ben Shalom will be around to make sure its bubblicious legacy persists for much, much longer).

Amusingly, there is an increasingly acrimonious battle between the prop trading desks of bailout drama queens Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs over the future value of said Cottonelle substitute, the former seemingly believing that bonds are going much higher (with a report claiming that the 30 year is heading to 8% in 2010, who do you think MS' clients will be selling bonds to?), while Goldman getting increasingly nervous about the economy and having investors buy even more bonds with the 10 Year expected to somehow hit 3.25% (again, Goldman's prop traders will be happy dump said security to long-only idiot money).

The full breakdown of this week's action, which will see $101 billion auctioned off just today.

Below is an artist's rendering of what the last calm before $2.5 trillion UST 2010 $2.6 trillion in gross coupon supply ($1.8 trillion net) shitstorm looks like.

Tyler Durden

Whither China’s Vassal State

2010 will be a year of major transformations, punctuated by the following key escalating divergence: i) on one hand, the ongoing contraction of the US consumer will accelerate, because even as the stock market ramps ever higher (and on ever decreasing trade volume a 2,000 level on the S&P while completely incredulous, is attainable, but will benefit only a select few insiders who continue selling their stock at ridiculous valuations), household wealth will at best stagnate (as a reminder, an increase in interest rates "withdraws" much more household net worth, due to implied house price reduction, than any comparable boost to the S&P can offset), ii) on the other hand, China, which is faced with the ticking timebomb of continuing the status quo and hoping that US consumers can keep growing the global economy, or alternatively, looking inward at its own consumer class, and shifting away from its historical export-led model. The one unavoidable side effect of this prominent departure would be a renminbi appreciation, and a logical drop in the US currency, once the US-China peg if lifted (a theme opposed recently by SocGen's Albert Edwards, who sees the inverse as likely occurring). The main question for 2010 and beyond is whether this will be a gradual decline or a disorderly drop. And behind the scenes of all the bickering, jawboning and posturing, this is precisely what high level officials from both the US and China are currently negotiating. This will be one of the major themes that defines the next decade. Another phrase to describe this process is the gradual drift of US into a nation that is aware it is no longer the primary economic dynamo of global growth as China eagerly steps in to fill that spot.

Looking at the aftermath of the financial crisis, the two major consequences that will define US economic trends for an extended period of time, are the increasingly more frugal US consumer, whose savings rate is likely to increase gradually to the long-term low double digit average, and an ongoing outflow from equities into safer assets such as municipals, bonds and loans, as the maturing baby-boomers finds the volatility of the engineered equity market far too risky as they enter retirement age.

So with US consumption-led growth entering its twilight days, courtesy of assets that simply do not provide the kinds of returns that allowed for a savings-free lifestyle, what does this mean for Asia, and China in particular? Bank of America provides a good and succinct overview of the major historical themes that have defined Asian economics, and what the next decade will likely bring.

The essence of the Asian development strategy is to build manufacturing capacity for global demand. High savings rates allowed the needed investment in plants and infrastructure to be financed domestically. This strategy was pioneered by Japan in the 1950s and 60s, copied by the Asian “Tigers” (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) in the 70s and 80s, and by a host of other Asian countries in the 80s and 90s. What changed the game was China’s adoption of the same strategy. Exports have increased nearly sixfold since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This had a profound impact on the global economy – but it had an even more profound impact on the China’s own economy and labor market. We estimate that 150 million Chinese workers joined the global labor force and began producing internationally traded goods. (As a contrast, the US labor force is 154 million people.)


The integration of China’s vast workforce into the global economy is what tipped the balance. The transfer of jobs and production from the US, where personal and corporate savings rates were low, to China, where savings rates were high, gave rise to huge imbalances. Within a few years after WTO entry, China’s current account surplus became the world’s largest, mirrored by an even larger US deficit.




Currency appreciation would have reduced wages, profits, and the flow of savings, but China was unwilling to allow market forces to play out. Thus, thePBoC (China’s central bank)  intervened in unprecedented amounts, and the vast flow of Chinese savings was channeled  abroad in the form of foreign exchange reserves – mostly short-duration government debt and bank deposits. Essentially, China was financing its own exports by purchasing short-term debt. The bulk ofthat found its way into US markets, keeping interest rates low and setting the stage for the housing bubble.

And herein lies the rub:

The financial crisis delivered a clear verdict, in our view, on the limits to the Asian growth model. It no longer makes sense to pursue double-digit growth by lending cheaply to the US consumer.


Yet change would require less reserve accumulation or – put another way – allowing the currency to appreciate against the US dollar, to which it is now effectively pegged. China needs to manage this “exit” carefully. Moving too fast risks a dollar crisis, with a disorderly drop in the US dollar and a spike in US bond yields. Moving too slow risks a boom-bust cycle in China, with capital inflows and strong monetary growth rates putting upward pressure on asset prices and inflation.

As noted earlier, the transitioning from the status quo, which worked for many years, but is now no longer relevant for the PBoC, will be likely even more critical than Bernanke's decision on when to finally begin raising rates. Because while the latter is mostly concerned with asset-price inflation (and stoking it every chance he gets), the Chinese decision will determine not only interest-rate policy for the US for decades to come, but will decide how soon the US should prepare to accept the consolation prize of first runner up in the global economic leader category. While on an absolute basis the US Economy is still a clear outlier, the rate of growth exhibited by China makes it a virtual guarantee that the days for US economic hegemony are numbered (even more so with GDP determination which is whatever the Central Committee says it is). The only open question is when will China decide it is finally time to shift away from the export-led growth model to one which prefers its own consumers as the source of growth. This transition will likely be of historical importance: just as the inception of the US vassal relationship with China lead to a historic and unprecedented boom in household net worth, doubling to $60 trillion in the span of a decade, so shall the unwind have a comparable impact to the downside.

It is merely this moment that Bernanke and the administration are doing all they can to prolong as much as possible. Alas it may be too late, as China seems to have finally realized that in the global prisoner's dilemma game, it has taken the constant US defections for far too long enough. And with the benefits of perpetuating the charade at this point outweighed by the detriments, 2010 could just be the year when China decides it has had enough.

For much more observations on the US-China relationship, and what lies in store for both the dollar and the renminbi, below is the most recent China FX roadmap analysis from BofA.

 

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