Archiv für das Tag 'economy'

The Fed’s Flow of Funds report was released at noon, and showed a continuing healing of the household balance sheet:  Assets grew, liabilities shrank, so Net Worth improved.  Debt-to-income continued to decline (now 127%) from a peak of 136% (still much work to do here).  Even Owners’ Equity as Percentage of Household Real Estate continued its rebound off a hideous 34% bottom about one year ago.  (That chart, to my eye, really encapsulates all that went wrong; it’s a picture that really is worth 1,000 words.)

Here’s the down and dirty:

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The trendline for Debt-to-Income is at about 114% which, absent rising Personal Disposable Income, implies a need to shed an additional $1.5 trillion in liabilities.

 

A (bullish) wirehouse has come out with some observations, among them this troubling nugget:

Household assets rose 1.0%, or $657 billion, to $68.2 trillion. The rise in assets was driven entirely by financial assets – the continued recovery in the equity market. Household equity assets rose 4.6%, or $534 billion, to $12.1 trillion. Meanwhile, in a sign that the recovery in home prices may have run out of steam, the value of real estate assets fell 0.3% to $18.2 trillion.

I do not find it at all heartening that the “rise in assets was driven entirely by financial assets,” as it goes without saying that leaving our collective fate to the whim of the markets can prove a bit problematic (see: 2008).  It’s also disheartening — though certainly no surprise — that “the recovery in home prices may have run out of steam.”  And that’s coming from bulls!

If time allows, I’ll take a deeper dive into the report.  It is always chock full of goodies and among my favorites to dig into.

Invictus

An Epidemic of Laziness?

Paul Krugman, last Friday:

But that’s not how Republicans see it [unemployment benefits]. Here’s what Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, the second-ranking Republican in the Senate, had to say when defending Mr. Bunning’s position (although not joining his blockade): unemployment relief “doesn’t create new jobs. In fact, if anything, continuing to pay people unemployment compensation is a disincentive for them to seek new work.”

Dancing DeLay agreed:

Crowley pointed out that saying “people are unemployed because they want to be” is a “hard sell.”

DeLay responded: “Well, it is the truth.”

Without trotting out all manner of charts and graphs [BR: Ok, one chart] to demonstrate how absurd this position is, I’ll make one comment and ask a few questions:

Comment:  This position — at its core — essentially labels Americans as lazy ne’er-do-wells who’d just as soon live off society’s largesse than earn a living. Is that really a position any politician would want to take?  Does anyone else find that as offensive as I do?  Anyone know someone who’s living on UI and lovin’ it?

Question for Senater Kyl and Dancing DeLay:  How would you explain the epidemic laziness that apparently afflicts Americans exactly at business cycle peaks, which is then somehow miraculously cured at business cycle troughs?

Interestingly, the JOLTS data was released just yesterday, and we see that there are still well over five unemployed for every job opening (near the recent record of over six, though there was an improvement in the number of job openings).  The un- and under- employment rates speak for themselves.  Comments like these should really be beneath any reasonable level of civil discourse.  It is pathetic that they’re not.

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Barry Ritholtz

Recession Slang

Nice list of slang terms from the Christian Science Monitor that were birthed in this Recession:

10. Funemployment, n. The practice of enjoying one’s unemployment.

8. Staycation, n. Vacationing at home or near home because traveling further would be prohibitively expensive.

6. Madoff’d, v. To get ripped off in a particularly offensive fashion.

5. Recessionista, n. A consumer who has historically paid big bucks to look like a million bucks and who, unwilling to quit his/her fashion habit in the face of the recession. NOTE: I prefer the Kudlowian definition of the rare person forecasting a recession before the event in the face of good news ; (i.e, I was the lone Recessionista on Kudlow & Co. last night).

2. Permatemp, n. The condition of being permanently employed as a temporary worker.

1. Decruited, adj. To be fired from a position one has not even started yet.

I would add Recession Porn – an obsession with the darkest, ugliest charts, articles and anecdotes about the recession. As in, “I used to go to that blog all the time, but I got bored with all of the recession porn.”

Any other new words out there worth adding to the list?

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Source:
Recession slang: 10 new terms for a new economy
Tracey D. Samuelson, Taylor Barnes
Christian Science Monitor, March 8, 2010
http://www.csmonitor.com/Money/new-economy/2010/0308/Recession-slang-10-new-terms-for-a-new-economy

Floyd Norris looks at dividends, job cuts and asset prices, and assesses the return to normalcy:

“As the accompanying charts show, three disparate indicators — covering unemployment, corporate financial distress and stock market volatility — have gone from very high to a little below historical averages . . .”

Here’s the mandatory chart:

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click for larger graphic

courtesy of NYT

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Source:
After Jerky Swings, the Economy Begins to Look Nice and Boring
FLOYD NORRIS
NYT, March 5, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/06/business/economy/06charts.html

Invictus

Good Grief!

Unless you’re an idiot — like me — if you own a home, you probably should have grieved your property taxes over the last couple of years, maybe even more than once.  It’s almost a sure thing that your municipality has been assessing your home at more than what it’s worth — and that you’ve been paying your taxes on that inflated value.  (Many tax bills, like mine, include the value at which the municipality is carrying your property.)

I speculated that grievances, and the reduced assessments that I figured went along with them, were going to be yet another problem for already-strapped municipalities and that, given the state of the real estate market, this would play out nationwide.  Looks like perhaps I was wrong:

I live in a community of about 5,500 households and a smattering of commerical businesses.  Curious about what was going on with regard to grievances, I filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.  This is what I got back (all calculations are mine):

In 2008, there were a total of 227 grievances filed (ed. note: both residential and commercial; unknown the number of each).  Of the 227 grievances filed, a total of 64 assessments (28%) were reduced by the Board of Assessment Review.

In 2009, there were a total of 551 grievances filed (+143% over ‘08).  Of the 551 total filed, 41 assessments (7.5%) were reduced by the Board of Assessment Review.

Here are my three takeaways:

1)  That even in 2009 only 10% of property owners grieved their assessments.  The other 90% are apparently idiots like me.

2) That in 2008 only 28% of those who grieved got relief and,

3) That in 2009 only 7.5% of those who grieved got relief.  What kind of sick joke is that?

I suspect it’s possible that municipalities have been digging in, denying grievances in the hope of hanging on to one of their main streams of revenue.  After all, how far is the typical homeowner willing to go to shave some bucks off his tax bill?  Probably not all the way to court, with its attendant attorneys fees and inconveniences.

Any interesting stories out there?

The St. Louis Fed has made it official, at least through their lens.  The recession ended in June 2009.  As you read here first in January, late last year the St. Louis Fed discontinued the use of  recession shading (thereby signalling its end) in its graphs as of mid-2009.

They have now retooled their Tracking the Recession page to Tracking the Economy, and the default graphs are indexed to 100 in July 2009 (the economy’s apparent trough).

The accompanying note states (emphasis mine):

The horizontal axis reports the months before and after the most recent business cycle turning point. In the recession chart of Figure 1, corresponds to December 2007 while in the expansion chart month zero corresponds to July 2009.

We’ll eventually see if the NBER agrees with their assessment.

There seems to be widespread consensus that the recession ended in mid-2009 (even perma-bear David Rosenberg has acknowledged as much in recent notes), and perhaps, on a technical basis, it did.  However, with employment and income gains virtually nonexistant, it’s certainly a tough sell to the American public.

Barry Ritholtz

Q4 GDP = 5.9%

The 5.9% in line report (seasonally adjusted annualized pace) up from the original 5.7% report. Don’t be surprised if this gets revised down, like Q3 was . .  .

The revision shows final sales in the US were weaker than originally reported last month. Business investments and exports were higher, but Inventories were bigger (meaning, the reduction of inventory backlog was also slower). Nearly two thirds of GDP growth for Q4were changes in inventories — not final sales.

Rex Nutting points out that even with the big Q4 GDP, U.S. GDP was down 2.4% in 2009 — the worst showing since 1946 (down 10.9%). Rex also notes “In 2009, business investment fell the most since 1942, while imports fell the most since 1946.”



via Barron’s Econoday

Michael Panzner

Durable Goods: Less Than It Seems

This morning, the Census Bureau reported the latest data on new orders for durable goods. As usual, all eyes were on the ex-transportation component, which unexpectely fell 0.6 percent in January, sending economists scurrying to figure out why the economy is not doing what they said it will.

Admittedly, month-to-month changes don’t tell a whole lot. After looking through the data going back several years, however, one trend seems to stand out: the growing impact of public spending on the overall total. Although the relationship has been somewhat volatile on a monthly basis, it’s clear that defense-related outlays, for example, have accounted for an increasing share of orders for products that are expected to last more than three years.

During the last 17 years or so, the median value of the ratio of defense-related orders to the overall orders number has been 4.4 percent. However, since the recession began (in December 2007), the average has been 6.6 percent. Last month, it hit 8 percent. As with other areas of the economy where the government appears to be playing an important role, it’s worth bearing in mind that the “recovery” may not be all that it seems.

Barry Ritholtz

Japanese Point of No Return

Be sure to see Vitaliy N. Katsenelson’s Japan: Past the Point of No Return


President’s Speech

Presentation to the Burnham-Moores Center for Real Estate
School of Business Administration, University of San Diego
San Diego, CA
By Janet L. Yellen, President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco
For Delivery on February 22, 2010, 8 AM Pacific time, 11:00 AM Eastern
Download PDF Version (79KB)

The Outlook for the Economy and Monetary Policy1

Thank you, William. It’s very nice to see a familiar face and to receive such a gracious introduction. And it’s a pleasure to be here with you in beautiful San Diego. This morning, I will try to cover a lot of ground. I’ll survey the economic landscape, and give you my reading of the outlook for the national economy. I’ll also discuss the situation in San Diego and finish with some comments about monetary policy. In particular, I want to go over a matter that’s on the minds of many people right now: the Federal Reserve’s strategy for winding down the extraordinary measures taken during the financial and economic crisis of the past few years. My comments reflect my own views, and not necessarily those of my Federal Reserve colleagues.

Given the dismal economic news we faced for so long, it’s a great relief for me to report that the tide appears to have turned. We are seeing convincing evidence that an economic recovery is well under way. Still, as I’ll explain in greater detail in a few minutes, the fact that the economy is growing again doesn’t mean we’re where we ought to be. Far from it. In particular, the unemployment rate is unacceptably high, creating real hardship for millions of Americans. But, at least we’re heading in the right direction.

Let me start with the good news. Real gross domestic product, or GDP, the broadest measure of a country’s total output, has turned around impressively. It rose at a robust 5.7 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2009. That’s a very welcome change from the huge declines we saw during the recession. In fact, it’s the best gain in GDP we’ve seen in six years. If we were able to sustain growth like this, we would experience a vibrant V-shaped upswing like those that occurred following past severe recessions.

Unfortunately, I’m not at all convinced that a V-shaped recovery is in the cards. That fourth-quarter leap in GDP overstates the underlying momentum of the economy. Much of it was due to a slowdown in the pace at which businesses were drawing down inventory stocks compared with earlier in the year. Less than half of the fourth-quarter growth reflected higher sales to customers. Those sales did grow, but at a lackluster 2.2 percent. It appears that businesses are getting their inventories closer in line with sales, which is a good thing. But such inventory adjustments can be a potent source of growth only for a few quarters. I’d feel much more confident about the prospect for a sustained robust recovery if I saw evidence of more vigorous growth in actual sales.

On that front, the most recent data show consumers releasing somewhat their tight grips on their wallets. But that doesn’t mean that people have thrown caution to the wind and returned to their spendthrift ways. Indeed, my business contacts tell me the consumer mindset is still in a fragile state. Clearly, the big weight hanging over everyone’s heads is jobs. The current high level of unemployment is severely restraining income and undermining confidence as people worry whether they will have a paycheck in the months ahead. Even those with secure jobs may worry about their finances since debt burdens were near historic highs at the onset of the financial crisis and, since then, equity and house prices have declined sharply. At this point, households are actually paying down debt, a development that partly reflects the reluctance of banks to lend to households with battered balance sheets.

The housing sector appears to have stabilized, but here too I don’t see any signs of a sharp turnaround. New home sales and construction finally stopped falling last year and have been reasonably stable, albeit at very low levels, for several months. Existing home sales surged late last year in response to the homebuyer tax credit. But, the credit expires this spring, so this source of support won’t be around much longer. The housing sector has also been benefiting from the Fed’s policy of buying mortgage-backed securities. These purchases appear to have helped keep home finance rates low. But, the Fed is now in the process of tapering off these purchases and plans to stop them at the end of March. As support from Federal Reserve and other government programs phases out, there is a risk that the housing market could weaken again.

If the consumer and housing sectors aren’t up to the task of delivering a V-shaped recovery, can business investment spending do it? It’s true that, in past recoveries, business investment typically grew rapidly once the economy turned the corner. And, in the current recession, businesses sharply curtailed capital expenditures, so they will eventually need to rebuild capacity and replace old equipment. In fact, we have already seen a rebound in business spending on equipment and software, and recent indicators for this type of spending point to solid growth.

Arguing against too much optimism, however, is that businesses remain very nervous and exceedingly cost conscious. One of my contacts referred to a “scarring effect” in the wake of the recession that has left businesses focused on survival and leery of investing. Many businesspeople say they are concentrating instead on process improvements, keeping supply chains lean, waiting for purchase orders before they produce, and meeting increases in demand with higher productivity from their existing workforces. True, they are beginning to plan with greater confidence. But the watchword remains caution.

Even for those businesses ready to expand—especially smaller ones—financing remains an impediment. Credit is becoming more available, but terms such as collateral requirements can be onerous. What’s more, the crisis made businesses keenly aware that they can’t count on being able to get credit. Some of my contacts say they plan to keep more cash on hand, rather than investing it, as protection against a renewed credit crunch.

Meanwhile, commercial real estate remains a bleak spot and investment in nonresidential structures is likely to stay depressed for some time. The recession drove up vacancy rates for office, retail, warehouse, and other income-producing properties, severely reducing demand for new buildings. In addition, credit is tight. Lenders and investors are demanding extra compensation for risk, driving up commercial real estate financing rates compared with pre-recession levels. And the market for commercial mortgage-backed securities remains distressed, despite support from the Fed’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF. So, I just don’t see this sector contributing to growth for quite some time.2

Put it all together and you have a recipe for a moderate rate of economic growth, well below the spritely pace set in the fourth quarter. The current quarter appears on course to post growth of around 3 percent. I see the economy gradually picking up steam over the remainder of this year as households and businesses regain confidence, financial conditions improve, and banks increase the supply of credit. I expect growth of about 3½ percent for the year as a whole, picking up to about 4½ percent next year, with private demand coming on line to pick up the slack as government stimulus programs fade away.

In addition to some of the weak spots I already mentioned, a number of other factors are holding back recovery. First, even though the banking and financial systems are gaining strength, they still bear wounds from the financial crisis, and these will take a long time to fully heal. Second, losses on mortgages, commercial real estate credits, and other loans continue to mount, and the full weight of foreclosures and bank failures on the economy has yet to be felt. Finally, the Fed, as well as central banks in other countries, has faced limits in the amount of monetary stimulus we have been able to generate. That’s because we can’t push interest rates below the near-zero level where they’ve been for more than a year. To be sure, we’ve developed many innovative programs to make credit cheaper and more readily available. But, all in all, monetary policy can’t give the same kick to the economy that it delivered in past recoveries.

Earlier I noted that, even though the recession appears to be over, it does not mean that we are where we want to be. Even with my moderate growth forecast, the economy will be operating well below its potential for several years. Economists think in terms of what we call the “output gap,” which measures the difference between the actual level of GDP and the level where GDP would be if the economy were operating at full employment. The output gap was around negative 6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009, based on Congressional Budget Office estimates. That’s a very big number and it means the U.S. economy was producing 6 percent less than it could have had we been at full employment. That’s equivalent to more than $900 billion of lost output per year, or roughly $3,000 per person.

I’m afraid that the economy will continue to operate well below its potential throughout this year and next. Let me do a little math for you. The San Francisco Fed estimates that the potential level of output is increasing roughly 2½ percent a year due to growth in the labor force and increases in productivity. Hence, over the next two years, potential output will increase by about 5 percent. My forecast is that real GDP will increase about 8 percent during that period, or 3 percentage points more than potential output. This implies that the output gap will shrink from its current level of negative 6 percent to around negative 3 percent by the end of 2011. In fact, I don’t expect the output gap to completely vanish until sometime in 2013.

This brings us to a subject that is of paramount concern to all of us—the job situation. This recession has been very severe, indeed. The U.S. economy has shed 8.4 million jobs since December 2007. That’s more than a 6 percent drop in payrolls, the largest percentage point decline since the demobilization following World War II. The unemployment rate, which was 5 percent at the start of the recession, rose to around 10 percent in late 2009. The rates of job openings and hiring are also stuck at very low levels. These statistics represent a tragedy for our country, our communities, and each of the families and individuals who have had to cope with a loss of livelihood.

There is a glimmer of good news on the employment front. The pace of job losses has slowed dramatically and some indicators, such as gains in temporary jobs, suggest that we may be close to a turnaround in the labor market. I was encouraged to see the unemployment rate drop from 10 percent to 9.7 percent in January. Nonetheless, given my forecast of moderate growth and a shrinking, but still sizable, output gap, I expect unemployment to remain painfully high for years. The rate should edge down from its current level to about 9¼ percent by the end of this year and still be about 8 percent by the end of 2011, a far cry from full employment.

I should warn that there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding this forecast. In the past, a given level of economic growth produced a more-or-less predictable change in the unemployment rate. Historically, a pattern emerged in which unemployment declined by half as much as the difference in the growth rates of actual and potential GDP. This is commonly referred to as “Okun’s law” after the economist Arthur Okun, who first described this relationship back in the 1960s.

Let me sketch out how this should work. In my forecast, GDP growth exceeds the growth rate of potential GDP by 1 percentage point this year and 2 percentage points next year. According to Okun’s law, the unemployment rate should fall by about one-half percentage point by the end of this year and a full percentage point during 2011. These figures are in line with my unemployment forecast.

However, Okun’s law let us down big-time in 2009. Given that GDP was stagnant last year, the unemployment rate should have gone up by about 1¼ percentage points, according to Okun’s law. In fact, it shot up 3 percentage points. Understanding what happened last year has important implications for what unemployment does in the future.

Economists have come up with a number of possible explanations for why the unemployment rate rose so much last year. The first explanation for the failure of Okun’s law is that special factors not directly related to output growth may be pushing up the unemployment rate. One possibility is that the severe recession is fundamentally altering the labor market, shifting jobs away from such sectors as manufacturing, real estate, and finance to other sectors. This reallocation takes time. Until it is complete, we will see higher levels of unemployment. A second possibility is that extended unemployment benefits are artificially boosting reported unemployment rates because workers who collect unemployment checks may be saying they are looking for work even if they have given up. In the past, such people might not have said they were searching for jobs and would no longer have been considered part of the labor force and counted in the official unemployment statistics.

Still, there is little evidence that structural shifts in the labor market or extended unemployment benefits have had large effects on the unemployment rate. Take the unemployment benefits explanation. If true, we would expect to see a large increase in the labor force participation rate, that is, the percentage of people who are working or saying they are looking for work. In fact, currently, the labor force participation rate does not appear to be unusually high.

A second possible explanation is that last year’s enormous decline in employment was somehow an aberration. GDP was basically unchanged over the four quarters of 2009. But payroll employment fell by 4 percent over the same period. In other words, the economy produced roughly the same quantity of goods and services with 4 percent fewer workers, which translates into a 4 percent increase in output per worker. That’s a huge rate of productivity growth, well above estimates of the long-term trend in productivity gains that stem from such factors as improved technology. So, if we ask where Okun’s law went astray, we can see the fingerprints of this unusual pattern of employment and productivity last year. But that’s not the end of the mystery. What would cause employment to dive and productivity to soar during such a severe recession? And is it a temporary or permanent phenomenon?

Those who believe it’s temporary point to the unusual nature of this terrible financial crisis and recession. Its severity made employers believe that it would be a long time, if ever, before they would need as many workers as they previously had. The credit crunch may also have caused some to fear that they wouldn’t be able to borrow in order to meet their payrolls. These factors prompted employers to break from the normal cyclical pattern in which workers are laid off relatively slowly and some are kept in reserve in case demand picks up. In this scenario, workforces have been cut to the bone and perhaps beyond. Businesses were able to continue to produce the same level of output despite big cuts in their workforces by working their employees harder. But that can only go so far. If demand continues to increase and businesses become more confident, they will eventually begin hiring again. If so, productivity growth will slow and the unemployment rate will fall faster than usual, reversing its unusual rise last year.

There is an alternative explanation regarding the events of last year though that bodes poorly for rapid employment gains going forward. According to this view, last year’s large increase in productivity is here to stay. In that case, we won’t see a quick drop in unemployment and may be in for a jobless recovery akin to those in the early 1990s and early 2000s. This is closer to my view and broadly consistent with my forecast.

According to this perspective, the recession has forced businesses to reexamine just about everything they do with an eye toward restraining costs and boosting efficiency. Strapped by tight credit and plummeting sales, businesses have overhauled the way they manage supply chains, inventory, production practices, and staffing. Stores don’t order merchandise unless they think they can sell it right away. Manufacturers and builders don’t produce unless they have buyers lined up. My business contacts describe this as a paradigm shift and they believe it’s permanent. This process of implementing new efficiency gains may have only begun and we may be in store for further efficiency improvements and high productivity growth for some time. If so, the rate of job creation will be frustratingly slow.

I’d like to bring this discussion home now by talking a little about San Diego. Obviously, the area economy was hit hard during the recession, but it does seem to have weathered the storm better than many areas of California. And, significantly, the San Diego area has shown signs of a job market turnaround in recent months. Employment grew notably in October and the gains were largely maintained in November and December. To be sure, San Diego still has far to go. The unemployment rate was significantly above the national average in December, the most recent data we have.

San Diego is among the nation’s leading biotechnology centers and this industry has been a bright spot. Biotech accounts for about two-and-a-half times as great a share of employment and income here as it does nationwide. Biotech wasn’t entirely immune—if I may use that word—to the recession. But demand for medical services continued to expand and that supported the industry. It appears that local biotech employment has largely held up during the past two years. Makers of pharmaceuticals, medical equipment manufacturers, and providers of research and development services even registered significant employment gains. Moreover, growth should continue. After bottoming out in early 2009, venture capital spending has risen substantially, with an important share going to biotech.

The local housing market appears to be improving as well. Fortunately, San Diego never saw as big a subprime mortgage boom as Nevada, Arizona, and some other places in California. Nevertheless, home foreclosures have surged in the San Diego area, rising from under 1 percent in the fall of 2007 to slightly over 3 percent of existing mortgages in December of last year. The trend, though, may be heading in the right direction. Foreclosures declined slightly in San Diego in December, even as they continued to rise nationwide.

Overall, the San Diego economy will likely recover along with the national economy. At the same time, I would not be too surprised to see the recovery take hold here with a bit more vigor than in the nation as a whole for the reasons I mentioned a moment ago.

Let me move on to the outlook for inflation nationwide. You can get into quite a debate on this topic. Some people worry that sustained federal budget deficits and the huge increase in the Federal Reserve’s lending and stimulus programs could eventually lead to high inflation. Others take the opposite view, arguing that economic slack and downward pressure on wages and prices are pushing inflation down. I would put myself squarely in the second camp.

I’m no fan of persistently large budget deficits. I’ve warned against them throughout my career. But the real danger I see from them is not inflation. Rather, they may be harmful once the economy recovers because they are apt to boost interest rates and absorb private savings that would otherwise finance productive investments. This is potentially a serious problem in the long term that could reduce investment and lower living standards, although, in the short run, federal deficits have cushioned the blow from the financial crisis and recession. As far as inflation is concerned, there’s no evidence that big government deficits cause high inflation in advanced economies with independent central banks, such as the Fed. Japan is a case in point. Japan has run enormous fiscal deficits for many years and its government debt has risen to very high levels. Yet is has suffered from persistent deflation, not inflation.

I believe that the more worrisome challenge for price stability over the next few years stems primarily from the sizable amount of slack in the economy. Whether measured by the output gap, the unemployment rate, the manufacturing capacity utilization rate, or whichever measure you like, the economy is running well below its potential. As a result, inflation is already very low and trending downward. Over the past 12 months, the personal consumption price index, excluding volatile food and energy prices, rose a modest 1.5 percent. This increase in core inflation was below the 2 percent rate that I and most of my fellow Fed policymakers on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) consider an appropriate long-term price stability objective. And, with slack likely to persist for years and wages barely rising, it seems quite possible that core inflation will move even lower this year and next.

So where does all this leave Federal Reserve policy? Traditionally, the main tool of Fed monetary policy is the federal funds rate, which is what banks charge each other for overnight loans. The Fed controls that rate by varying the amount of reserves it supplies to the banking system and we have pushed that rate to zero for all practical purposes. This is as low as it can go. Such accommodative policy is appropriate, in my view, because the economy is operating well below its potential and inflation is undesirably low. I believe this is not the time to be removing monetary stimulus. Consistent with that view, the FOMC has repeatedly stated that it expects low interest rates to continue for an extended period.

Of course, in response to financial and economic emergency, the Fed has done a lot more than simply lower the federal funds rate. It has provided secured loans to banks and other financial institutions to make sure key credit markets were functioning. It is also in the last stages of purchasing $1.25 trillion dollars of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and $175 billion of the direct debt of these agencies. These programs were vital in preventing a complete financial breakdown, which would have done immeasurable damage to our society.

As financial and economic conditions improve, the need for such extraordinary support diminishes. Accordingly, the Fed has begun to phase out its emergency lending programs. Special lending programs for primary dealers in the Treasury securities market, for money market mutual funds, and for corporate short-term debt have already been ended. So too have we shut down special arrangements to make dollars available to foreign central banks. The Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the TALF, which respectively supported financial institutions and credit markets, will be largely closed next month.3 Finally, the Federal Reserve has readjusted the terms of its loans to banks and thrifts—so-called discount window lending. During the financial crisis, we encouraged depository institutions to borrow from us when they needed cash to meet essential obligations. Now that financial markets are functioning more normally, banks can meet their usual funding needs by tapping private markets.

As we carried out our emergency lending programs and eased monetary policy in response to the recession, our balance sheet swelled from roughly $800 billion to its current level of over $2.2 trillion. Despite the reduction in our lending programs, our balance sheet remains, for want of a better word, enormous, owing to our holdings of mortgage-backed securities and agency debt. Now I just said this is not the time to be tightening monetary policy. But eventually the economy will gain enough momentum and won’t need today’s extraordinarily low interest rates. When that time comes, we will begin to tighten policy and remove monetary stimulus. And when we start doing so, we will face some technical issues due to the size of the balance sheet, as Chairman Bernanke noted in recent Congressional testimony.4 Let me briefly outline our strategy.

In normal times, the Fed raises interest rates by reducing the size of its balance sheet, say by selling Treasury securities to the public. This draws in cash from the economy, or, as we say, reduces the supply of bank reserves, which in turn causes the price of those reserves, that is, the federal funds rate, to go up. Since the fed funds rate is the benchmark for banks’ cost of money, other short-term market interest rates tend to follow suit. Higher interest rates in turn help slow the economy and reduce inflationary pressures.

But these aren’t normal times. Our securities purchases have caused the quantity of reserves in the banking system to swell to something like $1 trillion—far above the pre-crisis level of around $50 billion. If we were to follow our standard approach of selling securities to raise interest rates, we would have to sell off many hundreds of billions of dollars of securities to reduce the supply of reserves enough to have any chance of pushing rates higher.

The problem with doing that is that such massive sales of mortgage-related and Treasury securities could be disruptive to markets and cause mortgage interest rates and other long-term rates to shoot up when we are still in the early stages of the recovery and the financial system, although improving, is still not at full health.

There is an alternative. To push up short-term interest rates without selling off our securities holdings, we can instead raise the interest rate that we pay on reserves held at the Fed. Because banks would have the opportunity to collect a higher reward for keeping funds on deposit at the Fed, they would demand commensurately higher returns on the overnight loans that they make in the federal funds market. So an increase in the interest rate paid on reserves would raise the fed funds rate and tighten financial conditions more generally. The ability to pay interest on the excess reserves that banks deposit with the Fed is an important new tool that Congress gave us just over a year ago. It will play a lead role when the time ultimately comes to tighten monetary policy. And, to make sure this works smoothly, we have developed some technical tools that can help keep the federal funds rate near our preferred target.5 Eventually, after economic conditions have improved and a policy tightening has begun, we may then start a gradual process of selling securities in order to help return the Fed’s balance sheet to its pre-crisis levels.

The bottom line is that we are already unwinding the emergency programs we set up during the financial crisis. When the day comes to start raising rates again, we have tools at the ready. But, for the time being, the economy still needs the support of extraordinarily low rates. Thank you very much.

# # #


End Notes

1. I would like to thank Rob Valletta, John Williams, and Sam Zuckerman for assistance in preparing these remarks.

2. See Yellen 2009 for an in-depth discussion of commercial real estate.

3. The TALF for loans backed by new-issue commercial mortgage-backed securities will remain open until June 30.

4. See Bernanke 2010.

5. See Bernanke 2010 for a discussion of reverse repurchase operations and the term deposit facility.

References

Bernanke, Ben S. 2010. “Federal Reserve’s Exit Strategy.” Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, February 10.

Yellen, Janet L. 2009.  “The Outlook for the Economy and Real Estate.” Presentation to the Phoenix Chapter of Lambda Alpha International, Phoenix, AZ, November 10.

Time to look at he LEIs again:

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ECRI leading indicator starting to decline rapidly


Chart courtesy of Société Générale

Barry Ritholtz

Open Thread: Where to Stimulus Spend . . .

After reading yesterday morning’s discussion “Deficit Hawks Want New (or double dip) Recession,” a friend emails the following:

“Let’s say I buy your argument that expenditures beyond annual government income during recessions and the immediate aftermath is preferred to cutting the deficit. OK, smart guy, where would you spend the money?”

I believe that policy makers need to address two issues — and do so while individuals and banks deleverage — meaning, no more leverage or individual debt:

These issues are unemployment, and the related demand destruction the recession caused.

How to fix that?

There are many suggestions, but I would go with:

1) Payroll Tax Holiday: Over the Summer months (June, July and August) — no employer or employee taxes need to be paid. That would amount to an immediate surge of spending cash (with no additional individual debt), especially amongst the poor and middle class.

2) Public Works programs — Rebuild the US infrastructure — Airport terminals, Shipping Port Security, Highways, National parks — all of these not only create jobs, but leave something worthwhile  after the fact.

Any other ideas? Use comments to discuss

For those of you who are convinced the worst is behind us, I’ll see you at the next recession . . .

Yesterday, we noted that the Fed seems to have declared the end of the recession based upon Industrial Production (Federal Reserve Declares Recession Over).

The folks over at Tableau Software took another swipe at the data, and found the answer is less clear cut then the Fed suggests.  A breakdown by sector is somewhat are far less conclusive than Industrial Production

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Sector Analysis of Industrial Production


Chart courtesy of Tableau Software

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Construction is the obvious laggard, with consumer goods 2nd to last . . .

Barry Ritholtz

Federal Reserve Declares Recession Over

Last month, we noted that the St. Louis Fed had declared in their charts that the recession was over (Dude, Where’s My Recession Bar?).

Now, it appears that with the latest G17 release on Industrial Production, the Federal Reserve is making the same assumption. They make note of this referring to several charts (below) stating:

“The shaded areas are periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The last shaded area begins with the peak as defined by the NBER and ends at the trough of a 3 month moving average of manufacturing IP.”

They are referring to the technical definition of contractions (recessions) as starting “at the peak of a business cycle and end at the trough (as defined by the NBER).

Ron Griess observed the 3 month MA of the MANUFACTURING index:

12/31/08 101.5532 104.4655
1/31/09 98.781 101.6714
2/28/09 98.7251 99.6864
3/31/09 97.2599 98.2553
4/30/09 96.9201 97.6350
5/31/09 96.026 96.7353
6/30/09 95.6559 96.2007
7/31/09 97.2692 96.3170
8/31/09 98.4819 97.1357
9/30/09 99.108 98.2864
10/31/09 99.0424 98.8774
11/30/09 99.9374 99.3626
12/31/09 99.8848 99.6215
1/31/10 100.9264 100.2495

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Hence, as the following charts reveal, the Fed is marking the Recession over as of Q2’s end, based upon industrial production bottom.

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Industrial production, capacity, and utilization

Industrial production and capacity utilization

Hat tip Bob Dieli.

One of the oddest things to come out of the entire credit crisis, recession and muddling recovery has been the sudden re-emergence of deficit hawks.

While a few honest deficit hawks are out there — the Peterson Institute is a good example of a group looking at long term structural issues, not immediate fiscal concerns — the vast majority of born again fiscal hawks are political hypocrites. They voted for all manner of budget busting programs — unfunded tax cuts, new entitlement programs (i.e., prescription drugs), an expensive war of choice (Iraq).

How is it that they only learned of the evils of deficits after they lose power? How very convenient.

The current group of anti-deficit spenders are pro-cyclical, rather than counter-cyclical. This means that during an expansion, they have no problem with expanding deficits, running big spending programs, giving generous tax cuts. During a recession is where they suddenly rediscover fiscal prudence.

This is ass backwards. During an economic expansion, with employment gaining and GDP growing is when you should be thinking about saving for the next rainy day. Counter-cyclical spending means that governments should watch the budget carefully during the good times, but spend spend more freely during the downturns. What we are hearing from this crowd is the exact opposite of what should be.

Many people believe the government’s early withdrawal of depression stimulus after the early 1930s is what caused another downturn circa 1938-39. But few people realize that Japan made the exact same mistakes in 1997 and 2001.

That is the lesson SocGen’s Albert Edwards points to in Richard Koo’s book about Japan’s balance sheet recession, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession:

The crux of his analysis is that governments have no option but to stimulate
aggressively all the while the private sector is de-leveraging. ANY attempt at fiscal cuts simply results in renewed recession and a further loss of confidence, thus making it even harder and more costly to sustain any subsequent recovery and hence the budget deficit ends up bigger than before (e.g. see chart below). This is exactly the outcome I expect.

Koo argues that the premature fiscal tightening by Japan 1997 and 2001 weakened the economy, reduced tax revenue and ultimately made the fiscal deficit even bigger:

Premature Fiscal Reforms in 1997 and 2001 Weakened Economy, Reduced Tax Revenue and Increased Deficit

Source: Nomura Securities

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There are few things more annoying the a drinker who just discovered sobriety: Hence, those who have spent the past decade getting drunk on government spending are now suddenly proselytizing a belated sobriety. These calls are occurring exactly when government largesse would do the most good.

I can’t tell what motivates these new deficit hawks — are they merely ignorant, unaware of the historical analogs? Or are they hoping for another recession as part of a debased power grab? (I don’t know).

What I am sure of is that calling for fiscal temperance RIGHT NOW is essentially calling for another recession . . .

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Sources:
The Age of Balance Sheet Recessions:  What Post-2008 U.S., Europe and China Can Learn from Japan 1990-2005
Richard C. Koo, Chief Economist
Nomura Research Institute
Tokyo, March 2009

KOO’s “Good News”
Welling, September 11, 2009
http://welling.weedenco.com/newsletterdownload.aspx?newsletterpictureid=1803 (newsletterdownload.aspx?newsletterpictureid=1803″ target=”_blank”>PDF)

Richard Koo books:
The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession
Wiley 2009

Balance Sheet Recession: Japan’s Struggle with Uncharted Economics and its Global Implications
Wiley, 2003

See also:
Caving to Congress Creeps Into Market Views on Obama
Rich Miller and Mike Dorning
Bloomberg, Feb. 16 2010
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aDAeDq0lg0Rw&

Judging a Stimulus by the Job Data Reveals Success
DAVID LEONHARDT
NYT, February 16, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/business/economy/17leonhardt.html

Barry Ritholtz

NYS Appliance Rebate/Stimulus Plan

We walked into a local appliance chain (PC Richards) today to see how well the appliance rebate was going.

These rebates are being funded with $300 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. NYS got a total of $15 million for this, and as of Monday afternoon, $13 million was spent.  $75 for anoy of a list of appliances, $500 if you took a bundle of 3 (Fridge, Washer, and Dishwasher).

It wasn’t the state rebate that got me to part with some money, but the price drops that the store was offering.

Any thoughts on this ? A worthwhile usage of tax dollars, or a waste of money ?

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See also:
New York’s Great Appliance Swapout! – February 12th – 21st Only!
http://www.nyapplianceswapout.com/programdetails.aspx

State Energy Efficient Appliance Rebate Program
http://www.nyserda.org/Economicrecovery/appliance.asp

Rebates for ENERGY STAR Appliances
http://www.energysavers.gov/financial/70020.html

Energy Efficiency Appliance Rebate Program
http://www.recovery.ny.gov/Handbook/InfrastructureEnergy8.htm

Under the approved plan, customers purchasing appliances would qualify for a rebate of $75 ($105 with documented recycling) for ENERGY STAR qualified refrigerators, $75 ($100 with documented recycling) for clothes washers and $50 ($75 with documented recycling) for freezers. Rebates are available for dishwashers when they are purchased as part of a three-appliance package (refrigerator, dishwasher, clothes washer), which may qualify for a $500 rebate ($555 with documented recycling).

Of all the various economic indicators and data points out there, is there one that has any special ability to forecast future economic activity?

Or defined more broadly, what gives the best insight into future GDP ?

That is the question Dave Livingston of Llinlithgow Associates (he blogs at BizzXceleration) was considering perusing when he noticed one metric in particular stood out: Retail Sales.

So Dave did what any good econo-geek would do — he a regression analysis between YoY changes in retail sales and other key indicators.  (See composite chart of Retail Sales, with
his Cheat Sheet table, below).

Dave acknowledges this “cuts some corners, but it might serve a useful quicklook purpose.” How? Every time there’s a new sales report you can guestimate GDP, Employment, Consumption, Investment changes.

It also operates on another level as a brutal reality check — look at what GDP growth rates are required to get Unemployment down from these levels.

Dave adds that despite all the caveats to this, the table below is a great thing to have in your wallet the next Wonk Dinner Party you attend — just whip it out and read off the economic outlook based on the latest headline!

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click for larger graph

Michael Panzner

Forecasting with a Grain of Salt

Bloomberg News is out with its latest monthly survey of economists’ forecasts and, according to those polled, the U.S. economy “will grow 3 percent this year and next, more than anticipated a month ago.”

Good news, right?

Well, maybe not. If you go back and look at how the experts have fared when forecasting the pace of growth for any given quarter, let alone for the year ahead, their tea leaf reading skills have left a lot to be desired.

Based on an analysis of Bloomberg monthly surveys published just prior to or at the beginning of each quarter over the course of the past decade, the professional prognosticators as a group have rarely been close to the mark.

Except for the last quarter of 2007, when the economists’ prediction (published in September) came within 5 percent of the reported result, the differences in percentage points between their estimates and the actual readings have been in the double digits — at a minimum.

In fact, on three occasions — the first quarter of 2000, the fourth quarter of 2002, and the third quarter of 2006 — the economists overestimated the pace of quarterly GDP by 1,133 percent, 2,400 percent, and 2,900 percent, respectively.

Aside from the fact that many of the so-called experts still haven’t quite figured out that what the economy has been going through is anything but a garden-variety downturn, their history of poor calls on the near-term outlook suggest their longer-term forecasts should be taken with a grain of salt.

~~~

http://www.financialarmageddon.com/2010/02/grain-of-salt-forecasting.html

Barry Ritholtz

Dynamite Prize in Economics

I love this:

The Dynamite Prize in Economics is to be awarded to the three economists who contributed most to enabling the Global Financial Collapse (GFC), or more figuratively, to the three economists who contributed most to blowing up the global economy.

Here’s the short list:

Fischer Black and Myron Scholes
Eugene Fama
Milton Friedman
Alan Greenspan
Assar Lindbeck
Robert Lucas
Richard Portes
Edward Prescott and Finn E. Kydland
Paul Samuelson
Larry Summers


Go vote now
!

Guest Author

We Are All Austrians Now

Paul Brodsky & Lee Quaintance run QB Partners, a private macro-oriented investment fund based in New York.

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We Are All Austrians Now

Things are different this time, as they always are. The great difference between today’s capital markets and those since World War II is that government is taking an overtly active role in them. The consequences of this ongoing political intervention are substantial – on investor expectations, on asset pricing, and on the perception of market risk.

The growing influence of the political element in today’s markets has de-valued the investment experiences of market participants over the last thirty years. As the quote on the Einstein poster that hangs on our office wall says; “imagination is more important than knowledge.” So true. Trying to divine value or even technical trends from extrapolating past market cycles is a risky proposition. Still, the great majority of investors are still trying to do this, which presents opportunities for those willing to break free.

Should we be surprised that 2009 winners were summarily discarded in January? (Precious metal stocks declined about 25% from their December highs through January 31 while base metal futures were liquidated with extreme prejudice during the last week in January.) No, the severity of that correction is not surprising given the magnitude of their previous run. In fact, we should be thankful. Valuable real assets were shaken from weak-handed investors with luke-warm conviction and from cycle-minded momentum players.

We repeat our view that “a return to normalcy” as defined by most contemporary economists, policy makers, market strategists and financial asset investors is not forthcoming. Developed economies are not experiencing the downside of a typical post-WWII cycle, even if one were willing to label the current environment “a deep recession”.

We remain in the early stages of a currency crisis that is being further exacerbated by highly inflationary monetary policies and ad hoc regulatory changes. Confused investors, policy makers and professional chatterers, struggling to recognize familiar economic or market clues, are desperately trying to retro-fit troubling events into familiar patterns.

Voters seem to get it. We think the upset election in Massachusetts, for example, was a continuing revolt of an increasingly angry and politically agnostic public that intuits a disconnection between generally accepted public policies and the lack of sustainable public benefits that would accrue from them. Until they are satisfied, voters of all persuasions will insist that our politicians be as liquid as our portfolios. It was inevitable that fundamental macroeconomic forces would begin to be manifest in the political sphere, and logical that it would show up at the ballot box first. After all, voters are more sensitive to the real economy than politicians and financial asset investors.

We see hefty doses of irony and opportunity in the recent “flight from risk”. We think the majority of investors are wired (or structured) to continue to seek nominal absolute or relative returns above all else, rather than positive real returns within a highly inflationary environment.

As a result, they are unable or unwilling to accurately distinguish between truly safe and truly risky assets in the current environment. This mischaracterization is leading them to poor asset selection, general economic mal-investment and substantial opportunities for investors seeking real returns

We think investors’ knee-jerk compulsion last month towards familiarity will prove costly. We agree that imperceptible future political and economic outcomes should force capital into safe havens. However, the current perception of “risk assets” defines the precise sectors to which we think investors should be migrating during chaotic times.

The long term capital-at-risk spectrum in a global paper money currency system during a period of substantial monetary inflation should generally be:

We view recent market re-allocations to paper-denominated cash and bonds as a trap. The current generation of financial asset investors are used to (or paid for) seeking interim financial returns above all else, and so they have a tendency to equate (baseless, diluting paper-denominated) cash with safety. While paper cash may decrease the risk of nominal loss, it greatly increases the risk of future purchasing power loss within an inflationary environment. So, while it can be emotionally trying to convert baseless paper to scarce resources with fluctuating daily prices (as we have done), we think it will be far more painful over time to invest using the wrong metrics.

Financial assets denominated in diluting paper must offset that diminution of value to provide a positive real return. Treasury just increased the US Monetary Base by 135% over the last 18 months and all signs point to further dilution.

Further, the vast majority of investors continue to erroneously link economic contraction to deflationary asset values because they do not consider the impact of money printing on nominal asset prices. Curiously, even those investors that acknowledge the substantial future impact of past and current monetary inflation seem unwilling or unable to get beyond their bias for cash or to own bonds because they expect contracting output.

While we think economic malaise and political dissention in developed economies can continue into the foreseeable future, (and have tactically positioned ourselves for such), we also think markets will rise or fall independently of such chaos. Why wouldn’t they? When viewed from a monetary perspective, asset values rise or fall in nominal price terms with money and credit growth in the system. Value is another matter entirely. We see a decline in the nominal prices of unencumbered real assets in January as a gift.

Professional Wrestling

Is professional wrestling more a sport or a business? What about politics? (Need we ask?) It is easy to liken the business of politics to professional wrestling — both need a good guy and a villain to keep their constituents interested and generate revenues. Their game is to have each of us pick a side and root for it to protect our interests, whatever they may be. Wrestling is harmless, though.

Through the process of adverse selection politicians have almost universally become businesspeople. There does not seem to be a statesman anywhere near Washington today, not even a courageous personality. The door to power seems wide open for the first legitimate public servant truly willing to take personal risk to stand up to moneyed interests, regardless of where he or she sits on the political spectrum. (Third party, anyone?)

Politicians and policy makers within one nation – even the US – are ill-equipped to handle changing global economic incentives, especially when those incentives have been greatly warped by past pricing subsidies. Natural incentives among economic participants conflict too much with political imperatives, which focus on doing no harm in the near term and on punishing those who may (legally) behave in their best interests at the cost of the greater good.

While we must admit that fiscal and monetary policy makers responsible for substantial government intervention over the last two years helped “save the system”, you should not be surprised that we feel the system, as it is, should not have been saved.

Congress hasn’t seemed to figure out yet that whipping boys Alan Greenspan, Hank Paulson, Tim Geithner and Ben Bernanke did their jobs exceedingly well. (Or maybe they do know that?) Treasury, the Fed, and the US banking system made and distributed enough dollars and dollar-denominated credit to make Wall Street the center of the global economy, which (temporarily) increased nominal US consumption and GDP, US employment, US government tax receipts and US political campaign contributions.

The 800 pound gorilla now sitting in the Senate chamber is the indisputable truth that past and present policy makers are not the problem — the system is. (And the gorilla’s 1200 pound sister is the indisputable truth that Congress was supposed to oversee the Fed and the GSEs.) Lost in the commotion is that these very same politicians were responsible for synthesizing that temporary growth and are now literally to blame for today’s problems. The focus of politicians’ time now is to redirect blame and argue where the new money and credit should go, not whether it should have been created in the first place.

This is the biggest and best clue about the future. Regardless of rhetoric to the contrary, politicians and policy makers will encourage as much money and credit creation as is necessary to keep their seats. Even “fiscally conservative” Republicans have no stomach for economic contraction that would temporarily raise unemployment and reduce tax revenues. Like Democrats, Republicans most see their responsibility as public servants to administer sound fiscal policies by inserting their will on the private economy, rather than letting economies and markets sort matters out on their own.

Democrats have a conceptual edge in this fight because their historical platform is more accepting of a) economic intervention and b) monetary inflation. Since donors to “fiscally conservative Republicans” have already accepted these first two planks, arguing against distributing the new money and credit to those suffering would place any politician, regardless of flavor, in an untenable position (as both Republicans and Democratic debtors/voters are suffering).

If politicians are concerned only with the short-term, and policy makers are supposed to care about the long term, then what happens when policy makers become politicians? Not only do policy advocates on both sides of the political aisle fear contractionary forces and unemployment trends, they have accepted that the solution to reverse these trends can only be to put increasing credit in the hands of consumers.

Last month Majority Leader Reid said that his support for Bernanke was conditional. To merit confirmation, he said Bernanke “must redouble his efforts to ensure middle class families can access credit”. You just can’t make this stuff up. Our public servants want to further saddle us with even more debt so we can consume mostly foreign-made goods. (Ignorance is not a crime. Nor, it seems, is usury grounds for censure.)

Beyond the political posturing can there be any doubt that a reconfirmed Ben Bernanke will drop dollars on debtors if need be? When push comes to shove, politicians will inflate away the burden of private sector debt repayment (by shifting the burden to the public sector), thereby temporarily stimulating the economy. Any policy maker that gets in the way or doesn’t act fast enough will be replaced.

We anticipate unsettled political and economic environments to continue as long as the political dimension tries to kick the can further down the road. The longer this persists, the more frayed societies will become. Ultimately, meaningful change — in asset pricing, market incentives, the current global monetary regime and even the global economic architecture – will be re-defined, naturally or by fiat. Today’s crop of meek bought-and-paid-for politicians and policy makers will look foolish to all.

C’mon Barack!

Yes, Mr. Nixon, we have all been Keynesians for the past 39 years. Go ahead, Mr. Obama – make us Austrians now.

Debt promotion and distribution is not a fundamentally sustainable business model or a blueprint for a sustainable economy because it creates no capital and it shifts wealth from potential capital producers in the private sector (at all income levels) to financial intermediaries, to government, and to foreign capital producers. Legislators and policy makers still do not seem to grasp this, or they are unwilling to behave as though they do.

If Barack Obama were to adopt a more Austrian approach to economics he could make the US economy globally competitive again, (and sustainable to boot), and would encourage the global economy to function harmoniously.

The Austrian School views economies through the prism of natural economic incentives. It relies on the tendency of people to work for capital and then save it for the goods and services they want to consume. Money itself becomes a store of value.

Government policies and intervention would be acceptable, when need be, but only upon approval of the people. The government’s role would be relegated to protector of laws and property rights. It would also be an honest broker when natural imbalances from capitalism occur, as they always do. However, government would not be preeminent and, as it is today, omnipotent.

Would a society that accommodates a freer economic model be the death knell for today’s working class? No, in fact due to the unfathomable and growing debt assumed by developed societies over the last thirty years, the prospects for today’s working class look far bleaker than they would if the working class could earn and save at a global wage that reflected a global  equilibrium.

Liberals should be screaming for such a system because it swings power back to the worker and away from the more successful among us that have access to credit. Conservatives should endorse it too because it encourages a more objective society.

Austrian economics was discredited under the twentieth century dominance of Keynesianism, which allows governments to actively insert itself into otherwise naturally functioning private economies.

Politicians and policy makers that control government have conflicting incentives, which introduces subjectivity into more organic economic incentives. Over time, this politically-synthesized subjectivity tends to grow in relation to commercial incentives. The 1971 abandonment of the Bretton Woods system of monetary discipline (abolishing the gold exchange standard), which then allowed governments and banking systems to create as much money and credit (claims on money) as they wished, was a consequence of the subjectivity that active government brings to economies.

Once this subjectivity was accepted and became internalized by most all economic participants, Keynesian societies had to rely on the self-policing of governments (i.e. the human politicians that comprise them) and banking systems.

We can see how that turned out. Who wouldn’t want the power to make money from thin air and spend it as they see fit? The current economic system in the developed world is now corrupted beyond repair, especially given the more natural commercial and economic incentives being practiced and followed in emerging economies. Those of us in the West and in Japan can’t delude ourselves any longer.

Keynesianism replaced true capital with infinite money and credit, which in turn produced general economic mal-investment. It is a system that should be and will be discredited, as the Austrian School was last century.

Austrian economics clearly defines the distinction between money and credit. Further, it argues quite persuasively that growth in unreserved credit ultimately inflates assets, goods, input, and wage bubbles. At the core then of a Keynesian business cycle lies an unreserved credit cycle. Unreserved credit extension creates the illusion of wealth-creating opportunities that further invites mal-investment.

The ultimate reconciliation of credit inflations must be credit deflation that must then be offset by further monetary inflation. (This explains today’s environment.) Under a hard money system, credit deflations would prevail. Under a notional paper money system, monetary inflation prevails. Under either scenario, however, debt deflates in real terms.

Austrian School advocates are frequently identified as proponents of a monetary gold standard. This is really just a subset of their monetary views, which sees the free and unchecked extension of unreserved credit as the ultimate travesty. In today’s society, the monopoly power granted exclusively to banking systems in the developed world is terribly misused during periods of credit expansion. History clearly bears this out. In the end, it is the modern saver who bears the burden during the ensuing credit deflation.

We should change the game and transfer power back towards the private sector. Politicians could then argue about what they feel would be the optimal uses of their tax receipts, such as defense or national health care. Or, we can continue on as we have.

Burning Matches

All global currency values now rely solely upon confidence in global public policy. The current global monetary regime has become a confidence game that people in positions of power are foisting upon the disparate masses. Too harsh, you say? We don’t think so. The current powers-that-be are not operating in the best interests of people across all income levels and they should be called out on it.

The current system ensures no capital will be produced among the most indebted economies, which in turn implies there will be a transfer of wealth to less indebted economies.

All global economies no longer have currencies that act as stores of value, which means that paper currency holders cannot save. One cannot gain future purchasing power by placing earnings in a savings account. Alternatively, one cannot afford to pull his or her wealth or liquidity out of market-based investments without suffering a decline in purchasing power.  Worse still, deeply indebted developed societies need even more money to repay outstanding claims (as well as to pay taxes). With risk-free interest rates way below the rate of monetary dilution, no matter where we put our savings we are all holding burning matches.

Have you asked yourself why interest rates are so low when the demand for money is so high? Could it be because governments and banks need the money and have the power to borrow it (from the people) and manage its pricing?

The people have no choice in the matter. Most Americans, for example, have not accumulated unencumbered purchasing power. Or, if they once had it, they have subsequently had to re-allocate it from savings to equity – in homes and corporate shares. (This re-allocation was entirely rational given that saving it over the last twenty years would have provided negative real rates of return when compared to the loss of purchasing power brought about by monetary and credit inflation.)

The net effect is that the great majority of Americans would have negative net-worths, were we to subtract the value of our liabilities from the current liquidation value of our assets. And given US demographics, it seems obvious that the natural pace of diminishment of our liabilities (through amortization) will not be fast enough to produce positive net-worths were we all to stagger our equity liquidations over the next 10 years.

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We know it is unrealistic to expect global leaders to stand idly by while economies naturally shrink to sizes capable of sustaining longer-term output and employment levels, even if such economic pain would bring global economies out of its contractionary cycle quicker. Given the already very high levels of public and private debt as percentages of annual output and assets, (about 600% and 200% respectively), it stands to reason that without policy intervention, output and assets would shrink/devalue in nominal terms. Public discontent would surely rise, in turn compelling further political intervention.

We shouldn’t expect Paul Volcker to save the day. He was able to raise interest rates to drain the system three decades ago because developed countries were not nearly as levered then. The US budget deficit was about 2.5% of GDP in 1980 as opposed to about 13% today. More importantly, the private sector was nowhere near as indebted and in fact had net savings. Today’s global economy presents a very different set of circumstances.

The insidious cycle of monetary inflation is upon us and there is no way out. The best argument we know for being absolutely sure that monetary policy makers will not withdraw Monetary Base or credit from the system is because they have not done it yet. In their eyes, there will always be an economic imperative to do no harm in the short term. Applied to today’s highly leveraged developed economies, monetary and credit contraction equals output contraction.

The alternative — further credit promotion without end — is unconscionable because it makes the problem worse. Yet that is the plan. Politicians across the spectrum have tacitly agreed that the most rational and expedient way out is to destroy currencies slowly so that debtors do not suffer sudden bankruptcy brought about by overwhelming credit deflation.

If policy makers and politicians want to keep control over their economies (a presumption we are willing to make), then they don’t have a choice but to destroy their currencies in some way, shape or form.

And so we think policy makers are embracing currency debasement with gusto. They are transferring paper-denominated credit from private to public balance sheets and they are doing so on a global basis. We are experiencing global currency devaluations in absolute terms (vis-à-vis natural and sustainable resources); yet these devaluations are being masked because relative currency valuations are being held comparatively constant through policy intervention. This is not the ranting of conspiracy theorists because we can see FX capital flows and the re-pricing of global resources.

***

There is a solution. Mr. Obama, de-value the dollar formally and simultaneously peg it to gold. In doing so, you and other policy makers in the developed world would be able to arrange terms and manage the outcome of a new monetary regime and a sustainable global economy.

As we wrote last July:

Potential Endgame: A Managed USD Devaluation

As we first hypothesized last fall (2008), we think there is a growing likelihood that policy makers will see the handwriting on the wall for the US dollar and act to preempt the utter economic chaos they will have wrought from copious money printing. The pragmatic solution would be to formally devalue, and peg, the US dollar to gold.

It would work like this: The Fed would monetize gold at a substantial premium to its current nominal price. As we quantified through the SGP (the Shadow Gold Price, which uses the Bretton Woods monetary discipline to value paper money to gold), the gold price peg would have to approximate $6000/oz to remediate all past monetary inflation. (Since this discussion in July 2009, that price has risen to about $8,000/oz.) We doubt this would occur. It would be more likely that the Fed would announce a public tender for privately held gold at, say, $3000/oz. Any gold tendered would be funded with the creation of new Federal Reserve Notes.

While this would be massively inflationary it would also be discrete in its application. In other words, once the Fed acquired enough gold from the free market at $3,000/oz, a gold price peg for the dollar could be established and maintained. The solvency of the banking system would be reestablished by such measures, as most assets would appreciate in nominal dollar terms to the point that loan books, etc. would once again be fully-secured.

The positive consequences of formally devaluing and pegging the dollar to gold would be obvious: the burden of repaying public and private sector debt would be inflated away versus the higher nominal revenues, wages and public tax receipts, and by pegging it to gold the US dollar would again gain credibility in the world – and probably increase its reserve status.

The negative consequences would be that dollar holders and creditors (bond investors and banks holding debt as their assets) would find the value of their cash/assets diminish substantially in real terms. Pension funds, bond funds and banks would be hurt.

So what? It is happening anyway, only more slowly. Remember, there are only two ways the financial system can de-lever in today’s environment:

  1. Asset/collateral values contract or,
  1. Monetary reserves increase

In the first instance, the highly levered banking system is most likely to be wiped out. In the second, the currency is most likely to be ultimately wiped out.

Dollars can gain absolute purchasing power value only if less of them exist tomorrow than today. If fewer dollars were to exist tomorrow, then dollar denominated debt currently outstanding could not be repaid (in fact many more dollars must be printed to pay off future claims on already existing debt). Therefore, dollars cannot gain value in real terms unless no more are printed AND unless dollar-denominated debt is defaulted upon.

That will never happen. Voters will never proactively sacrifice their balance sheets or lifestyles in the short term so they will never let their politicians drain reserves.

Beyond the loud proclamations, there will be no relief forthcoming from Washington given the current regime. Maybe policy makers are just trying to suspend reality as long as they can, hoping something from another dimension provides enough cover to press the economic reset button (as World War II did in the 1930s)? We just don’t know.

To prevent a contracting economy and contracting wealth then, policy makers will continue to contrive new dollars so that they can, in effect, refinance current claims. This process creates even more debt. Thus, the public will eventually figure out that their dollars are debt that cannot be repaid. Dollar holders will stop working.

Mr. Obama, this is your moment. This is your time. This is your place. You are The Man and this would be change we could all believe in.

Best,

Lee & Paul

Paul Brodsky     Lee Quaintance

pbrodsky@qbamco.com lquaint@qbamco.com

Their mediocre track record not withstanding, it seems you just cannot stop the economic crowd from making forecasts.

The WSJ has the latest round up of gibberish:

“About a quarter of the 8.4 million jobs eliminated since the recession began won’t be coming back and will ultimately need to be replaced by other types of work in growing industries, according to economists in the latest Wall Street Journal forecasting survey.

While the job market is constantly shifting as some sectors fade and others expand, this recession threw that process into overdrive. Thousands of workers lost jobs as companies automated more tasks or moved whole assembly lines to places like China. As growth returns, so will job creation—just with a different emphasis in the mix of jobs being created.

Economists in the survey are predicting a slow upswing for the economy as a whole. Respondents on average expect economic growth to settle at about 3% in 2010, off sharply from the powerful 5.7% seasonally adjusted annual growth rate in the fourth quarter.”

click for interactive graphic

>

Source:
Many Jobs Gone Forever, Economists Say
PHIL IZZO
WSJ, FEBRUARY 12, 2010
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703382904575059424289353714.html

Barry Ritholtz

Insolvent European vs American States

While all the investing world seems to be utterly fixated on the outcome of Greece’s solvency woes, perhaps we need to step back and put this into perspective.

Portugal, Ireland, Italy Greece and Spain are in varied degrees of difficulty; but how significant are the PIIGS’ debts to the world’s economy? (If they require a workout, perhaps they can what we do. Give them lower rates and an extended term and/or a cramdown to their lenders).

In contrast, consider the distressed United States: How do our own economic “pigs” measure up? In terms of economic importance relative to the world, aren’t the bigger US States that are in deep distress more important (GDP sizewise)?

Consider the size of the budget issues and debt load in dollar and percentage terms for just these six states relative to their European cousins:

You Can’t Put Lipstick on These PIGS:

California
Budget gap (as a % of the total budget): 22%
Gap: $22.2 billion

New York
Budget gap (as a % of the total budget): 9.8%
Gap: $5.5 billion

Florida
Budget gap (as a % of the total budget): 19.9%
Gap: $5.1 billion

New Jersey
Budget gap (as a % of the total budget): 7.7%
Gap: $2.5 billion

Arizona
Budget gap (as a % of the total budget): 19.9%
Gap: $2 billion

Nevada
Budget gap (as a % of the total budget): 16%
Gap: $1.2 billion

All data for fiscal year 2008
Source Businessweek

All by itself, the insolvent nation-state of California is the 8th largest economy in the world. Its the size of France. According to the CIA Factbook, Greece is number 34. That is a lot of hyperventilating about a relatively small impact to global GDP. Italy is 11, Spain is 13, Portugal is 50, and Ireland is 56.

Additionally, in the US, we have 43 of the 50 states in some form of financial distress.

Perhaps the solution to California’s woes is for Arnold (who is from Austria) to have California join the EU. Then, they might qualify for a bailout from Germany . . .
>

click for larger graphic

courtesy of the WSJ

>
Previously:
Countries’ GDP vs US States (January 2007)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2007/01/countries-gdp-as-us-states/

US food stamps set ever-higher record-32.8 million

A record 38.2 million Americans were enrolled in the food stamp program at latest count, up 246,000 from the previous month and the latest in record-high monthly tallies that began in December 2008. Food stamps are the primary federal anti-hunger program, helping poor people buy groceries. The Agriculture Department updated enrollment data on Friday with a preliminary figure for November. USDA estimates up to $58 billion will be spent on food stamps this fiscal year, which ends Sept 30, with average enrollment of 40.5 million people. Food stamps were renamed the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program in 2008. Participation has surged since the financial-market turmoil of late 2008 and has set records each month since December 2008, when it reached 31.78 million. Enrollment is highest during times of economic distress.

Comment

The two charts below show the same thing.  The first is monthly going back about 5 years and the second is yearly back to the start of the program in 1969.

<Click on chart for larger image>

<Click on chart for larger image>

US food stamps set ever-higher record-32.8 million

A record 38.2 million Americans were enrolled in the food stamp program at latest count, up 246,000 from the previous month and the latest in record-high monthly tallies that began in December 2008. Food stamps are the primary federal anti-hunger program, helping poor people buy groceries. The Agriculture Department updated enrollment data on Friday with a preliminary figure for November. USDA estimates up to $58 billion will be spent on food stamps this fiscal year, which ends Sept 30, with average enrollment of 40.5 million people. Food stamps were renamed the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program in 2008. Participation has surged since the financial-market turmoil of late 2008 and has set records each month since December 2008, when it reached 31.78 million. Enrollment is highest during times of economic distress.

Comment

The two charts below show the same thing.  The first is monthly going back about 5 years and the second is yearly back to the start of the program in 1969.

<Click on chart for larger image>

<Click on chart for larger image>

Barry Ritholtz

PIIGS Got You Down? Try These!

Last week, FT Alphaville noted that PIIGS was becoming an “unkosher” acronym at Barclays Capital.

The oft amusing Jim Bianco suggests that instead of using the phrases PIIGS, we give these acronyms a try:

* DEBT – Dubai EU Brazil Turkey
* SICK – Spain Iceland Columbia Kazakhstan
* DUMP – Dubai Ukraine Mexico Portugal
* PUKE – Portugal UK EU
* STUPID – Spain Turkey UK Portugal Italy Dubai

James Bianco

The Superbowl As An Economic Indicator

The Superbowl As An Economic Indicator

America’s unofficial holiday is this weekend, the Superbowl.  What can this event tell us about the economy?

The first chart below shows the cost of a 30-second commercial (domestic audience only).  The blue bars show the actual cost, while the black like shows the cost on an inflation-adjusted basis.  In red are the 2010 estimates based on various news reports.

A 30-second commercial this Sunday should cost around $2.6 million, down from $3 million last year.  This 13% decline is only the third decline ever and the largest year-to-year decline on record.  At $2.6 million, the cost of a commercial is the same as it was in 2000.  Interestingly, the Dow Jones Industrial Average is also near its 2000 levels, as is total employment in the United States.  America’s Lost Decade takes many forms.

The only other Superbowls that saw lower advertising rates were in 2001 (-2.38%) and 2002 (-7.38%).  These declines were in the aftermath of the 2000 “dotcom” bubble which saw advertising rates increase by over 50% just two years earlier as floods of internet companies bought commerical spots.  Who could forget the pets.com sock puppet that year?  The company was in bankruptcy for the 2001 Superbowl.

Charts after the jump . . .

<Click on chart for larger image>

While the advertising rates shown above are interesting in their own right, the size of the audience must also be considered.  The next chart shows the number of viewers as blue bars (in millions), the number of households as the black line and the 2010 estimate in red.  For 2010, the Superbowl’s domestic audience is expected to down-tick slightly from last year to 98 million viewers spread among 48.15 million households.

<Click on chart for larger image>

Combining the two series together, we get the next two charts.  Both show exactly the same thing, differing only by time frame as the second chart below only shows the last 10 years.

These charts divide the size of the domestic TV audience by the cost of a 30-second commercial.  The blue bars show the number of views per nominal dollar and the black line shows the number of viewers per inflation-adjusted dollar.  The red shows the 2010 estimate.

<Click on chart for larger image>

<Click on chart for larger image>

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Superbowl advertising was a real deal.  Each dollar was paying for hundreds of prospective viewers.  By the late 1980s each dollar of adverting was still paying for about 100 prospective viewers.  As the second chart shows, in the last 10 years each dollar of advertising was paying for less than 50 viewers, bottoming at 33 viewers per advertising dollar for last year’s (2009) Superbowl.

These charts suggest that Superbowl advertising is no longer a growth industry, at least domestically.  The audience size seems to have peaked near 100 million viewers (about one-third of the country, nearly one-half if only adults are considered).  Therefore, we believe Superbowl advertising now moves up and down with the economy, unlike the 1970s when Superbowl advertising was a growth industry and increased dramatically each year even if the economy was struggling like 1974/1975 and 1979 to 1981.

As the last chart above shows, advertisers are estimated to be getting the best deal in years.  They are expecting 38 viewers per advertising dollar at this year’s Superbowl.   Such a deal means advertisers are not as willing to bid for ad time this year relative to previous years.  We believe this shows that advertisers are still concerned about the economy and do not want to pay to advertise to consumers that cannot buy, or have elected to bypass, their products.  With a 10% unemployment rate  nearly 10 million unemployed are going to be watch the Superbowl.

This year’s Superbowl advertising, consistent with other measures of the economy, shows an economy still struggling to recover from the financial crisis.

Barry Ritholtz

Dissecting the NonFarm Payroll Data

Today’s NFP data was surprising — both to the upside and the downside. 20,000 jobs were lost in January, below the consensus. But everywhere else, there were surprising improvements.

Is it possible that those people expecting a mediocre recovery and weak employment picture — including me — might be pleasantly surprised? A closer look suggests that many people may be underestimating the recovery.

Consider the cyclical progress that occurs as a recovery takes hold: Revenues improve, followed eventually by greater Profits. Companies have been doing capital expenditure spending first . . . and only hiring when they have to. Greater hiring leads to greater spending.

So far, we have seen the revenue improvements, and the beginnings of better profits. Various tech firms (Cisco in particular) are seeing improving CapEx orders. Temp Help has improved, and some firms are actually hiring.

Ask yourself what outcome would surprise the most people — the economy sliding in a double dip recession – or a stronger than anticipated recovery?

Here are some other data points beneath the headlines:

Positives

1. BLS reported that in January, persons unemployed “due to job loss” decreased by 378,000 to 9.3 million. That is a decent number.  And, “nearly all of this decline” came from the “permanent job losers.” (See table A-11.)

2. The Underemployed – Persons who want full time jobs but working part time instead — fell from 9.2 to 8.3 million in January. That is an enormous improvement. (See table A-8.)

3. Temporary help services added 52,000 jobs — that is a leading indicator of future hiring. (See table B-1.) Since the temp help lows in September 2009, temporary help services employment has risen by 247,000.

4. The Household survey showed growth of 541,000 workers. In a recovery, this tends to pick up new employees (especially at smaller firms) faster than other measures. The Household Survey isn’t “large firm ” biased the way the Establishment Survey is.

5. After experiencing steep job losses earlier in the recession, job losses in manufacturing has moderated considerably.

6. Retail trade employment rose by 42,000 in January, after showing little
change in the prior 2 months.

Negatives

1. 2009 benchmark revision reveal employment in 2009 was far worse than originally believed — revised data showed nearly 600,000 more jobs lost than previously reported.

2. The number of long-term unemployed — jobless for 27 weeks or longer — is still rising. Since the December 2007 start of the recession, long-term unemployed has risen by 5.0 million. (See table A-12.)

3. NiLFS — Not in Labor Force — rose 409,000 to ~2.5 million persons. They are also called “marginally attached to the labor force” — not in the labor force, want and available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months.  (See table A-16.)

4. The average workweek for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls are still near record lows — 33.9 hours in January.5.  1.1 million discouraged workers in January is a huge increase of 734,000 from a year earlier. (Discouraged workers are not currently looking for work because they believe no jobs are available for them)

6. Revisions continue to be negative. December 2009 was revised downwards to 150k loss from 85k.

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